

PARAMATTHADĪPANĪ

(AN EXPOSITION OF THE TRUE MEANING)

A Sub-Commentary on the
ABHIDHAMMATTHASANGAHA

by

ASHIN NANDAMĀLĀBHIVAMSA

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ABBREVIATION

The references given here are all according to the Burmese versions mostly edited in the Sixth Synod and printed in Burmese letter .

A.N.	Aṅguttara Nikāya
A.N.A.	Aṅguttara Nikāya Aṭṭhakathā
C.P.	Compendium of Philosophy
D.N.	Dīgha Nikāya
D.N.A.	Dīgha Nikāya Aṭṭhakathā
M.N.	Majjhima Nikāya
M.N.A.	Majjhima Nikāya Aṭṭhakathā
S.M.P.	Samanta pāsādikā , the Commentary on Vinaya
S.M.V.	Sammoha vinodanī , the Commentary on Vibhaṅga
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V.	Verse

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INTRODUCTION

1. Why is it called Abhidhamma ?

Abhidhamma is unique in Buddhism. It is one of Tipiṭaka Pāḷi texts which explains dhammas in detail and in analytical way. Regarding the explanation of dhammas it details more than Suttanta. It is why the text is called "Abhidhamma".

2. Who is the author ?

The Buddha is the author of Abhidhamma. There was an argument about the author. It was said that Abhidhamma is not the teaching of the Buddha. Indeed, it is only later work.

Thera Buddhaghosa, a new commentator, advocates that Abhidhamma is the Buddha's teaching. It is described in his commentary on Dhamma saṅgani, Aṭṭhasālinī by name:

"His heart by that world-pitying love inspired,
When, after the Twin Miracle, he dwelt.
At the high mansion of the Thirty-three,
Throned - like the sun on Mount Yugandhara-
On Paṇḍukambala, his rocky seat,
Under the tree called Paricchattaka,
He by that noble insight gave discourse,
On the Abhidhamma to the spirit who came,
Led by his mother, from the myriad worlds,
And compassed him about on every side. "

(The Expositor, 2)

3. Who brought Abhidhamma to the human world ?

In Theravāda Buddhist circle it is widely accepted that Abhidhamma was taught to the gods. In the seventh year after enlightenment, the Buddha went to the world of gods and taught Abhidhamma for three months.

During those days the Buddha gradually came down to this world for the purpose of having meal every morning as human time. Uttarakuru, the north continent, was a place where the Buddha went for alms food. After lunch the Buddha took rest under a big tree on the bank of the lake, Anotatta.

Ven. Sāriputta, a chief disciple, approached and served the Buddha with water. On the meeting of Ven. Sāriputta the Buddha briefed him what He talked in the deity world. Ven. Sāriputta has learnt and brought the Abhidhamma to this human world. Then he taught his Bhikkhu pupils the doctrine. In this way Abhidhamma was introduced into our world. However, it should be noted that the Abhidhamma taught to the gods is in great detail and the Abhidhamma retold by Ven. Sāriputta is in concise form.

4. Seven Abhidhamma Texts

The Abhidhamma comprises seven texts, viz.,

- (1) Dhamma saṅganī, the Explanation of Dhammas,
- (2) Vibhaṅga, the Book of Analyse,
- (3) Dhātukathā, the Speech on Element,
- (4) Puggalapaññatti, the Designation of Individual,
- (5) Kathāvatthu, the Point of Controversy,
- (6) Yamaka, the Book of Pairs, and
- (7) Paṭṭhāna, the Book of Condition.

This is the list which is widely accepted in the Theravāda Buddhist circle. There was an argument about the treatise, Kathāvatthu. Instead of Kathāvatthu the Abhidhamma text was enumerated with "Dhamma hadaya vibhaṅga" by some, with "Mahā dhātu kathā" by others.

Ven. Buddhaghosa advocated the list of Abhidhamma text only with "Kathāvatthu". However, kathāvatthu is a work of Thera Moggaliputta Tissa who made his appearance 263 years after the Buddha's parinibbāna. Although it was so, originally the Buddha himself gave "the outline of kathāvatthu". Then it was detailed by Ven. Moggaliputta Tissa referring to one thousand suttas - five hundred of own and five hundred of others. Therefore, as justified by Ven. Buddhaghosa, kathāvatthu is a teaching of the Buddha in one mode.

5. Commentaries on Abhidhamma.

There are five topics that are expounded in the Abhidhamma Texts, wit, Citta (consciousness), Cetasika (mental concomitants), Rūpa (matter), Nibbāna (a state of freedom from attachment) and Paññatti (concept). Of them the Paññatti alone is unreal while the other are real in ultimate sense. They are all denoted by using the term, dhamma, which is in the sense of "bearing its own nature".

The dhammas which are expounded in the Texts are profound. It is hard to understand them without complete explanation. There were some commentaries to explain the Abhidhamma. It was not known how many commentaries are compiled. Mahā aṭṭhakathā could be the first commentary. It might be India origin and was brought to Lanka island by Ven. Mahinda who introduced Buddhism into Sri Lanka. Mahā aṭṭhakathā was written in Sinhalese in order to avoid mixing the original meaning with the other sects' views.

Then Ven. Buddhaghosa tried to write new commentaries on Abhidhamma. It condensed Mahā aṭṭhakā and is translated into Pāli. Ven. Buddhaghosa's commentaries are classified into three :-

- (1) Aṭṭhasālinī, the commentary on Dhammasaṅgani,
- (2) Sammoharinodanī, the commentary on Vibhaṅga and
- (3) Pañca-pakarāṇa aṭṭhakathā, the commentary on the other five texts.

When the new commentaries have appeared the old gradually disappeared. The new commentary became popular and it needs to explain it. Ven. Ānanda wrote a sub-commentary on the new commentary. The Sub-commentary is known Mūlaṭīkā. Ven. Ānanda's Abhidhammic views are so high and comments are so elucidatory. He criticized some of views that is expounded by Ven. Buddhaghosa.

Then Anuṭṭīkā appeared to explain Mūlaṭīkā. It is a work of Ven. Dhammapāla who was also a commentator of Visuddhimagga Mahā Ṭīkā. He was an advocate the opinion of Ven. Buddhaghosa, which was rejected by Ven. Ānanda.

6. Abhidhamma flourished in Sri Lanka

It is believed that Abhidhamma was introduced into Sri Lanka when Ven. Mahinda, a leader of Asoka mission, arrived in the island. During the earlier period the study of Abhidhamma could be through the Pāli text and its commentary, Mahā aṭṭhakathā.

Before or at the time of Ven. Buddhaghosa, there appeared celebrated Abhidhammic scholars in Sri Lanka. Their names and views are found here and there in the commentaries of Ven. Buddhaghosa.

- They are (1) Tipiṭaka Cūḷānāga,
(2) Moravāpivāsī Mahādatta,

- (3) Tipiṭaka Mahādhammarakkhita,
- (4) Tipiṭaka Cūḷābhaya, and
- (5) Ābhidhammika Godatta.

They are believed to be senior to Ven. Buddhaghosa, the new commentator. Their Abhidhammic views are referred in his books and considered notability.

Actually Abhidhamma is so profound that it is hard to understand. Students need easy access to that subject. Therefore, the Abhidhammic scholars in Sri Lanka tried to write : concise books on Abhidhamma.

Ven. Buddhadatta, a contemporary of Ven. Buddhaghosa, wrote the two books, Abhidhammāvātāra (Approaching to Abhidhamma) and Rūpārūpa-vibhāga (the Analyse of Mind and Matter).

In about ninth century A.D. There appeared an Abhidhammic scholar in Sri Lanka. He is Ven. Anuruddha who came from southern India to Sri Lanka. He wrote three books on Abhidhamma:-

- (1) Abhidhammattha Saṅgaha, Compendium of Abhidhamma
- (2) Paramattha vinicchaya, the Clarification of Reality, and
- (3) Nāmarūpa-pariccheda, the Analyse of Mind and Matter.

Through these books the study of Abhidhamma flourished and is kept alive.

7. Abhidhamma flourished in Myanmar.

Perhaps Buddhism could be introduced into Myanmar earlier than that Asoka mission arrived in Suvāṇṇa bhūmi, a part of Myanmar. When Buddhism was introduced, the Tipiṭaka Pāli Texts could be brought.

During the reign of King Manuhā, 11th century A.D., there were Buddhist monks who were well versed in Tipiṭaka in Suvāṇṇa bhūmi. When King Anawratha has made the whole Myanmar one kingdom Buddhism became developed more. The king brought Tipiṭaka books from Suvāṇṇabhūmi as well as from Sri Lanka and established library to keep them.

The study of Abhidhamma began becoming popular in Myanmar. At the time of King Navapati Seethu, 1173 A.D., Ven. Saddhammajotipāla, well known as Sappada (chappada), was back from Sri Lanka after having long-

term study and wrote the two books on Abhidhamma, Saṅkhepa vaṇṇanā (Concise Explanation) and Nāma cāradīpaka (the Exposition of mind appearance).

During the reign of King Kyaswa, 1234 A.D. the people of Bagan were interested in Abhidhamma. The King and the other royal families earnestly studied Abhidhamma. The king wrote a small book, Paramattha vindu (A spot of Reality). Some of women in Bagan, it was said, even who had baby, learnt a section of Paṭṭhāna by heart. It was recorded that there was a minister who was well versed in Tipiṭaka.

When the age of Pinya (1312 A.D.) came into being the study of Abhidhamma continuously increased. At the time of King Thiha thura (1350-1359) Ven. Nāṇakitti wrote the two books on Abhidhamma, wit. Aṭṭhasālinī-yojana and Sammohavinodani yojana. In "yojana" book it gives Pāli to Pāli explanation.

When the age of Inwa (726) had dawned, the study of Abhidhamma flourished in Myanmar. There found the list of Abhidhamma texts to be studied in Inwa. They run as follows:

- (1) The Seven Abhidhamma Pāli texts.
- (2) Commentaries on them.
- (3) Mūlaṭikā
- (4) Anuṭikā
- (5) Abhidhammattha Saṅgaha
- (6) Ṭikā on it | old |
- (7) Ṭikā on it | new |
- (8) Nāmarūpa-pariccheda Ṭikā | new |
- (9) Paramattha-vinicchaya Ṭikā | new |
- (10) Mohavicchedani

During the reign of King Thalun (1629-1648) the Patamapyān examination began to be held. In this examination Abhidhamma was an important syllabus. Therefore, the study of Abhidhamma was prevalent among Buddhist monks. A large number of books on Abhidhamma either in Pāli or in Burmese appeared in this period.

When Konbaung period (1753-1885) came into being the study of Abhidhamma was keeping its popularity. In monastic examinations Abhidhamma was compulsory subject. At present even lay people are

interested in Abhidhamma. Abhidhamma examinations are yearly held for lay people.

In Myanmar there are a large number of Abhidhamma texts that are edited and printed. The Abhidhamma treatises which are India original are seven. The commentaries and sub-commentaries which were written in Sri Lanka were twenty-six.

Referring to those Pāḷi and Commentaries Abhidhammic scholars in Myanmar wrote numerous books dealt with Abhidhamma. Those which are written in Pāḷi are 43, in Pāḷi and Burmese both are 112; which give general information of Abhidhamma are 333, according to the list of "Abhidhamma History" in Burmese (printed in 1965). In Myanmar the study of Abhidhamma is still kept alive.

8. The role of Abhidhammattha saṅgaha

In Myanmar Abhidhammattha saṅgaha is widely known as "Thingyo" which is derived from the Pāḷi word "saṅgaha", or "thingaha" as Burmese people pronounce.

In Monastic school in Myanmar the two books, "Thada" and "Thingyo" are very important subjects. They are compulsory in Pāḷi examinations and young novices are requested to learn them by heart. Here "thada" which is derived from "sadda" is denoted "kaccāyana", the Pāḷi Grammar.

Thingyo or Abhidhamma saṅgaha serves as a primer of Abhidhamma in Myanmar. Its utility ranks very high, and its excessively condensed points stimulates students who wish to learn Abhidhamma to greater efforts.

It is the way of Myanmar in which Burmese Abhidhamma students practise: firstly they learn "Thingyo" by heart, then the meaning through the "Nissaya" books in which word for word translation is given. After that students need to study the text by going into detail through commentaries, especially Vibhāvanī Ṭīkā. This is the way of learning the text in ordinary level. But in Advanced level students need to proceed the study of Abhidhamma through the original Pāḷi texts and their commentaries. In this way Burmese Buddhist monks are well versed in Abhidhamma. So Abhidhammattha saṅgaha plays a key role in study of Abhidhamma.

To learn Abhidhammattha saṅgaha there needs commentaries in which

general information are given. There are some of Commentaries on Abhidhammattha saṅgaha:

- 1) Abhidhammattha saṅgaha Ṭīkā [old], by Nava vimalabuddhi of Sri Lanka,
- 2) Abhidhammattha vibhāvanī, by Sumangala sāmi of Sri Lanka,
- 3) Saṅkhepa vaṅṅānā, by Saddhammajotipāla of Myanmar [1446],
- 4) Abhidhammattha dīpanī, by Silācāra of Myanmar [1801],
- 5) Paramatthadīpanī, by Nāṇa Thera, Ledi sayadaw, of Myanmar [1897],
- 6) Aṅkura Ṭīkā, by Vimala Thera of Myanmar [1905],
- 7) Mahā atula Ṭīkā, by Nāgindasāmī of Myanmar [1914],
- 8) Abhidhammattha saṅgaha vinicchaya, by Paññājota of Myanmar [1919]

9. The role of Vibhāvanī

Vibhāvanī, as its full name Abhidhammattha vibhāvani, is one of the commentaries on Abhidhammattha saṅgaha. It is a work of Sumaṅgala sāmi and the most popular and the most authoritative.

The writing style is very simple and the explanations are elucidatory. So the Commentary is known in Myanmar as "Ṭīkā-gyaw" meaning "the famous Ṭīkā".

In Myanmar Buddhist monks have been studying Ṭīkāgyaw since long time. It demands the easy access to the text and commentaries were compiled in Pāḷi or in Burmese by the scholar monks.

During the reign of King Narapati (1442-1468) of Inwa, Thera Ariyaraṃsa wrote in Pāḷi a commentary on Vibhāvanī. It is named "Maṅṣārāmañjūsā". In Rāmañña Territory, lower Myanmar, the King Sinphyushin ruled Haṅsavati (Hantharwady as Burmese pronounced). During that time (1550-1580) Thera Mahāsuvannaḍīpa wrote in Pāḷi Apheggusāra-dīpanī, a commentary on Vibhāvanī.

There have been many books, Nissaya, in which word for word translation into Burmese is offered.

During the Konbaung period (1753-1885) there have been some Abhidhammic scholars who criticize Vibhāvani. They asserted that Vibhāvani is full of mistakes.

Although it is so, Vibhāvani can keep its popularity among those who study Abhidhamma in Myanmar.

10. Ledi Sayadaw

Ledi Sayadaw, as the name after the monastery he founded, was a great teacher of Abhidhamma. The name by preceptor was Nāṇa.

He was born in 1846 in a village, Sai pyin, in Dipeyin Town ship, upper Myanmar. After he has entered into the order he left for Mandalay to study Pāḷi and Tipiṭaka.

Mandalay, a great Buddhist study center, was founded in 1859 by King Mindon. During the reign of King Mindon (1859-1878) there were sixty thousand monk students who were studying Pāḷi and Tipiṭaka under the eighty great monk teachers in Mandalay. The King honored the teachers with the highest title, Rājaguru, and provided with food, clothes, shelter and medical treatment.

On those days they delivered a lecture on Abhidhamma referring to the two books, Mūlaṭīla and Anuṭīkā, but not referring to the two books, Vibhāvani and Maṇisāramañjū sā. They said, 'Vibhāvani was full of mistakes and while Maṇi sāramañjusā was full of useless things.

On hearing that Ven. Nāṇa, as a young monk student, was great interested in realizing the mistakes of Vibhāvanī.

After having studied Pāḷi and Tipiṭaka Ven. Nāṇa left Mandalay. He founded a monastery in Monywar in 1886. The monastery situated in the forest, Ledi, which was in the north of Monywar. It was named "Ledi" after the forest.

Ven. Nāṇa was known "Ledi Sayadaw" by the name of the monastery he founded. He wrote a large number of books, grammatical, ethical, religious and philosophical. The book he wrote are more than hundred. Of them Paramatthadīpanī is a book which is written in Pāḷi and the most important in the History of Abhidhamma. His fame was going beyond the border of Myanmar. In 1911 the Government honored him with the title of "Aggamaha paṇḍita". In 1918 an honorary degree, D.Lit., was conferred on him by the University of Rangoon.

At the age 77, he passed away in Pyinmanar..

11. Paramatthadīpani, the critique of Vibhāvani

Ledi Sayadaw was interested much in Abhidhamma. So he had been studying that doctrine with great attention. He noted down some references from Abhidhamma texts. He noticed that some opinions are mistakenly informed in Abhidhamma commentaries. Especially Vibhāvani is full of grammatical, logical and philosophical mistakes.

In 1897, Ledi Sayadaw wrote Paramatthadīpani, a commentary on Abhidhammattha saṅgaha. It offers general information of the text and correct meaning of words. It also pointed out some mistakes which are put forward in Abhidhamma commentaries, especially in Vibhāvani.

Paramatthadīpani made several unfavorable comments about the opinion of Vibhāvani and presented innovative idea.

12. Controversy over critique

The innovation put forward in Paramatthadīpanī has not met with general acceptance. Actually the critique arouse controversy among the readers.

To advocate Vibhāvani there appeared some commentaries which were written in Pāḷi. Some of them were published:

- 1) Aṅkura Ṭīkā, by Ven. Vimala, Talaigon Sayadaw, in 1905,
- 2) Mahā atula Ṭīkā, by Ven. Nāgindasamī, in 1914,
- 3) Paramattha visodhanī, by Ven. Dīpamala, Chaung Oo Sayadaw,
- 4) Abhidhammattha vibhāvani yojana, by Ven. Nāṇindasabha, in 1918, and
- 5) Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha vinicchaya, by Ven. Paññājota, in 1919.

There were other books and articles written in Burmese. Some of them offered unfavorable comments and some favorable comments about the criticizing Vibhāvani. But "Abhidhammattha saṅgaha vinicchaya" arbitrates between the two commentaries, Vibhāvanī and Paramatthadīpanī.

Ledi Sayadaw wrote Anudīpanī, a sub-commentary on Paramatthadīpani, to clarify his innovation in Paramatthadīpanī, in 1916.

13. The translation of Paramatthadīpanī

I have translated Paramatthadīpanī from original Pāḷi into English. Paramatthadīpanī, although it is in the sense of the expounding of true meaning as the author defined, means the exposition of higher truth.

Paramatthadīpanī is a commentary on Abhidhammattha saṅgaha and it offers word for word explanation which is followed by almost all commentaries.

A commentary can be classified into two parts: explained (saṃvaṇṇe-tabba) and explaining (saṃvaṇṇanā). For example : bhāsissanti kathessāmi. Herein the word, bhāsissam, is a word which is to be explained. It is used combining with ' iti '. The word, kathessāmi, is a word through which it explains the meaning.

In my translation the word which is to be explained is left untranslated to avoid confusing of words. Yet the meaning of those words which are left untranslated can be easily known through the explaining words.

There are many technical terms which are used in Abhidhamma. They are used in this translation without giving equivalent English words to them. However, the meaning of those words and their general information will be offered in Glossary.

Paramatthadīpanī is originally in Pāḷi. So in this translation I tried to follow the Pāḷi style as closely as possible.

A. Nandamālābhivamsa

Sagaing
Myanmar, June 1995.

PARAMATTHADĪPANĪ

(AN EXPOSITION OF THE TRUE MEANING)

GANTHĀRAMBHĪA KATHĀ (The Preliminary Speech)

1. Owing to arising of the sun of the *Buddha* that has the light of the true *dhamma* bloomed the lotus of living beings in the great lake, that is the sphere of the birth (of the *Buddha*)¹.
2. I pay homage to that great sun which expels the darkness of great delusion. May the great sun remove the block of darkness arising in my heart.
3. Many commentaries on the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*, the compendium of higher truth, explained by ancient scholars are found in this world.
4. These commentaries, however, do not satisfy those who hanker after the true meaning. Being approached, they requested me to explain the higher truth.
5. If someone takes gems out from a great ocean and gives islanders as many gems as they want, it should not be taken that the supply of gems becomes less.
6. Similarly, in this treatise there are many facts like gems in an ocean. These facts do not become exhausted if one explains them even hundreds of times.
- 7-8. Extracting the essence from those commentaries, I shall, therefore,

give the explanation which is full of various essence, using the correct words and phrases, not too brief and not going into too much details and making persons of little intelligence able to understand. Those who want to master the higher truth might also listen to the explanation.

Chapter 1 CITTA SANGAHA

1. *Thera Anuruddha*², who wanted to compile the text, *Abhidhammattha saṅgaha*, spoke the opening verse in an attempt to summarize expounding at first the five points (*piṇḍattha*³), each with its advantages.

The five points are:-

- Worshipping the Triple Gem (*Ratanattaya paṇāma*),
- The Theme of the Text (*Ganthābhidheyya*),
- The Writing Style of the Text (*Ganthappakāra*),
- The Title of the Text (*Ganthābhidhāna*), and
- The Advantages of the Text (*Ganthappayojana*).

Of these, Worshipping the Triple Gem is to make oneself humble towards the Triple Gem. It is indicated by these words, *sammā sambuddha matulaṃ, sasaddhamma ganuttamaṃ, abhivādiya*.

The Theme of the Text is the four topics of *Abhidhamma*, the major subject which are set forth by the whole treatise. This is indicated by this word, *abhidhammattha*, a part of the combination word of *abhidhammattha saṅgaha*.

However, it is said in *Vibhāvanī*: The Theme of the Text is indicated by the whole combination word, *abhidhammattha saṅgaha*, assuming that the summarizing also should be the "Theme"(p.70)".

That is not correct. Because that summarizing which is not a major

point should not be the 'Theme' whereby the points are presented.

By the way, from here on, if mentioned *Ṭṭkāyaṃ*, it should be known as the First *Ṭṭkā* out of the two *Sinhala Ṭṭkās* on this Compendium. If mentioned *Vibhāvaniyaṃ*, it should be known as the second one which is popular at the present time. If said *Ṭṭkāsu*, it should be known both of them. If said *Mahāṭkāyaṃ*, it should be known the *Mahāṭkā* on *Visuddhimagga*. Furthermore, if found a statement in *Vibhāvanī* as well as in other *Ṭṭkās*, it will be mentioned here only as *Vibhāvaniyaṃ*. Because it is in the range of our notice.

The Writing Style of the Text is the style of compilation by gathering common subjects. It is indicated by the word *saṅgaha*.

However, it is said in *Vibhāvanī*: 'by the word, *abhidhammattha saṅgaha*'(p.70).

That is not correct. Because the word, *abhidhammattha*, cannot indicate the Writing Style of the Text.

The Title of the Text is the name of the text in a literal sense. It is indicated by the word, *abhidhammattha saṅgaha*.

The Advantages of the Text is the original and the subsequent advantage of treatise which is the knowledge of the nature of dhamma as its beginning and the complete extinction free from grasping (*anupādāparinibbāna*) as its end that, if the Compendium is written, can be attained without trouble through learning, discussion and so on. That is also implicitly (*sāmatthiyato*) indicated by the word, *abhidhammattha saṅgaha*.

However, it is said in *Vibhāvanī*: 'by the word, *saṅgaha*'(p.70).

That is not correct. Because such a special advantage of which end is the complete extinction free from grasping cannot be known by the mere word, *saṅgaha*, without the combination word, *abhidhammattha*, which denotes only the accomplishment without trouble. Because there also found

in this world the summarizing of untrue dhammas.

2. Herein, "Worshipping the Triple Gem" has at first a countless and measureless advantage. It should be quoted:

The merit, begotten by honoring those who attained the *parinibbāna* and were free from trouble, cannot be measured by any one as such and such.⁴

Yamettha mapi : The interpretation is that "By anyone - by a human being, or by a deity, or by a *Brahmā* - it cannot be measured."

Commentators, too, elaborate on that advantage in various ways here and there. The masters who summarize ancient Commentaries (*saṅgaha kāra*) intend mainly towards only the protection against misfortune. The word, *saṅgahakāra*, is used for the Commentators, *Thera Buddhaghosa*, etc.

It is actually said:

"Through the power of this merit obtained by making oneself humble Towards the Triple Gem, having totally removed misfortunes...⁵"

How is the protection against misfortune acquired through Worshipping the Triple Gem? - if asked, this must be answered.

Worshipping the Triple Gem is a process of merit (*puññābhisando*), a stream of merit (*puññappavāho*) which produces by the action of worshipping arising seven times in each term and accumulating many hundred thousand crores in number. And that is a superior merit, full of great benefit and advantage owing to growing on the soil of merit, the supreme *Buddha*, etc., and owing to being fertilized by the *Thera*'s virtues - best wish, faith and wisdom. This merit, being itself a successful effort (*payoga sampatti*), renders a beneficial power to the producing *kamma* (*janaka kamma*) which already have a chance since the time of rebirth by removing the external conditions of failure (*vipattipaccaya*) and bringing

about the means of success (*sampatti paccaya*) and making physical elements grow which are produced by more excellent seasonal condition (*utu*), mind (*citta*) and nutriment (*āhara*). It gives a chance for another merit which does not yet have a chance.

On this occasion, the process of mind and matter generated by both merits- one which has a beneficial power and the other which has a chance- comes up in great force within the *Thera*, as if twin rivers run in great force. At that time, in the *Thera*'s wholesome life, there is no room for misfortunes, disease, etc., which are undesirable results. Therefore, the demerits which obstruct the process of desired results and produce the process of evil results are totally wiped out. It is true, *kamma* s- either merit or demerit - are never conducive to their results if they have no opportunity to produce their results. Then, within *Thera* that process of good results - long life, robust body, etc. - progressively appear until the completion of the text or the end of life span.

It should be quoted:

Four conditions -long life, elegance, happiness and strength -come to grow for those who practise paying homage and venerating elders.⁶

Thus, through that worshipping one is protected against misfortunes. Therefore, in an attempt to compile the Compendium, Worshipping the Triple Gem is to complete the composition of "the Book of Compendium" for *Thera* without any obstacles. It is not only for the *Thera*, but for students also who learn the Compendium, to succeed in learning without any obstacles. Because Worshipping the Triple Gem is made only at the beginning of the text.

However, in *Vibhāvanī*, it seems to explain the advantage of worshipping only through the first *javana* thought out of seven. In that Commentary, it is true, the word, "being a *kamma* of which result

is experienced in the present life," is spoken (p.70).

That is not correct. Because, it needs here only the act of supporting . That too can be found in all of seven *javana* thoughts.

Let me explain: Of the two functions of the nutriment matter producing the eight-fold matter of which the eighth is *Ojā* is small and minor, and only maintaining the process of matters by four conditions is big and major. It is true, in Paṭṭhāna ⁷, referring to only the function of maintaining the *Vibhangavāra* is explained: "Edible food (*kabalikāro āhāro*) is related to this group of matters (*imassa kāyassa*) through nutriment condition".

Similarly, the act of immediate effect of the *first javana* here is small and minor. It is said in Commentaries⁸ that it produces a mere result absent from *hetu*. The act of maintaining other *kammas* is big and major. And this retaining function is found in all of seven *javana* thoughts.

3. Then, if known the Theme of the Text, the Writing Style of the Text and the Advantages of the Text at the beginning, the eagerness (*ussāho*) of students for learning the treatise comes into existence. Therefore, expressing these points, the Theme of the Text, etc., is to encourage them in learning the text.

Then, indicating the Title of the Text is it to be easily called by its name. This is expounding the points here.

4. This is the meaning of the words: One realized correctly and realized by himself as well; so he is called '*Sammā sambuddha*' (the Fully Enlightened One). Herein, the word, *sammā*, is a *nipāta* particle in the sense of 'not erroneously (*avipar itattha*).' This word denotes the verb, *bujjhati*, covers the things that should be realized (*ñeyadhammā*).

That is true. It is said in Commentaries⁹: "Those who have partial

knowledge (*padesañāṇa*), *Pacceka Buddha*, etc., know things without error only within their scope. But regarding the things beyond their range of knowledge, they seem to plunge into darkness."

Furthermore, the scope of their knowledge is very narrow, compared with the range of knowledge of the omniscient *Buddhas*, as the space between the two palms of hands putting together (*hatttha puṭa*) is little, compared with the space in the sky above. They, indeed, are unable to discern even the single one of many *dhammas*, e.g. contact etc., in all its aspects.

On the contrary, the omniscient *Buddhas* have nothing to go wrong within their scope of knowledge where they may misunderstand. It is true, they equally realize, like gems on the palm, the *dhammas* in the three periods and beyond the period that exist in *samsāra* of which beginning is unknown and in infinite universes. It is indeed said: "the whole *dhammas* come to reflect on the face of wisdom (*ñāṇa mukha*) of the *Buddha*, the Blessed One"¹⁰.

Herein, the great *bhavaṅga* of the omniscient *Buddha* is called "the face of wisdom". It is true, those *dhammas* come into manifestation forever themselves in it since contemplating the whole *Abhidhamma* at the place where He attained the enlightenment (*bodhi maṅḍa*). And the omniscient *Buddhas* contemplate as many *dhammas* as they want by analyzing them through *āvajjana*. Such a question should not be posed: the *dhammas* are so many; the *bhavaṅga* too small; how do they become manifest in it? Because this is the power of mind belonging to those who reach the position of supremacy.

Then, the word, *saṃ*, is an *upasagga* particle in the sense of 'by himself.' It denotes that the Blessed One has no teacher concerning with *dhammas* penetrated (*paṭivedha dhammesu*). It is truly said: "I have no teacher".

The attainment of the Third and the Fourth *Arūpa Jhānas* originated with *Ājāra* and *Udaka*, did it not? It is true. But just after having attained them they were abandoned without using as adornment at all. Therefore, even these attainments cannot be the primary causes of later enlightenment. Needless to say, they are not the primary causes of the *dhammas* penetrated. These attainments, therefore, cannot be an evidence to prove that the Blessed One has a teacher to be Enlightened-One.

This is the meaning according to Canon and it should be quoted:

"Herein, who is the Enlightened One? In this world a certain person enlightens himself by discovering the truth of *dhammas* never heard before. Through the *dhammas* He reaches the state of realizing all and the state of mastery in powers. This person is to be called the Enlightened One." ¹¹

In the word, *tattha*, the ending, *ttha*, is in the sense of "because of." *Balesu* means "in the ten powers of wisdom". *Vasībhāvaṃ* means 'the state of mastery'. Then, this praise, "*pubbe ananussutesu dhammesu sāmāṃ*," denotes here the meaning of the word, "*sām*" and by these words, "*tattha*, etc.," the meaning of the word, "*sammā*", is described.

5. Now, *Thera* spoke the word, "*atulaṃ*", to make his worship more powerful. It is true, a worship by reciting many words of virtue is more forceful.

A worship by reciting a single word of virtue, too, has the ability to protect against misfortune? If so, for what use is the second word? It is not because of being unable to protect, but because the wise never set any limit to admire the virtue of the Master. And the *Thera* is such a wise person. But you are not a man of wisdom, so you raise the question based on the idea of limit.

In other way, the protection against misfortune is not only the aim in

worship, but to have the ability of knowledge, etc. as well. Because acquiring of the knowledge is also a condition to complete the text without trouble and it makes the work free from errors. It is true: the mental culture (*citta bhāvanā*) on the objects of recollection leads to mental concentration. When the mental concentration comes into existence, the wisdom carries on sharply and boldly its function. It is indeed said: "*Bhikkhus*, one who has mental concentration knows correctly."¹² Therefore, for this purpose, too, one's worship should be made forceful act.

However, it is said in Vibhāvanī: "Although the word, *sammā sambuddha*," conveys the aforesaid meaning, it denotes the mere name of the Blessed One; so it is to be qualified by the word, *atulaṃ*. (p.71)".

It is not correct. Because, the word, *sammā sambuddha*, ranks so high among the words of virtue for the Master, like the moon among the stars. Therefore, that term cannot be the mere name of the Master devoid of its literal sense for those who know "the genuine dialect (*sabhāva nirutti*)". But for others (who do not know it), it will denote the mere name of the Master although thousands of words are used.

One who can be compared with another person is to be called "*tula*." One who is not to be compared with another is called "*atula*." In other way, one has no equal (concerning virtue), so he is called "*atula*." It is the term for the Blessed One. It is true, the Blessed One does not have any other person who is equal to him in the world.

It should be quoted:

I have no teacher; I have no equal.

In the world including gods, I have no counterpart.¹³

It does not cause surprise that one who is the Buddha has the state of peerlessness; even a just born *Bodhisatta* has such a state of peerlessness. It is explanation in detail: on that occasion, the Great Man just born, stood

up facing towards the East . In that direction, the infinite universe became a single plane. The gods and the *brahmās* in those universes honoured him with great measure saying thus: "O Great Man, none here is equal to you; needless to say, there is none who is superior." The same way is to be known in the other directions as well.

Then, the Great Man knowing his superiority to the entire world claimed in fearless words:

"I am superior to the world! I am the greatest in the world!

I am supreme in the world! This birth is the last one. Now I have no more rebirth."

This too does not make a surprise that one who lives his last life has the state of peerlessness. Even on that occasion when *Bodhisatta* named *Sumedha* received a definite prophecy from the *Buddha, Dipankara* , he had no equal in the state of perfectness except *Dipaṅkara* , the *Buddha* . The state of having no equal can be proved by uncommon miracle events-quaking of ten thousand worlds, etc. It is true, such events cannot not be created by hundred thousands of *Pacceka Bodhisattas* . Needless to say, *Sāvaka Bodhisattas* are unable to create such events. Therefore, it is said in Commentary:¹⁴ "The knowledge of contemplating perfections (*pārami pavicaya nāṇa*) on that occasion is equal to the omniscience (*sabbaññūta nāṇa*) in its range".

Then, regarding to *Sāvaka Bodhisattas* , they are able to know by themselves the means proper for enlightenment; since then they never return and plunge into the life of *Bodhisatta* passing over the position of *puthujjana* who ever follows the circle of birth and death. In one aspect they have confirmation of and inclination to enlightenment. Only on such an occasion they are able to receive a definite prophecy if they are in the presence of the *Buddhas*. Needless to say, the *Sabbaññū Bodhisatta* and *Pacceka Bodhisatta* can receive the definite prophecy.

However, it is said in *Vibhāvanī*: "This word, *tula* , is made by adding 'yā' or 'a' in the sense of 'measured'(p.71)."

It is not correct. Because it is not impossible to justify that the word, *tula* , is formed by means of root and in the sense of *Kammasādhana* . It is true, in *Ṭīkā* ¹⁵ it is said: "*atula* is so called because one cannot be measured; it means "measureless one." By this definition, it denotes that the word, *tula* , is in the sense of *Kammasādhana*. If so, it is useless to think of addition of endings, 'yā' or 'a' in the sense of "measured."

Then, if argued - that meaning is defined referring to this rule: "Terminology (*saddappayogo*) follows what one wants to say," the answer is "No". Because it is useless to think of what is unheard by setting aside what is heard and appropriate. [*Atula padaṃ*]

6. Then, through these words, *sammāsambuddha* and *atula* , the three accomplishments (*sampadā*) belonging to the Master are expressed. They are:

The Accomplishment of Condition (*hetu sampadā*) ,

The Accomplishment of Consequence (*phala sampadā*) , and

The Accomplishment of Benefaction for Sentient Beings (*sattupa kāra sampadā*) .

Of these, "the Accomplishment of Condition" is the possession of great compassion and the accumulation of means of enlightenment. And the great insight knowledge of the Omniscient *Buddha* which is called the "diamond knowledge (*vajira nāṇa*)" numbering twenty-four hundred thousand crores generated at the *Bodhi* Ground (*bodhi maṇḍa*) is also included here. Because the insight knowledge is a proximate cause of the great enlightenment. Or it is regarded that the insight knowledge is included in "the Accomplishment of Removing ".

The Accomplishment of Consequence (*phala sampadā*) is four-fold:

The Accomplishment of Removing (*pahāna sampadā*),
 The Accomplishment of Knowledge (*ñāṇa sampadā*),
 The Accomplishment of Supremacy (*ānubhāva sampadā*), and
 The Accomplishment of Physical Appearance (*rūpakāya sampadā*).

Of these " the Accomplishment of Removing " is expelling the mental defilements together with habitual impression (*vāsanā*); the absolute eradication is the meaning. As phenomenon it is a Noble Path or the knowledge associated with the "Supreme Path (*agga maggañāṇa*) ".

"The Accomplishment of Knowledge " is the knowledge of omniscient Buddha, the knowledge of ten-fold power (*dasabala ñāṇa*) and so on.

However, in Vibhāvanī, "the Accomplishment of Knowledge", of these two Accomplishments, is mentioned first, then "the Accomplishment of Removing (p.72)."

Actually, "the Accomplishment of Removing "should be mentioned first. Because it is the forerunner as well as the cause of "the Accomplishment of Knowledge". In *Mahāṭīkā* ¹⁶,too, "the Accomplishment of Removing" is mentioned first.

Then, "the knowledge of Supreme Path(*aggmaggañāṇa*) that is the proximate cause of the Omniscient Knowledge", Vibhāvanī says in the Accomplishment of Knowledge (p.72).

It is not reasonable. Because the Supreme Knowledge should be only "the Accomplishment of Removing". It is true, there is not any other things to be the Accomplishment of Removing except the Supreme Knowledge. Perhaps, someone may say that the Knowledge of Path (*magga ñāṇa*) is either knowledge (*ñāṇa*) or eradication (*pahāna*); so it should be both (*ñāṇa* and *pahāna*). That is also not reasonable. Because, if so, there will be a mixture of Accomplishments (*sampadā sankaro*).

Then, the Omniscient Knowledge should be mentioned first of all in

the Accomplishment of Knowledge; but it is not done so in Vibhāvanī(p.72). That is also not correct.

Then, if given the reason -" by the word *ādī* ' in this phrase, "*tammūlakāni dasabalādi ñāṇāni*," the Omniscient Knowledge is also included" That is also not reasonable. Because it is not a proper way to express the minor point directly and the major point by the word, '*ādī* '.

"The Accomplishment of Supremacy" is to be endowed with virtues, morality, etc. and the supernormal conditions of which powers are cannot be thought .

"The Accomplishment of Physical Appearance " is the possession of a graceful figure marked with major and minor symbols.

"The Benefaction for Sentient Beings" is of two types:

The Accomplishment of Inclination (*āsaya sampadā*), and
 The Accomplishment of Effort (*payoga sampadā*).

It means that the state of excellence of inclination and that of purification of physical and verbal effort. Of these two, "The Accomplishment of Inclination " is the possession of the inclination of welfare for beings ,even antagonists like *Devadatta* , etc. "The Accomplishment of Effort" is the purity of the act of preaching *dhmma* without intention of gain and esteem, etc., when preaching *dhmma* to the well known persons - kings, ministers of kings, rich householders and even the kings of gods.

Herein, "the Accomplishment of Removing "and "that of Knowledge" are denoted by the word, "*sammāsambuddha* ." And the two Accomplishments of Benefaction for Sentient Beings together with the two Accomplishments of Removing and Knowledge are denoted by the word, "*atula* ." Then, the Accomplishment of Condition is implicitly (*sāmatthiyato*) stated by both. Because other accomplishments cannot exist without such an Accomplishment of Condition.[Accomplishment]

7. Again, *Thera* spoke the word, "*sa saddhamma ganuttamaṃ*" in order to make his worship more forceful. By this word, he pays also respect to the *dhamma* and *saṅgha*. It is true. If says- "from distance I pay homage to the Lord of the World together with his Order," the worship of the Order, too, can be known through the word, "together with (*saha*).". Here too must be similarly regarded. Herein, "*namassissam*" means "homage paid."

However, it is said in *Vibhāvani*: "it is known the *dhamma* and the *saṅgha* are also worth to be worshipped through the word, '*saha*' (together with) (p.72)."

Herein, it should not be said "worth to be worshipped (*abhivādetabba bhāvo*)", but it should be said "have been worshipped (*abhivādita bhāvo*)" or "worshipping (*abhivādanam*)". So that ,being known the equality of act (*kriyāsamavāya*) that needs here, *Thera*' s worshipping the *dhamma* and the *saṅgha* will be also included. Otherwise, because of that the suffix, "*tabba*," conveys the meaning of "deserving", the equality of quality (*guṇasamavāya*) which is the state of deserving to be worshipped must be spoken. But that meaning is not necessary here. Nor it also accords with his example either: "One came together with his wife and children."

In other way, it is not impossible to say that *Thera* paid homage to the Triple Gem when he is about to begin compiling this text; then he composed this verse to denote his worship together with his vow to write the book. Therefore, the word, '*abhivādiya* (having worshipped),' is used, not the word, *abhivādiyāmi* (I worship). In this way should be known in other places, too.

"*Sa saddhamma ganuttamo*" is one who is with either the true *dhamma* or the Noble Order organized by himself, an asylum of the entire world. This term is used for the Fully Enlightened One. It is true, the

disciples who are with either the true *dhammas* or the noble order organized by others cannot be called '*sa saddhamma*' as well as '*saganuṭṭama*'. Then, the *Pacceka Buddhas* are also not worthy of such praise, although they are with true *dhamma*, an asylum for only himself and with the noble community of his colleagues (*sabrahmacārī*). Therefore, it should be regarded that this term, (*sasaddhamma ganuttama*) is also special for the Master.

It is here the definition of words: it holds, so it is called *dhamma*. Whom does it hold? It holds those who practise it. It is true, "the *dhamma* indeed protects one who practices *dhamma*,¹⁷" is said.

How does it hold? It holds by not letting one who practice *dhamma* fall into the four woeful states and the circle of suffering (*vaṭṭa dukkha*). What is the meaning of holding? It is eradicating mental defilements, partial or whole, through which sentient beings fall into woeful states and the circle of suffering. According to this meaning, *dhamma* is exactly a term for the eightfold noble path and *Nibbana*. Because the eightfold noble path eradicates mental defilements only depending on *Nibbāna*, not without doing so. Therefore only those five *dhammas* are to be truly *Dhamma*.

Then, the *dhamma* to be learnt (*pariyatti dhamma*) is only the means of holding (*dhāraṇū pāyo*). And the four Fruitions (*phala*), the benefits of the life of a *samaṇa*, are only advantages of holding (*dhāraṇa phalāni*); and proper for holding (*dhāraṇānukūla*) as well because they extinguish again the mental defilements. Therefore, those five are to be *dhamma* in one aspect (*pariyāya dhamma*).

In other way, it should be held, so it is called *dhamma*. It is meant to be worth of being held (*dhāraṇāraho*). A phenomenon that sets the holder of it actually free from suffering and places him in the position of supreme happiness, is to be called "*dhamma*" on account of deserving to be held. What is that? It is the *dhamma* as told above.

To be explained: some of those *dhammas* are held by developing them, some by attaining them, some as a way of dwelling happily in the present life, some by learning and memorizing them; and those *dhammas*, if they are held, set the holder of the *dhamma* properly free from suffering in woeful states and in the circle of birth and death. Besides, they place such a person in a state of supreme happiness of Fruition and *Nibbāna*.

Or good persons hold themselves not to fall into woeful state and suffering in the circle of birth and death by means of this phenomenon, so it is called *dhamma*. And this is also reasonable that the persons who have *dhamma* as their island and *dhamma* as their asylum stand on it; so it is called *dhamma*.

Then, why is the *dhamma* divided into only ten, here? It should be divided into eleven together with the *dhamma* practised (*paṭipattidhamma*). It is true. But the *dhamma* practised is only the initial stage of practice for the Path; so it is included in the Path just as the prior volition (*pubba cetanā*) is taken into 'giving (*dāna*).' Therefore, the *dhamma* is divided everywhere into only ten.

In other way It is reasonable that there is reason to reckon the *dhamma* learnt (*pariyatti dhamma*) as '*dhamma*' here, and for that reason the person who learns *dhamma* is also reckoned as '*saṃgha*' deserving worship. Then, there is reason to reckon a good worldly person (*puṭhujjana kalayānako*) as '*saṃgha*', the trainee (*sekkha*), and for that reason the *dhamma* practised (*paṭipatti dhamma*) that makes him good should be reckoned as '*dhamma*' deserving worship. It is impossible to say that the worldly person, though he is in such a position, is to be reckoned as 'trainee', the undergoing to attain the 'first Noble Stage' through the *dhammas* he possesses; but those *dhammas* are not reckoned as 'the Path of the Stream Winner' belonging to the trainee.

So far as I have said, it rejects the statement of those who expound

thus: "A *bhikkhu* in the position of a good worldly person would not be taken into account as '*saṃgha*' in this formula, '*saṃghaṃ saranam gacchāmi* (I go to the *saṃgha* as refuge)'; because there is no benefit to go to such a person as refuge."

Of course, it should be said "it is reasonable that the *dhamma* learnt which is honoured by the Master by placing it in the position of Teacher and declared thus: "That *dhamma* and *Vinaya* explained and laid down by me, *Ānanda*, will be your teacher after I have passed away."¹⁸ is taken into account as *dhamma* to be refuge. Then, the person who learns *dhamma* is two: one who follows the noble way and the other who does not so. Of these two, "the person who does not follow the noble way" cannot be 'refuge' even for himself. Needless to say, he will not be refuge for others. Besides, it is he who is blamed by the Master in thousands of *Suttas*. Therefore, it is reasonable that he should not be reckoned as '*saṃgha*' to be refuge, and only the other is to be reckoned.

It is *dhamma* that belongs to good persons; so it is called "*saddhamma*." It is meant "the *dhamma* of good or wise persons who are worthy of praise and honour because of that their passions have become extinct". Or the *dhamma* that is worth of praise and honour is to be called "*saddhamma*." Because the *dhamma* of those who are worthy of praise and honour must be absolutely a *dhamma* that is worthy of praise and honour. It is meant "the *dhamma* deserving praise and honour". Or "the *dhamma* that is true". To be explained: it does not falsely effect one who holds it, like the *dhamma* of other viewers (*añña titthiya*) does; it indeed brings about only malevolence (*ahito*) to those who hold it with the belief that "it is beneficial to me." [saddhamma]

The word *gaṇa* in '*gaṇuttama*' is used for the community of those colleagues who have common view and morality in the world. In this

Teaching, however, the community of disciples of the Master with high virtues, morality etc. is to be " Noble Community (*uttama + gana*)" in the sense of being either noble or community; only that term "*uttama gana* ," is used here "*ganuttama* " in reverse order, like these "*muni seṭṭho* (noble sage)" and "*muni varo* (exalted sage)."

However, in Vibhāvanī, it is said:"*Ganuttama* is the nobility of communities or among the community of gods,human beings and so on (p.73)."

It is not correct. Because if known the meaning, it cannot inform that the word,*gaṇa* ,is used here for "Noble Community" ; because the word,*uttama* , although it is truly "qualifier.", have to be "qualified,"

Then, the word '*gaṇa* ,' describes only *Samgha* .The *Samgha* is two-fold: *saṃgha* organized (*sammuti saṃgha*)and *saṃgha* deserving honour (*dakkhiṇeyya saṃgha*). Of these two,"the *saṃgha* organized" is the community of *bhikkhus* receiving higher ordination through the function of *upasampadā* , also called *sammuti*, conducted by united *saṃgha* .Thatsaṃgha concerns *Vinaya* functions. Then "the *saṃgha* deserving honor " is a group of eight noble persons. And although that *saṃgha* is included in "the *saṃgha* organized", it should be noted that "the *saṃgha* deserving honour" is particularly stated by the Blessed One admiring in such and such ways to advocate them as "the excellent field of merit (*anuttara puñña khetta*)" concerning worthy of being refuge,worshipped, esteemed, offered, honoured and the object of recollection. The *Puthujjana saṃgha* cannot be "the excellent field of merit" though it is the field of merit. Why? Because that *saṃgha* has the latency of wrong view on Aggregates (*sakkāya diṭṭhi*) and doubt (*vicikicchā*) that are the evil conditions of the field of merit like grass in a field of "*sāli* " rice. Then, to be the field of merit of that *saṃgha* can be understood as explained in the former word,*saddhamma* .

8. *Abhivādiya* means having worshipped in a special way. Herein a worship, making in one's mind thus : "this person with virtues,morality,etc.is noble and deserves worship", is said to be " worshipping in a special way".

Then the worship is three-fold through "bodily worship" etc. It should be quoted :

"*Bhikkhus* , there are three types of worships. What are the three? To worship by body, to worship by speech and to worship by mind".¹⁹

Of these "to worship by body" is that one lies down towards the persons who deserve worship keeping ' the state of nobility' in mind and placing his five body parts - the two knees, the two elbows and the forehead-on the ground. Referring to this manner of worship it is said "*pañcappatiṭṭhitena vandanā* ," here and there. And it is the way of worship in which if a *bhikkhu* pays homage to those who are not in the position to be worshipped, he is guilty of "*āpatti* . "

"To worship by speech" is that one recites the words of virtues (*gunapada*). And such a speech - "I pay homage to the *Buddha* ; May the worship be to the *Buddha* ; I pay homage to the noble freedom; May the worship be to those who have freedom; May the worship be to the *Buddha Vipassi* by name."etc. is to be called "verbal worship" (*vācā vandanā*).

"To worship by mind" is that one repeatedly recollects virtues by thinking of words of virtues.

9. *Bhāsissam* means "shall speak." *Thera* will commit to writing a book compiling this Compendium. It should be, however, noted that he uses the word "*bhāsissam* " with this idea "the compiling of book is widely known as a verbal action".

10. In the word *abhidhammattha saṅgha* *Abhidhammattha* is the topics

pointed out in *Abhidhamma*. text. Then in this Compendium or by this Compendium those topics are summarized, so it is called "*Abhidhammattha saṅgaha* ." By the word, " summarized (*saṅgayhanti*)" it is meant that the topics are spoken briefly by *Thera* .

Then it is definition of the word, "*abhidhamma* " : the *dhamma* which is higher or extraordinary is termed "*Abhi-Dhamma* ." And by the word "*dhamma* " the two texts are denoted except the *Vinaya*. It is true "that Dhamma and Vinaya , Ānanda , explained and laid down by me ...," is addressed. Then, the two *Pāli* Texts expound the only ultimate realities, *kusalā dhammā* etc. as they appear by setting aside *Vinaya* function which is a sort of command. Of these two *dhammas* as expounded, the only *dhamma* which is higher and extraordinary than the other is to be called "*Abhidhamma* " but the other is only "*Dhamma* ." On this point, Commentaries²⁰ say "this tetrad (*catukka*) should be known here: " *dhamma* (doctrine), *abhidhamma* (higher doctrine), *vinaya* (discipline) and *abhivinaya* (higher discipline).Of these four,*dhamma* is for *Suttanta Piṭaka* , *abhidhamma* for the seven texts, *Vinaya* for both of *Vibhāṅgas* and *Abhivinaya* for *Khandhaka* and *Parivāra* ."

And "the state of being higher and extraordinary " here must be known through "*Kusala* ", etc., through "*Khandha* ", etc., through "*saṅgaha* ." etc., through the complete explanation of *dhamma* division in such and such ways and through "talk on mere *dhamma* ." For that reason the omniscient *Buddha* expounds this "*Abhidhamma* " discourse only on the plane of gods; indeed human beings are unable to sit and listen in one posture to such a speech running for three months in a row from beginning to end. And it is impossible to give such a speech under the same outline to various persons in different periods.

Some commentators, however, point out "*Abhidhamma* is higher and extraordinary than *Vinaya Pāli*. as well." That does not accord with the

"*Aṭṭhasālinī* ," because in that Commentary, "the state of being higher and extraordinary" is remarked only between the two texts under the name of "*dhamma*."; it is not justifiable to take in *Vinaya* ; because they have uncommon function and field. To be explained: *Vinaya* serves to train in physical and verbal actions and concerns violation of rules while *Dhamma* serves to analyze *dhammas* and concerns the appearance of natural law as they appear.

Then, some commentators say:"if so,only *Vinaya* may rank in superiority because "a bhikkhu who condemns *Vinaya* is guilty of *pācittiya* ,but *Dhamma* is only guilty of *dukkaṭa* ."

This is not reasonable. Because *Vinaya* is command (*āṇācakkā*) while *Dhamma* is natural law (*dhammacakkā*). Herein to condemn *Vinaya* is hitting out at "the wheel of command"(*āṇācakkā*) of the Master.This is utter disrespect towards the Master ; if one has no respect for the Master,he certainly has no respect for the *Dhamma* , the *Saṅgha* and the three Trainings as well. Therefore, by condemning *Vinaya* the offense (*āpatti*) is serious,but not because of that *vinaya* is superior to all.

In other way *Vinaya* is the root of the *sāsana*;if *Vinaya* does not exist, the *Sāsana* does not exist. Therefore to perpetuate *Sāsana* the severe penalty is imposed on act of condemning *Vinaya*.

So far as I have said, the explanation of correct meaning on the first verse in '*Paramatthadīpanī* ', the fourth commentary on *Abhidhammattha - saṅgaha* comes to end.

11. Thus having explained the five points each with their advantages in the opening verse, now *Thera* spoke the second verse to expound the outline of the topics in *Abhidhamma* .

Herein, *Tattha* means "in that word, *Abhidhammattha saṅgaha* "which is used in this phrase,*bhāsissam abhidhammattha-saṅgaham*; the topics in

Abhidhamma (*abhidhammattha*) pointed out by me are four-fold in all aspects under the name of *paramattha* (ultimate reality). This is interpretation.

Firstly in *Ṭīkā* the meaning of "ta" is given: "Tattha means in that text, "Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha," or in that word, "Abhidhammattha," or in that *Abhidhamma* (p.287). Then Vibhāvanī says "in that Abhidhamma (p.73)."

All are not correct. Because the meaning - the topics in *Abhidhamma* which I have already mentioned in this book, *Abhidhammamatta-saṅgaha* - is not reasonable; even the book indeed will be compiled later on, not yet compiled; where are the topics in *Abhidhamma*? Furthermore, there is not such a word, "ta", that refers minor words at the very beginning in Commentaries; so the meaning of the word, "ta," here must be understood as if the word, "ta" in the first sentence, "tatha kenatthena abhidhammo?," in *Aṭṭhasālinī*.

If so, the interpretation in all *Ṭīkā*s (Purāṇa,p.287;Vibhāvanī,p.73; Saṅkhepa,p.216) - "pointed in all aspects" - is rejected. The interpretation indeed does not accord with these words, *sabbathāpi dvādasā, sabbathāpi aṭṭhārasa*, etc., which will be mentioned above.

Herein *Sabbathā* means that it is only four in all aspects of divisions, kusala, etc. that is said in *Dhammasaṅganī*; it is also four in all aspects of division, *khandha*, etc. that is said in *Vibhanga*. And it also should be said "in all aspects of division that is said in *Dhātukathā* and so on".

12. *Paramatthato* means 'according to ultimate truth'. Truth is indeed twofold: the conventional truth (*Sammuti sacca*) and the ultimate truth (*Paramattha sacca*). Of these two, the conventional truth is thus: The things based on concept (*pannattiattha*) - being (*satta*), person (*puggāla*), soul (*atta*), life (*jīva*) and so on - never exist as reality; but they seem to be

reality by conjuring up bigger and bigger in the minds of many people who do not have analytical knowledge of *dhamma*; many people harmoniously talk and accept them in this and that way as if they are real. And they are accepted harmoniously by many people and are the ground of true speech (*vacīsacca*) and true-abstinence (*virātisacca*) as well; therefore those things are called conventional truth (*sammuti sacca*). Then using the conventional truth those who well practise *dhamma* accomplish all worldly happiness and all means of enlightenment. But those who practise *dhamma* in incorrect ways are to be born in woeful states. Thus the conventional truth ranks very high. However, it is not regarded as truth, if compared with the ultimate truth, because it makes many people accept it as reality being itself not reality. And being the ground of the wrong view on aggregate (*sakkāyadiṭṭhi*), the sixty-two views and the threefold wrong view, it does not let fools escape from the circle of suffering. Thus the conventional truth is so false and with so great fault as well.

Then the ultimate truth is two-fold: the truth in its own nature (*sabhāva sacca*) and the truth belonging to noble persons (*ariya sacca*). Of these two the truth in its own nature is the dhammas, "kusala etc.", classified in seven texts beginning with *Dhammasaṅgani*. Because they never make people false who accept them as "there exist the kusala dhammas and there exists the happy feeling" existing by themselves in their own nature. But it (*sabhāvasacca*) becomes untrue in one aspect, if compared with the truth belonging to noble persons.

Let me explain: Feeling is said to be happiness referring to the division of mere enjoyment (*anubhavana-bheda*); but it is not because of real happiness in its all aspects. All feelings are actually only "pain" from the point of many hundred views - the state of being impermanence, that of being conditioned things and so on. In the same way, the state of kusala in the sense of faultlessness and producing the result of happiness is known by

comparing with *Akusala* . All *kusala dhammas* on three-plane are indeed only with faults, the fault of being with canker, with mental defilements, the object of *Ogha* , the object of *Yoga* and the object of *Upādāna* . And they have pain as their result because they produce an effect ,that is the "truth of suffering."

Then, the *Ajjhattattika* is said depending on the concept in this world. Actually, all *dhammas* on the four-planes have nothing to be called even "*atta*." Needless to say, they will have something to call "*ajjhatta* "; but they belong to only others (*bahiddha*) . "Do see the conditioned things as not self"²¹ is truly said. This way should be possibly known in the other *dhammas* of *tika* and *Duka* .

Then, the truth belonging to noble persons is that all *dhammas* on the three-plane are to be real suffering; craving is to be real cause of suffering; the *Nibbāna* alone is to be the cessation of suffering; the Path with eight factors is to be the way leading to the cessation of suffering. This truth alone is the real truth that is unchangeable and perfect in all aspects in the wisdom of *Ariyas* who have pure knowledge. Then to exclude here the conventional truth of these two truths the word, *paramatthato* , is said. Therefore, it was said "*paramatthato* means according to the ultimate truth."

In this word, *paramattha* , *attha* is twofold: thing that exists in own nature (*sabhāvasiddha*) and thing that exists in image (*parikappa siddha*). Of these two, the thing (*attha*), *citta* etc., that exists separately with its own characteristic without referring to other things is to be called the thing that exists in own nature. Then, the thing which does not exist with its own characteristic but exists only in mind being imagined and conjured by the mind depending on various appearances of the reality that is mind-made and mind-created; such a thing, being (*satta*), person (*puggala*) and so on, is to be called the thing that exists in image.

Of these two, 'the thing that exists in own nature' alone is to be called

paramattha.. This is definition: It is *attha* , because depending on it the comprehension (*buddhi*) and words are born. And it is *paramattha* , because it is the *attha* (thing) which is higher (*parama*) than the other in the sense of absolute reality.

In other way, *paramattha* is an absolute thing in the sense of not failing in reaction accordingly for those who practice to realize what should be realized; to analyze what should be analyzed; to eradicate what should be eradicated; to attain what should be attained; to develop what should be developed with such a confidence 'this exists; this can be known.'

The other thing, however, is not worthy to be called *paramattha* , because it, being non-existent, causes only failure in reaction for those who practice to realize it etc., but it does not accomplish the purpose.

However, it is said in *Vibhāvanī*: " or *paramattha* is an object of higher knowledge (p.74)".

It is not correct. Because it never sees the word, *parama* , to be in the sense of knowledge and the word, *attha* , to be in the sense of object as well. And it is said in *Anutikā*. ²², "only the *sacca* is *saccika*; *saccika* alone is *attha* in the sense of object of right understanding; so it is called *saccikatth*..This too points out this meaning: *Attha* is so called because it should be approached by right understanding, not defining the meaning of *parama*..[*paramattha*]

In the word, *citta*: it is conscious, so it is called *citta* . Herein 'to be conscious' is to turn ever towards an object. It is true, the state of being conscious is not known without an object. To be conscious is, therefore, regarded here only as the ' accepting object 'and ' receiving object.' If it is the correct meaning, the statement by some commentators, "at the time of *bhavaga* or at the time of feeling faint (*visaññi samaya*), consciousness exists without an object", is rejected. Then, it must be noted that consciousness gets its name only through the *Ārammana* condition, not

through the other conditions- *Nisaya*, *Samanantara* and so on - though these conditions exist.

In other way, *citta* is so called, because through which the mental concomitants (*sampayuttakā*) come to be conscious of. The consciousness is indeed the forerunner in the case of perceiving an object; so the mental concomitants perceive an object through only consciousness whenever they perceive an object.

Or *citta* is being merely to be conscious of. It is true all *dhammas* are known as mere actions of nature. Within those *dhammas* there is no substance (*dabba*), form (*saṅṭhāna*) and entity (*viggaha*) to be known. They also arise depending on conditions; they have not by itself energy (*thāma*), power (*bala*), ability (*vasa*) or quality (*satti*) through which they are able to appear. Needless to say, they cannot be conscious and impinge. And they exist just only for a moment. They can never be able to follow the wish of someone. Therefore, such a division "this is substance; this is quality; this is action" is unknown in those *dhammas* . Because of this reason, in all 'words of ultimate truth' the definition of *bhāvasādhana* alone should be mainly known. But the other definitions can be known only in one aspect.

Herein to think of analyzing the consciousness which is indivisible as substance etc. is to be known as 'talk in one aspect (*pariyāyakathā*)' in order to make one know the special meaning, as if in this example: "the body of a small stone (*silāputtakassa sarīraṃ*)." And to do so is to describe the total non-existence of soul (*atta*), life (*jīva*), being (*satta*) and person (*puggala*) which are excluded from reality (*dhamma-vimutta*), imagery of others (*paraparikkappa*) and known as doers (*kāraka*). If there exists soul, etc., what is the use of thinking of dividing which is indivisible.

However, Vibhāvanī seems to say 'thinking of reality which is not reality (*abhūtaṃ bhūtaparikkappanā*)' as if in this example 'the

horn of hare (*sasavisāṇaṃ*)' (p.74).

It is the meaning what he wants to say: There is none who is to be called either 'doer (*kattā*)' or 'one who commands to do (*kāretā*)' in *dhammas* . However, there is a doer (*kattā*) in the world that performs a deed by himself. So the definition , *cintetīti ciattaṃ* , is given by placing 'the state of doer' upon consciousness to explain that in the act of being conscious *citta* is reliable by itself. Then, the definition, *cintenti sampayuttakā dhammā etenāti cittaṃ* , is given by putting again 'the state of means to do (*karaṇabhāva*)' upon the consciousness and 'the state of doer (*kattabhāva*)' upon mental concomitants to explain that through the power of consciousness those mental concomitants performs properly in the act of being conscious .

In other way, the word, *citta* , conveys the meaning of variety (*vicitra vācako*). It is truly said in Saṃyutta nikāya ²³ :

"*Bhikkhus* , have you ever seen an exhibition of paintings (*caṇaṇaṃ nāma cittaṃ*)? Yes, Lord! *Bhikkhus* , the exhibition of painting is designed by mind. *Bhikkhus* , in deed, only mind is more in variety even than that exhibition of paintings".

"And *Bhikkhus* , I have never seen any other communities as animals which is in variety. *Bhikkhus* , the animals are made various by only mind as well. *Bhikkhus* , even than those animals it is mind that is more various."

Herein, 'the exhibition of paintings' is a sheet of cloth on which various pictures, the divine abode etc., are painted; and they wander about and exhibit it explaining thus: "those who act this and that merit can be born in such and such abode." In the word, *cittena* , the ending 'ena' is a particle, *karanvacana* , in the sense of ablative case. *Yathayidaṃ* means 'as if these.' *Cittikatā* means making it various.

Furthermore, herein it is known that mind is various, so perception is

various. And as perception is various, so attachment is various. And as attachment is various, so *kamma* is various. And as *kamma* is various, so genus (*yonī*) is various. And as genus is various, so are animals.

Lakhaṇa is this and that own nature;

Rasa is function or accomplishment;

Paccupaṭṭhāna is said to be manifestation or advantage;

Padaṭṭhāna is known to be a proximate cause;

These are to classify dhammas for the wise.

Citta has the awareness of an object as its characteristic; the preceding as its function; the ceaseless process is its manifestation; mind and matter are its proximate cause.²⁴ [*citta*]

In the word, *cetasika*: *Cetasika* is that which is born in *citta* since it arises depending on it. It is a term for the *dhammas* beginning with *phassa*. And herein 'the state of appearance depending on it' is to arise together with *citta* as if it seems to be one according to the characteristic, "arising together, etc." By this word, it is clearly known that *cetasika* is only those *dhammas*, *phassa*, etc., which are seemed to unite with consciousness having the same birth etc., like flowers in a branching flower-stalk on a single stem, being in this position - "only the birth of *citta* is the birth of *phassa*, etc.; the decay of *citta* is the decay of *phassa*, etc., the death of *citta* is the death of *phassa*, etc., the object of *citta* is the object of *phassa*, etc.; the seat of *citta* is the seat of *phassa*, etc."

If asked - if so, *citta* also must be called *phassika*, *vedanika* and so on, because it exists, as said above, together with those *dhammas*; *phassa*, etc.- the answer is "No". Because *citta* alone is the chief. The *Buddha* truly says, "*dhammas* have mind as their forerunner; have mind as their chief; have mind as their source."²⁵

Herein "*manomayā*" is 'made or created only by mind'; it is meant 'the act of mind'. By this two lines of verse, it denotes that those *dhammas*,

phassa, etc., cannot be known without *citta*. However, *citta* can exist even without some of those *dhammas*. For example, the "five-*viññāṇa*" *citta* arises without some of those *dhammas*, *vitakka*, etc. So 'the state of existence depending on it' is spoken only for those *dhammas*, not for *citta*.

However, Vibhāvanī explains those *dhammas* to be in 'the state of dependent' and in 'the state of being *Cetasika*' through merely being on the same object (p.74-5).

It is not correct. Because, merely through the state of being on the same object it cannot be called *Cetasika*.

In addition, suppose people in the world paint various pictures on a canvas mixing varied colored paints in water. Herein, the absorption on the canvas and remaining on it is only the function of water, not of coloured materials; displaying the various forms is only the function of coloured materials, not of water. Of these, the object is compared to the painting canvas; *Citta* to water; *Cetasikas* to varied coloured paints. [*Cetasikaṃ*]

15. *Rūpaṃ*: Herein, it changes; so it is called *Rūpa*. It means that it changes into a different state through harmful conditions (*virodhi-paccayehi*)- cold, heat, and so on, or it is changed by those harmful conditions. It should be quoted:

"*Bhikkhus*, it changes; so it is called *Rūpa*. By which does it change? It changes by cold; changes by heat; changes by hunger; changes by thirst; changes by biting of tsetse fly or mosquito; or by the effect of wind, heat; by biting of poisonous reptiles."²⁶

"*Ruppanti*' means changes, perishes, being attacked, oppressed, and being broken", is said in *Mahāniddeśa*.²⁷

This is a concise meaning: only those *dhammas* which remain long and have the nature of impact (*sappaṭighasabhāvā*) meet harmful

conditions at the static moment; but not those which are in short term and have not the nature of impact (*appaṭighasabhāvā*). It is true, even the subtle matters without the nature of impact do not meet external conditions, cold, etc. Needless to say, the mental *dhammas* (*arūpadhamma*) in short term and without the nature of impact do not meet external conditions.

If so, 'the subtle matters (*sukhumarūpa*)' may be the mental *dhamma*? No, it may not be so; because they are in the same nature as if that of 'the gross matters'. Indeed, they change when the gross matters change.

Or 'the meeting' here is, it is said, 'the mutual impingement' of the gross matters or of only the great elements which contradict each other and are at the static moment, apart from getting into the avenue (*āpātagamana*) and perceiving an object (*ārammaṇakaraṇa*). It is, indeed, said: "*Ruppati* means being attacked (*ghaṭṭiyati*) and oppressed (*pīṭiyati*)."

'Changing (*ruppana*)' is said to be the state of ruin (*kuppana*) and perishing (*bhijjana*) of the elements which are in different matter-unit, as if a country is in a state of chaos caused by war waged by enemies. It is truly said that "becoming ruined (*kuppati*) and broken (*bhijjati*)". In addition, herein *Kuppati* means to be in a state of chaos and moving about. *Bhijjati* means to be distorted. When they meet harmful conditions, since that moment they become distorted by themselves. It means that they work as conditions to produce material process, more or less.

In another way, 'changing (*ruppana*)' is two-fold: increasing and decreasing. Both of these are clearly known at the time of destruction and construction of universe and in changing of various life-span, year, season, month, night, day, etc.

Why is the term, *rūpa*., used for only the *dhammas* which change through impact? Because only they have substance. Matters have substance being in a state of gathering and forming, etc. So it is noted that 'changing'

pertaining to only those matters is common to the world and the term, *rūpa*, is used only for those.

On the contrary, mind exists without substance; so the state of distortion pertaining to those cannot be seen directly (*paccakkhato*); it can be known on seeing or hearing or asking about this and that distortion of matters by the world except those who can read others' minds. So mind is not in the state of matter.

However, Vibhāvanī dismisses the supposition - 'mind may be in a state of matter (*rūpatā patti ppasango*)'- by the implicity of these terms, *Sīta*, etc.(p.75)

Actually, 'terms (*voḥāro*) cannot be used without general consensus of the world' (*lokopacāra*); the general consensus of the world is only through widely known signs. Hence, it should be noted that without the term, *sīta*, etc., such a supposition (*pasāṅga*) can be removed only through 'the general consensus of the world'.

Then, in *Brahma* world it can be seen that *Brahmas* have physical gesture, verbal gesture and various forms created by psychic power. These, too, can be a sort of material changing in one aspect. Therefore, it is understood that according to this aspect the matter in *Brahma* world can be in a state of matter.

In other way, '*Rūpa*' is so called, because they become manifest by themselves in their own nature. It is true mind cannot become manifest in their own nature. They are to be known only through matter on which they depend. However, matter being manifest by itself in its own nature is to be known by five-consciousness. If it is the meaning, the matters in *Brahma* world can be directly known to be in a state of matter.

In Vibhāvanī it is explained: "The matter in *Brahma* world can be known through either beneficial cold, etc., or going not beyond the nature of matter'(p.75).

However, these words, *sītenāpi uñhenāpi*, etc., are used to indicate a mere point (*nīdassana mattaṃ*). Because 'the changing' can be through mind and nutriment as well. It is true *saññā* (perception) and *viññāṇa* (consciousness) are explained in *Pāli* canon only through the objects, form and taste. However, perception does not perceive only form; consciousness is not aware of taste alone; so it should be understood that discourse is given to indicate a mere point; therefore it is useless to explain the matter in *Brahma* world referring to the word, beginning with the word, *sīta* . [*Rūpaṃ*]

16. In the word, *Nibbāna*: In this state all burning miseries (*dukkha-santāpā*) in birth-and-death circle (*vaṭṭa*) become extinct; so it is called *Nibbana* . ' to become extinct (*nibbāyanti*) ' means that only those mental defilements (*kilesā*) and aggregates (*khandha*) that are worthy of arising in future within those who have not developed their Path are put in the state of not worthy of arising within those who have already developed their Path.

Dhammas in the past, it is true, which have ceased after being for three moments cannot be called " to become extinct (*nibbāyanti*)." Needless to say the *dhammas* in present and will certainly arise in the future can be called ' to become extinct '.

"The burning misery in birth-and-death circle (*vaṭṭadukkha-santāpā*) is that the burning misery which is in the circle of mental defilement (*kilesavaṭṭa*), in the circle of *kamma* (*kammavaṭṭa*) and in the circle of result (*vipākavaṭṭa*). It is true 'the complete extinction (*anuppāda-nirodha*)' concerning with trees, etc., which are without the burning suffering in the three circles cannot be called *Nibbāna* .

Etasmiṃ : the inflectional ending ' *smiṃ* ' is in the sense of location (*bummaṃ*) as if in the example, " *ākāse sakuṇā pakkhandanti* = in the sky

birds fly." Indeed, there is no other locality apart from those burning miseries which become extinct.

In other way, '*Nibbāna* ' is so called because in this state the noble persons (*ariya-jana*) become extinguished. It is said: " the wise become like the extinguished flame of a lamp." ²⁸ ' to become extinguished ' means that such and such defilements and aggregates are to be in a state of non-rebirth

Etasmiṃ : the ending, *smiṃ* , is only in the sense of location. Or that word is connected with the word, *adhigate* . (it is the meaning "when this state is attained).

However, it is said in *Ṭīkā* : ²⁹ "Craving is to be called '*vāna* ,' because it sews lives together; and from that craving it departs , so it is called *Nibbāna* (*Puraṇa*, p.287; *Vibhāvanī*, p.75)

However, it is said in *Vibhāvanī*: "*Nibbāna* is that through which the fire of craving, etc., becomes extinguished (p.75)."

This is not correct. Because *Nibbāna* is not known as an instrumental case like Path; besides *Nibbāna* cannot be the cooperating cause (*sahakāri-paccaya*) of craving which works as a subject to do the act of extinguishing. [*Nibbāna*]

The exposition of correct meaning of the second verse ends.

17. Now, *Thera* spoke the word, '*tattha cittaṃ* ', etc. to explain *citta* (consciousness) according to the order of outline.

Tatta means 'out of those four topics of *Abhidhamma* ' . *Tāva* means 'firstly'. *Catubbidham* means ' that which has four-fold '.

18. In the word, *Kāmāvacaraṃ* : It is desired, so it is *kāma* . Or it is *kāma* where beings who have not yet expelled sensual desire are delighted with only sensual pleasure, but not with *Jhāna* pleasure as if in the higher

planes. It is the term for eleven-fold *kāma* plane.

Are there not any persons also who have attained *Jhāna* in this plane? I did not say 'there are not'; but they are there only sometimes; so there is nothing wrong.

How are the *nirayas* (hells), *Avīci* etc., being in the sense of 'desired'? How are the beings there delighted with sensual pleasure? They are delighted being satisfied with an object or with affection for life (*bhavanikanti*). Indeed, for those beings the flame of fire in the *niraya* that is manifested on death are seemed to be shining gold.

'A *brahman* who held wrong view was lying on his death bed. His guru *brahman*s sitting near him said, "Sir, go to the *Brahma*- world." His mind was being invaded by the flame of fire in *Avīci niraya*. Then he said, "Sirs, the shining gold is seen." They said, "Sir, this is the *Brahma* world. Go there." He died and was born in *Avīci*.'

In this way, those *nirayas* are to be desired being satisfied with objects. And even those who are born there have an affection for their life. In other way, those who are born in *niraya* are only those who have not yet eradicated sensual desires. If have a chance, they will certainly take delight at sensual pleasure.

It occurs in *kāma* plane, so it is called '*Kāmāvacara*'

Here, it should not be known the word, *avacarati*, to be in the sense of 'to arise'. Because that sense does not accord with *Pāli* canon and it may cause various misunderstandings as well.

To be explained: it is said in *Pāli* ³⁰, '*yam etasmim antare etthāvacarā etthapariyāpannā* (whatever there is in this inclusion, occurring therein, included therein...). If needs the sense here, it may say '*etthāvacarā etthuppannā* (occurring therein, arising therein...); but it does not say so. Besides, it is impossible to say 'the word, *pariyāpanna*, is equally in the sense of 'arising' as if the word, *Uppanna*. It is true, the Supramundane *Cittas*

, although they arise in the three-plane, are not included therein. Thus that sense does not accord with *Pāli*.

If that sense is known, there may be such misunderstandings: those *dhammas*, *mahaggata* and *lokuttara*, which arise in that *kāma* plane are to be a '*kāmāvacara*', but not to be a '*Rūpāvacara*', etc. And those *dhammas* of *kāma* which arise in *Rūpa* or *Arūpa* plane are to be a '*Rūpāvacara*' or a '*Arūpāvacara*', but not to be a '*kāmāvacara*'.

Then, do some persons not get a name through the "generality (*yebhuyya-vutti*)" like these examples, '*vanacarako* (hunter), *saṅgāmāvacaro* (soldier)?" So, it is nothing wrong here with those *dhammas* that get the name of *kāmāvacara*, etc., as they mostly arise each in their own planes.

If argued, the answer is 'No'. Because, if so, for the *dhammas* of *lokuttara* a plane where they arise may specifically be spoken to be freed from the name of *kāmāvacara*, etc. But there is not such a plane where they mostly arise; and they, indeed, arise only in three planes if arise. So, it may not avoid getting the name of *kāma* or *rūpa* or *arūpa*. Thus, it may cause various misunderstandings.

Therefore, without noting such a meaning of *avacarati* that meaning alone which follows the way of *Pāli* '*etthāvacarā ettha pariyāpannā*' used by the Blessed One should be noted. Indeed, it is the correct meaning: 'it occurs in *kāma* plane as including therein and plunging into it, so it is called '*Kāmāvacara*'

The 'state of inclusion (*pariyāpannabhāvo*)' is reaching, absorbing and including in that *kāma* which is its base being with common conditions - species, family and name; and it should be noted that such a state of inclusion is made by sensual desire that dominates. So far as I have said, those *dhammas*, although they arise within *Rūpa* or *Arūpa* beings, which are grasped by sense desire "they are mine" and are inclusive in *kāma* should be named '*kāmāvacara*'.

This way is known in the word, *Rūpāvacara* and *Aruṇpāāvacara* as well. Especially in those planes the dominating desire is a 'desire for Form (*rūpatanhā*)' and a 'desire for Formlessness (*arūpatanhā*)'.

Those *dhammas* which are free from dominating by three desires and are not inclusive in three planes, though they arise in three planes, are to be known as *lokuttara*, the supramundane.

In addition, Paṭṭhāna says that the 'thirst for *kāma* (*kāmatanhā*)', the sensual pleasure (*kāmacchanda*), arises even within the beings, *Arūpa*, in this passage, " *āruppe kāmacchandaṃ nīvaraṇaṃ paṭicca uddhacca-nīvararaṃ* (in *Arūpa*- plane the 'hindrance of restlessness' arises depending on the 'hindrance of sensual pleasure'...)"³¹. Therefore, it should be noted that the dominating desire for *kāma*- arising in the planes of *Rūpa* and *Arūpa*, arises even within the beings, *Rūpa* and *Arūpa*.

In *Pāli* the word, '*kāmacchanda-nīvaraṇa*' is used because it is equal to the state of *nīvaraṇa* (hindrance). Actually there cannot be known any hindrances that perform a real function of hindrance in *Jhāna* planes.

Here should be said 'the division of *kāma*': *Kāma* is two-fold: Subjective (*kilesa-kāma*) and objective (*vatthu-kāma*). Of those two, all types of craving except the craving of *Rūpa* and *Arūpa* are to be called the 'subjective *kāma*' in this section of four-plane division. All other *dhammas* of *kāmāvacara* that arise in three-plane are to be called the 'objective *kāma*' apart from the *dhammas* of *Rūpa* and *Arūpa*.

However, "all *dhammas* of three-plane are the 'objective *kāma*.'", said *Aṭṭhasālini*³². It should be known that the statement follows the way of *Sutta*, which is mentioned in *Mahāniddeśa*³³. Indeed, there are not any *dhammas* of *Rūpa* and *Arūpa* that are described under the name of *kāma*. [*kāmāvacara*]

19. In the word, *rūpāvacara* and *arūpāvacara*:: Herein these words, *Rūpa*

and *Arūpa* are commonly used respectively for those planes.

In another way, the planes are of two types: *Rūpa* plane and *Arūpa* plane. Of these two, the four-fold plane which has not the matter with 'the characteristic of changing (*ruppāna-lakkhaṇa*)' is to be called *Arūpa* plane. The other planes, twenty-seven in number, are to be called *Rūpa* plane. And among these (twenty-seven planes) the eleven lower planes are to be called *kāma* plane qualifying with common *kāma*. The sixteen planes above are said to be only *Rūpa* planes.

When craving or *Jhāna* are spoken by these words, *rūpa* and *arūpa*, it should be known as metaphorical terms (*upacāro*) indicating *nissitta* (depending thing) by the name of *nissaya* (thing where it depends). When it is spoken only plane (*bhūmi*) by these words, *kāmāvacara*, etc., it also should be known as metaphorical term indicating *nissaya* (thing where it depends) by the name of *nissita* (depending thing). The other points which should be said here have already been said in the section of the word, *kāmāvacara*.

Herein, it is the exposition of correct meaning which follows the *Pāli* in the section of *tebhūmaka* (dhammas existing in three-plane):

"Which *dhammas* are '*kāmāvacara*'? There are the *dhammas* - aggregates, elements, bases, forms, feelings, perception, mental formation and consciousness - occurring therein and including therein in those planes between the *niraya*, *avici*, the boundary below and *Paranimmita-vasavatti*, a plane of gods, the boundary above. These *dhammas* are to be called '*kāmāvacara*'.

Which *dhammas* are *Rūpāvacara*? There are minds and mental properties belonging to those who have attained, or who were born there, or who live in blissful life in present occurring therein and including therein in those planes between the *Brahma* world, the boundary below and *Akaniṭṭha*, a plane of *brahma*, the boundary

above. These *dhammas* are to be called '*Rūpāvacara*.'

Which *dhammas* are *Arūpāvacara*? There are minds and mental properties belonging to those who have attained, or who were born there, who live in the blissful life in present occurring therein and including therein in those planes between the plane of *ākāsānañcāyatana*, the boundary below and the plane of *nevasaññānāsaññāyatana*, the boundary above. These *dhammas* are to be called '*Arūpāvacara*'.³⁴

However, the definitions and decisions given in other ways here in *Ṭīkā*s³⁵ (Purāṇa, p.287; Vibhāvanī, p.76; Saṅkhepa, p.217-8) without following the way of *Pāḷi* text as said above are not note-worthy. Then, those and other definitions are given even in *Aṭṭhasālinī*³⁶? True. But having known the meaning which is correct, plain and following the *Pāḷi* text it is useless to think of various ways.

20. In the word, *lokuttara*: the *dhamma* in the three-plane (*tebhūmaka-dhamma*) as said above is to be called '*Loka*' in the sense of perish. It should be quoted: *Bhikkhus*, it perishes; it clearly perishes; so it is called *Loka*.³⁷

If so, the supra-mundane *dhammas* except *Nibbāna* are also to be known as '*loka*.' Why? Because they are also such *dhammas* that are in the nature of perish and clearly perish. No, it may not be so. Indeed, the term, '*Loka*', is used to prevent wrong view only in those *dhammas* where the wrong view- permanence, stability and eternity -occurs within beings. Therefore, it is said that those *dhammas* in which the wrong view does not occur cannot be said by the name of *loka*. In other way, by the name of *loka* it is commonly described only those *dhammas* of which the nature of perish and clearly perish is manifested for many people. Hence there does

not exist a supposition that *lokuttaras* are inclusive in *loka*.

It goes beyond *loka*; so it is called '*lokuttara*.' It denotes the 'Path-consciousness (*magga-citta*)'. It has already gone beyond *loka*; so it is called '*lokuttara*'. It denotes the 'Fruition-consciousness (*phala-citta*)'. But *Nibbāna* cannot be known by this definition.

Herein "going beyond" means only 'the state of not including' in the three worlds by being free from three types of craving. And 'that state of not being inclusive (*apariyāpanna-bhāvo*)' is assumed as a ground of those *dhammas* and so it is the fourth particular "*Avatthā* plane."

The exposition of correct meaning of 'the division of the four-fold plane' ends.

21. Having thus explained *citta* in four-fold by the lower and higher level, now clarifying this four-fold *citta* according to the order as said above, *Thera* said these words, '*Somanassa-sahagataṃ*', etc., to expound first *kāmāvasara citta*, then the lower 'non-beautiful consciousness (*asobhana citta*)' therein, and then again the lowest *Akusala* consciousness therein.

Herein, it should be noted that in the *kāmāvacara citta* too the order of *Akusala*, *Ahetuka* and *Sahetuka* is spoken according to the lower and higher level.

However, in *Vibhāvanī* it is said, 'to expound first the *Akusala* and *Ahetuka* which are less for the purpose of easily giving the name of *Sobhana* than to the other *cittas* which are many and will be said above' (p.76-7).

This is not correct. Because that meaning can be clearly known only by the order of level, lower, etc.

It is also said there (p.77): "only those *cittas* accompanied by attachment (*lobha-sahagata*) are said first; because they arise first as

a *vīthicitta* (thought process) within those who have just got rebirth in these and those lives".

This is too not justifiable. Because it is only *Manodvārāvajjana* that arises first of all as *vīthicitta* (thought-processes).

It should be noted that out of *Akusalas*, *Lobhamūla* is more and salient and distinct being with the two roots of birth-and-death circle; so only it is said first.

22. It is a lovely mind; so it is called *sumana*. It is a term for "lovely mind (*siniddha-citta*)." Indeed, 'the state of loveliness (*sundaratā*)' that is in the sense of faultlessness is not proper here.

In other way, *sumana* is one who has a lovely mind. It is a term for the person who has a lovely mind (*sinidda-citta-samaṅgī*). The state of a lovely mind or the state of a person who has a lovely mind is to be called *Somanassa*. It is a term for the pleasant mental feeling (*mānasika-sukha-vedanā*).

Herein, the state of a lovely mind or the state of a person who has lovely mind (*sumanassa bhāvo*) means that in that mind or that person there exists a source (*pavatti-nimitta*) of the word '*sumana*' (*sumanābhidhāna*) and of the perceiving of lovely mind (*sumana-buddhi*), "this is that *sumana*".

The 'state of being (*bhāva*)' is a source of a word or a perception in this sense "from that source words and perceptions are born." And in the word, *etasmiṃ*, the ending, *smiṃ*, is a locative case in the sense of cause (*nimitta*) as if in this example: "*nāgo dantesu haññate* (an elephant is killed for its tusks)." Just as to kill an elephant with tusk is for its own tusk, even so the word and perception arise on mind or person with feeling depending on that feeling which is a source. And some scholars say, 'it is *bhāva* because through which word and perception come into being'; or

others say, "from which."

It exists together with a pleasant feeling, so it is called '*somanassa-sahagata*'. It is meant 'associated with pleasant feeling.'

It views, so it is *diṭṭhi*. It is of two kinds: right view (*sammādiṭṭhi*) and wrong view (*micchādiṭṭhi*). Here 'wrong view' is proper, because it concerns *akusala* (immoral). Only the word, *diṭṭhi*, is used as *diṭṭhi-gata* as if these words, *gūthagataṃ muttagataṃ*.

It associates with wrong view in all its aspects; so it is called '*diṭṭhigata-sampayutta*'. It means that with wrong view it associates and unites as one, being in these aspects 'arising together', etc (*ekuppādatādīhi*).

In these words, *asaṅkhārika: mekaṃ sasaṅkhārikamekaṃ: saṅkhāra* is a prior action. It is of two kinds: effort (*payoga*) and instruction (*upāya*).

Of them, the 'effort' is a physical and a verbal action which are performed by others through command or request or threatening 'you must do this'. And instruction is of many types in this way: others explain this and that ways to do a work without command, etc.; clarify evil results in not doing and benefits in doing; make commitments; impose terms of punishment; or one reasons by recalling and contemplating this and that.

These two efforts are to be called here *saṅkhāra* (prior action) since being in this sense "it organizes and encourages the mind which is normally inactive without letting it not to do in this and that deed, so it is called *saṅkhāra*".

Then, the group of conditions which has not that prior action is *asaṅkhāra*. And the other which has it is *sasaṅkhāra*. It is truly said in Commentary:

"It is with a prior action, so it is called *sasaṅkhāra* 'together with a group of conditions, that is with effort, with means' is the meaning".³⁸

Herein, "the group of conditions is a group of common conditions beginning with object" said in Commentary.³⁹ However, the group of

conditions that is not common ,say, association with good persons;etc.is for *kusala* , association with bad persons is for *akusala* , should be separately said.

Then,that group of conditions ,if it by itself makes mind arise letting it not hesitate without the two prior actions, is to be called '*asañkhāra* .' And it which cannot make mind arise by itself without the two prior actions and it can make so only with the supporting of prior actions is to be called '*sasañkhāra* .' Thus, these terms '*asañkhāra* ' and '*sasañkhāra* ' are used only for the group of conditions (*paccaya-gaṇa*), not for mind.

But *citta* (mind) which arises by a mere group of conditions, the *asañkhāra* , is to be called '*asañkhārika* 'and by a group of conditions,the *sasañkhāra* ,is to be called '*sasañkhārika* .' Indeed,this suffix, '*ika* ' is in the sense of arising.

It is truly said in *Pāḷi* : "When the *akusala citta* (immoral mind)arises associating with pleasant feeling, accompanying by wrong view through the group of conditions..."⁴⁰

Herein, it should be connected "arises by a group of conditions,the *sasañkhāra* .This, here, is the exposition of the correct meaning of these words, *asañkhārika* and *sasañkhārika* .

In *Ṭīkā*s, without noticing this meaning and thinking of only mind to be *asañkhāra* and *sasañkhāra* it is said (*Purāṇa*,p.288;*Vibhāvanī*,p.77-8;*Sañkhepa*,p.219):

"It has no *sañkhāra* ,so it is called *asañkhāra* . Only *asañkhāra* is used as *asañkhārika* . And it exists with *sañkhāra* , it is to be called *sasañkhāra* . Only *sasañkhāra* is used as *sasañkhārika* .Then,it does not possess it,so it is *sañkhāra* .Only *asañkhāra* is spoken as *asañkhārika* .And it arises together with *sañkhāra* , so it is *sasañkhārika* ."

This is all not reasonable.

Then,it is also said in *Vibhāvanī*: "it makes mind to be in a state of keenness (*tikkhabhāva*) as its special ornament (*maṇḍna-visesa*), or it (mind) is made to be in such a state as its ornament in that way as said,so it is called *sañkhāra* . (p.77)"

This is also not correct. Because, if so, even the mind that arises with *sañkhāra* (*sasañkhārika*) may be in the state of keenness.

It is also said in that *Vibhāvanī*: " And that prior effort (*pubba-payogo*) occurs either in own mind that preceded it or in others' mind; so only the special state,the keenness of mind, that is generated by the prior effort is called here '*sañkhāra* '.(p.77)"

It is too not reasonable. Because giving the definition wrongly of these words, *asañkhārika* and *sasañkhārika*., the *sañkhāra* , according to it , is said depending on that wrong idea.

By this reason, this stanza is also rejected:

"The state of keenness born in mind which is produced by prior effort is called '*sañkhāra* ,' Through it the division of *asañkhārika* and *sasañkhārika* is to be known.(p.78) "

It is also said in that *Vibhāvanī*: "Inotherway, these words, *sasañkhārikaṃ* and *asañkhārikaṃ* ,are said referring to the absence and non-absence of *sañkhāra* , but not arising together since it does not arise together. And here also needs a *sañkhāra* which exists in different individuals,so the mind produced by such a *sañkhāra* is to be called '*sasañkhārika* ' defining thus: it has *sañkhāra* , so it is *sasañkhārika* . Because the word '*sa* ' here conveys the sense of 'having' as if in this example, "*sa-lomako* (one who has hair), and *sapakkhako* (a bird that has wing)." And the other mind is *asañkhārika* , since it has not *sañkhāra* . as said above (p.78)."

That statement too should not be noted, because it is said depending on his own idea without referring to the direct and apparent meaning that is

given in *Pāḷi* and Commentaries.

Herein, the mind that is caused by others' command or request or appeal, without one's own wish, is a mind that is produced by effort (*payoga-samuṭṭhita*).

Then, the mind that is caused by fear of others, or shame, or respect, or agreement, or fear of punishment, without one's own wish, is a mind that is produced by means (*upāya-samuṭṭhita*). Or the mind that is caused by giving instruction in various ways by oneself, after having noticed one's mind to be in a state of hesitation, or by recalling such and such ways is a mind that produced by means (*upāya-samuṭṭhita*). This is to drop a hint (*naya-dassana*).

Diṭṭhigata-vippayutta is that which dissociates from wrong view.

Upekkhā is that which sees an object with indifferent feeling. Or it views an object in the manner of moderation, so it is called *upekkhā*. To be explained; just as pleasant and unpleasant feelings view extremely an object, say, a person of pleasant feeling (*somanassito*) upsets when he dissociates from that object and a person of unpleasant feeling (*domana ssito*) upsets when he associates with that object either, even so *upekkhā* is not. Indeed, it views an object only in the manner of moderation. And it never makes a person upset concerning association with or dissociation from an object.

And some scholars say, "this meaning, 'it views in the manner of moderation' is not proper here. Because, *akusala* have not a state of moderation". Then, it is the combination: 'association with indifference (*upekkhāya sahaḡatam*)'.

23. Herein, these *dhammas*, contact, etc., initial application, etc., delusion, etc., exist and associate with this entire eight-fold consciousness. They, however, have no division as if 'feeling' has; no differentiation - occurring

in some of this consciousness, or not occurring in some of it as if 'wrong view' and 'prior action' have. Therefore, it should be noted that those *dhammas* are not listed here since they do not make this consciousness differentiate.

But craving (*lobha*) differentiates this eight-fold consciousness from other minds. And feeling, wrong view and prior action differentiate these minds each. So only those *dhammas* are, it should be noted, listed here.

Then, "joy, conceit, sloth and torpor differentiate mind, do not they? So they too should be listed here classifying 'that being with joy or without joy, that associated with conceit or dissociated from conceit, and that associated with sloth and torpor or dissociated from sloth and torpor', if argued, the answer is "No". Because, if take in the pleasant feeling (*somanassa*) of these 'joy (*pīti*) has already been taken in. Then, the other three (conceit, sloth and torpor) are not taken in since they are either the *dhammas* of occasion (*aniyata-yogī*) or the *dhammas* that are mentioned in the word, "yevāpana."

However, Keeping this in mind - these *dhammas*, contact, etc., initial application, etc., and delusion, etc., associate with other *cittas* and they do not differentiate this *citta* from others; so they should not be listed here - it is said in Vibhāvanī:

"Why is only the state of association with pleasant feeling said, although there are still other *dhammas* that associate, contact, etc., here? If asked, it is the answer: because, only these *dhammas*, pleasant feeling, etc., are not common to all. To be explained: some of these *dhammas* beginning with contact are common to all *cittas* and some are common to the *dhammas* beginning with *kusala*. Then, the *dhammas* beginning with delusion are common to all *akusalas*. Hence it is impossible to differentiate *citta* through those *dhammas* beginning with contact (p.78)."

That should be examined. Because, if so, the pleasant and the indifferent feelings and prior action may not be listed here; because these *dhammas* are also found in other *cittas* and they too do not make this *citta* differentiate from the other *cittas*.

24. Here are the conditions of the pleasant feeling (*somanassa-kāraṇa*):

to have *paṭisandhi* which associates with the pleasant feeling, to possess not a profound thought, to meet a pleasant object, and to be in the state of freedom from loss.

To be explained: One whose *paṭisandhi* associates with the pleasant feeling has a thought-process which is permeated by the *bhavanga* pleasure; hence his *citta* generally arises, whenever it arises, associates with pleasant feeling. Then he does not have a profound thought and has little desire. He thinks of little as much, of inferiority as superiority; so his mind also generally arises, whenever it arises, associates with pleasure. Then, the association with a pleasant object is the association with an object, inferior or superior, which is desired by oneself. Then, the freedom from loss is the freedom from loss beginning with 'the loss of relations (*nātibyasana*)'.

These are the conditions of indifferent feeling (*upekkhā kāraṇa*): to have *paṭisandhi* which associates with indifferent feeling; to possess profound thought; to meet a moderate object and to be in the state of freedom from loss.

Herein, 'to possess profound thought' is a state of filling with ambition. Such a person, indeed, even thinks of much as little, of superiority as inferiority.

These are the conditions of wrong view (*diṭṭhiyā kāraṇaṃ*): to have a tendency of wrong view; to associate with a person of wrong view; to turn away from the *dhamma* of good persons; to have mostly wrong thought and to

have an idea in incorrect way.

Herein, 'to have a tendency of wrong view' is to have the inclination of eternality and annihilation in this life since one became a holder of wrong view in previous life like *Kāṇāriṭṭha*⁴¹ and *Sunakkhatta*.⁴² To turn away from the true *dhamma* of good persons' is to be in a state of the absence of *dhamma* for a long time. 'To have mostly wrong thought' is to have mostly wrong thought by thinking of *dhammas* which are in a scope of the omniscient *Buddhas*, and not in a scope of oneself without realizing one's own ability. 'To have an idea in incorrect way' is the idea that the thing which is seen by oneself is assumed as an essence and as a truth.

In different way the conditions of 'the dissociation from wrong view' (*diṭṭhigata-vippayutta-kāraṇaṃ*) should be understood.

These are the conditions of *asaṅkhārika* (*asaṅkhārika-kāraṇa*):

To have *paṭisandhi* produced by the *kamma* which is without a prior action; to have the healthy body and mind; to have great patience; to discern the consequences in the effort of a man; to engage in a work and to have beneficial seasons and nutriment, etc.

Herein, 'to have great patience' is to have the great patience with cold and heat. 'The effort of a man' is an effort which should be done by a man. 'To engage in a work' is to be in the habit of doing.

In different way the conditions of *sasaṅkhārika* should be understood. Then, how to arise these *cittas* should be noted from *Visuddhimagga*.⁴³

By the word 'pi' in *aṭṭhapi* it adds the many of these *cittas* through the division of the course of *kamma* (*kammaṭṭhāna*) which is possible and the other divisions - time, individuality, object, etc.

The exposition of the correct meaning of *Lobhamūla-citta* ends.

25. In *Dosamūla citta*: it is a mind which is evil mind, so it is called *dummana*. It is a term for ugly mind (*virūpa-citta*). Or *dummana* is one who

has an evil mind ; it is a term for a person who has an ugly mind.

Then, the state of an ugly mind or the state of a person who has an ugly mind is to be called *dommanasa* . This word is used to describe mental distress. That mental distress is, indeed, the cause of the word, *dummana* , which lies on mind associated with it and a person possesses it or the cause of perception of mental distress, 'this is *dummana* '. The remaining has the same way as said above. It is the combination: '*domanassena sahatatam* (it associates with mental distress)'.

It impinges; so it is called *paṭigha* (repugnance). It is used to describe *dosa* (hatred). Indeed it strikes even against the *dhammas* that associate whenever it arises and it makes the *dhammas* that associate dry and burnt. It impinges upon its base and burns the heart and it makes the person (within whom it arises) to have the distorted face. Then, it impinges upon its object and receives it oppressively. So it is called *paṭigha* (repugnance).

Herein, a question may be posed: 'Firstly *saṅkhāra* differentiates this mind; so it is suitable to use the term *saṅkhāra* here; but feeling and repugnance do not make mind diverse; so they should not be used here' - if argued, the answer should be given.

At first, to use the word, *domanassa* , is to avoid the supposition (*pasaṅga*) which this *citta* may sometimes associate with other feelings. To be explained: when the kings smilingly order to execute the robbers, or when people declare their enjoyment upon the death of their enemies and delight in it, or when wicked people happily kill beasts and birds, there occurs the supposition - perhaps this *citta* may associate with pleasant feeling. Needless to say, there occurs the supposition - the *citta* perhaps associates with indifferent feeling. Therefore, using the term '*dommanassa* ' is to avoid the supposition that perhaps the other feelings associate.

Then, the word, '*paṭigha* ', is used to avoid the supposition that perhaps the other *dhammas* associate with this *citta* . To be explained: There may

occur such a supposition - 'some people who hold wrong views - *natthika* , *ahetuka* and *akiriya* - believe that there is no evil in committing execution of living beings; some also believe that there is no evil in killing animals but in killing human beings; some also believe that there are big merits which lead to birth in the deity world for those who practise sacrifice by slaughtering animals. They, holding the false view of *sakkāya* , commit killing living beings by themselves, or let others commit killing; so perhaps this *citta* (*dosamūla*) associates with wrong view (*diṭṭhi*).'

Then, there also may occur such a supposition: some of foolish and unintelligent people who hold right view are at first doubtful when they try to slaughter living beings following the manner of those who hold wrong view. At the time, this *citta* perhaps associated with doubt (*vicikicchā*). To avoid that supposition the word '*paṭigha* ' is used. Otherwise (*itarathā*) being clear that this *citta* associates with *paṭigha* through the minor conclusion like the former mind associates with *lobha* , to use these words, *domanassa* and *paṭigha* , may be useless.

Then, not to mention here *issā* (jealousy), *macchariya* (stinginess), *kukkucca* (worry), and *thina-middha* (sloth and torpor) should be understood as the way of not describing *Māna* (conceit) and *thina-middha* (sloth and torpor) in the former *citta* . This is here the exposition of the correct meaning.

However, it is said in *Vibhāvanī* and *Mahāṭṭkā*: 'To use this term *Dommanassa* is to mark the mind by means of a specific *dhamma* , or by means of a unique *dhamma* . (Vi, p.80; Mah, 2-121)

Herein, at first this word, "by means of the specific *dhamma* ," is not reasonable. Because it causes the unnecessary significance - 'although this *citta* associates with pleasant and indifferent feeling, the word, *domanassa* , is used to mark this *citta* with *domanassa* which is not common to other *cittas* , as if although previous and this *cittas* associate with *moha* , the

word, 'lobhasahagata, paṭigha-sampayutta', is used to mark these *cittas* with *lobha* and *paṭigha* which are not common to the other *cittas*.

Then, the word, 'to mark', also should not be said. If said, it causes the unnecessary meaning - 'it refers even to the other feelings which are not clearly known through the *domanassa* which is clearly known, like this example: *laddhātapatto rājakumāro* (a prince who has received a parasol).'

It is also said in Vibhāvanī: the state of association with repugnance (*paṭigha-sampayutta-bhāva*) is expressed to show that both these *dhammas* always arise together (p.80).

This is also not correct. Because such a significance can be known only through the minor conclusion.

27. Here are the causes of unpleasant feeling (*domanassa*) as well as repugnance (*paṭigha*): to have the state of tendency of hatred, not to have a profound thought, to have a little learning, to associate with the cause of animosity, or to meet an unpleasant object.

Herein, 'to have the state of tendency of hatred' should be understood as much habitual hatred. 'Not to have a profound thought' is in a position of having base desire. Then, for a person who has little learning, when stricken by vicissitudes of life, has no such contemplation: "nothing more could be done (*taṃ kutettha labbha*)."

How these two types of consciousness arise should be taken from *Visuddhimagga*. The meaning of the word, *pi*, has the same way as said before.

The exposition of the correct meaning of the *dosamūla-citta* (hatred-rooted mind) ends.

28. In *Mohamūla citta*: the meaning of these words, *vicikicchā*, *uddhacca*

, will be explained later.

Especially, this *citta* associates with *moha* (delusion), which has a chance being free from the other roots and is very powerful and *vicikicchā* (doubt) and *uddhacca* (restlessness) which are in a state of wavering and derangement. So the feeling in this mind cannot enjoy fully an object and only *upekkhā* (the indifferent feeling) associates with this *citta*.

And although it is so, there may occur such a supposition: 'this mind perhaps associate with the two feelings, pleasant and indifferent, because this mind arises just after the mind associated with pleasure or displeasure'. To avoid such a supposition the word, *upekkhā*, is used here.

Then, it should be noted that the word, *vicicchā*, is used to mark this mind by the *dhamma* that is not common to other minds and *uddhacca* is mentioned only in this mind in order to denote that having a chance it (*uddhacca*) is with great power only in this mind, although it associates with all *akusala* (Immoral minds). For this reason, it should be noted, that in the section of the outline of *dhammas* in *Dhammasaṅgī*⁴⁴ *uddhacca* is expressed in the other *akusala* minds under the term of 'yevāpana' (some) without description by name and only in this last mind it is mentioned directly by name.

Then, both of these minds are in the nature of sentient beings; they cannot be generated by means, effort or way, and they arise without drawing back, sinking, difficulty and trouble like *bhavaṅga citta*; so they are definitely *asaṅkhāra* and in this *citta* the division of *saṅkhāra* is not mentioned.

And for only that reason in this *citta* the term of the second mind, '*sasaṅkhārena*', is not said like in preceding *cittas* in *Pāḷi*.⁴⁵ This is here the exposition of the correct meaning.

However, it is said in Vibhāvanī: "these two *cittas*, being in a state of deep delusion and wavering, are absent from attachment and

hatred; so they associate with only indifferent feeling (p.81)".

This is not correct. Because *lobhamūla citta* (the attachment-rooted mind), although they have attachment, associates with *upekkhā* (indifferent feeling).

Then, it is said in that *Vibhāvanī* and *Mahāṭṭkā* as well: "these (two *cittas*) have no division of *sankhāra*. Because, they are absent from the natural activity and the encouragement (Vib,p.81;Mah,p.121).

Herein, by this assertion, 'absent from the natural activity', it rejects that this *citta* is to be absent from the prior action; by this, 'absent from encouragement,' it rejects the state of being with prior action; by both it denotes that these two *cittas* are totally absent from the prior action.

This does not correspond even with Commentary. The Commentary on 'the analysis of *paṭiccasamuppāda*'⁴⁶, it is true, says *avijjā* (ignorance) is to be of twofold only by the division of *sankhāra*. If these two *cittas* are absent from *sankhāra*, *moha* (delusion), too, in this *citta* may be absent from *sankhāra*; this *moha* is nothing but *avijjā* (ignorance); hence *avijjā* should be said to be of threefold in that Commentary, but said not so. Thus at first it does not correspond with Commentary.

Then, 'the state of sharpness of mind (*tikkhabhāva*)' is here said to be able to arise through the mere group of the usual conditions, without a prior action; so his *citta* appears in such a way. Therefore, it cannot be said that this *citta* has no activity in its nature.

It becomes bewildered much, so it is called '*mohamūha*'; although it is the term, *momūha*. is used according to the way of grammar.

29. The speech beginning with *iccevaṃ*, is a major conclusion. Herein, the word *iccevaṃ* is analyzed *iti + evaṃ*. This is a group of particle (*nipāta*). Or the latter word '*evaṃ*' describes the meaning of the former

iti. Or the word '*iccevaṃ*' is a single word of particle (*nipāta*).

By the word *sabbathāpi* it should be noted the significance: 'in aforesaid way beginning with *somanassa-sahagataṃ*'. It should be known that this word, *sabbathāpi* is a qualifier of the word, *dvādasa* (twelve).

Sabbathapi means that it is only twelve through the division which is mentioned in *Dhammasaṅgani*⁴⁷; it is only twelve through the division which is classified in *Vibhaṅga*;⁴⁸ it is only twelve through the division which is expressed in *Dhātukathā*⁴⁹, etc; it is only twelve through the division which is stated in such and such *Suttantas*; it is only twelve through the division which is classified as time, locality, continuity, etc. "How do they become twelve?" if asked, "in this way (they become) twelve" is the interpretation.

However, *Vibhāvanī* explains only the mode of association, etc. that is said before (p.81).

That is clear only by the word, '*iccevaṃ*'.

Akusalacittāni is the *cittas* which have such a name being with the contradictory nature of *kusala*.

Herein, only confidence, etc., are, indeed, *kusala* and only delusion, etc., are *akusala*. But *citta* is common to each other like contact, etc. It is true, the state of being conscious cannot definitely be with fault like delusion, etc. and without fault like confidence, etc.; if associates with *akusala*, it is called *akusala* and if associates with *kusala*, it is called *kusala*.

Then, it should be understood that the state of contradiction between confidence, etc., and delusion, etc., is to be a state of eradicating (*pahāyaka*) and of being eradicated (*pahātabba*) in their order.

To be explained: *Akusalas* are weak and worthless compared to a fake gold; they are not worthy of being developed and are wavering and scattering although they are repeatedly practiced. They respond only in one

life to be born in a woeful state even if they reach a state of certainty. And they cannot make sentient beings float on the current of *vaṭṭa* for ever, by entirely cutting off the root of *kusala* .

On the contrary, *kusalas* are strong and have essence like pure gold; they are possible to be developed. If repeatedly practised, they become more firmer and flourishing and prospering up to the super normal power to show various forms in the case of mundane stage and the Path of *Arahatta* in the case of supramundane stage. They reach a state of certainty and respond to attain *Nibbāna* without the *upādi* remaining by cutting off completely the current of *apāya* or *vaṭṭa* . Therefore, it should be understood that only *kusalas* are the 'eradicating' and the others are the 'eradicated.'

In another way, *kusalas* , even the act of offering of a morsel of meal, are accepted and done by wise only for eradication of *akusala* like preparing medicine (is to eradicate sickness) in the world. Therefore, only those *kusala* are the 'eradicating.' And the *akusalas* are only the nature of entire world like various diseases ; so they are the 'eradicated.'

Samattāni is so called because it is grasped without remaining. Or *samattāni* means that 'it comes to an end' or 'it is completed'. These words beginning with *aṭṭhadhā* is a summarized stanza.

It is the combination of words: '*lobho mūlaṃ etesanti (lobha mūlāni)*. In these words, *dvādasā'kusalā siyuṃ : siyuṃ* is noted here to be a particle and it means that the *akusala citta* are twelve.

Thus, the exposition of the correct meaning of *akusala citta* in the *Paramatthadīpanī* ,the fourth Commentary on *Abhidhammattha saṅgaha* , ends.

30. Having thus summarized *akusala* (the Immoral mind), the lowest of all, now *Thera* said the word, *upekkhāsahagataṃ* , etc., to summarize *Ahetuka citta* , then to expound at first , 'the result of *akusala* ', the lowest of

them all.

However, it is said in *Vibhāvani* with this idea that *citta*, being a result of *akusala* , is described just after *akusala* : "although these *ahetuka citta* have three types, the result of *akusala* , etc., to classify only 'the results of *akusala* ' just after *akusala* ...(p.82)."

This is not correct. If so, 'the results of *kusala* ' also should be said just after only the *kusalas* .

31 The meaning of these words beginning with *cakkhu* , *sota* , etc., will be explained later. It is conscious, so it is called *viññāṇa*.. It should be quoted: "*Bhikkhus* ,it is aware; it is aware; so it is to be called, *viññāṇa*." ⁵⁰

Cakkhuvīññāṇa is a *viññāṇa* which depends on eye. Or *cakkhuvīññāṇa* is a *viññāṇa* which is conditioned by eye that is its cause. Or *cakkhuvīññāṇa* is a *viññāṇa* which is caused in eye by *kamma* . Or *cakkhuvīññāṇa* is a *viññāṇa* which was born from the eye. Or *cakkhuvīññāṇa* is a *viññāṇa* of the eye which is the master being the faculty, Or *cakkhuvīññāṇa* is a *viññāṇa* which arises in eye. This way should be known in '*sotaviññāṇa* ', etc. also.

However, it is addressed in *Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhaya sutta*:

"Just as, *Bikkhus* , a fire shines burning wood; it is to be called 'wood-fire'. A fire shines burning a piece of bamboo; it is to be called 'the fire of a piece of bamboo'. A fire shines burning grass; it is to be called 'grass-fire'. A fire shines burning cow-dung; it is to be called 'cow-dung fire'. A fire shines burning husks of grain; it is to be called 'husk-fire'. A fire shines burning rubbish ; it is to be called 'rubbish-fire'.

Even so, *Bikkhus* , depending on eye and visible object arises consciousness; it is to be called only *cakkhu-viññāṇa* (eye-consciousness). Depending on ear and sound arises

consciousness; it is to be called only *sota-viññāṇa* (ear-consciousness). Depending on nose and odour arises consciousness; it is to be called only *ghāna-viññāṇa* (nose-consciousness). Depending on tongue and taste arises consciousness; it is to be called only *jivha-viññāṇa* (tongue-consciousness). Depending on body and tangible object arises consciousness; it is to be called only *kāya-viññāṇa* (body-consciousness).⁵¹

The word, *tathā*, refers *upekkhāsahagataṃ*.

It causes pain, so it is '*dukkha*'. It means that it afflicts and tortures the *dharmas* that associates, or the person who possesses it. In other way, it removes bodily pleasure, so it is *dukkha*. Or it is to be endured strenuously, so it is *dukkha*. Or it has a chance which is difficult to give, so it is *dukkha*. It is the name of the feeling of physical pain (*kāyika-dukkhavedanā*).

Sampaticchana is that which receives (an object) perfectly (*suṭṭhu*) and thoroughly (*paṭimukhaṃ*). Herein, *suṭṭhu* (perfectly) means without getting loss; *paṭimukhaṃ* means without thinking of the others; *icchati* means 'wants', 'pleases' and 'accepts'. Therefore, it gives the meaning 'accepted' in this sentence, *bhāsitaṃ abhinandun* (they accepted the speech).

It weighs (*tuleti*) and examines (*vicāreti*) well, so it is called *santīraṇa*. And *Ṭīkā* (p.289) says, *tireti niṭṭhāpeti* (=completes). *Vibhāvanī* (p.83) says, *tireti vīmaṃsati* (=examines).

32. Then, here are the four conditions of eye-consciousness: the eye is not ruined, it gets light conditions, visible objects come into sight, and attention.

These are four conditions of ear-consciousness: the ear is not in a state of ruin, it gets space conditions, sound comes into being, and attention.

These are four conditions of nose-consciousness: the nose is not in a state of ruin, it gets air condition, odour comes into being, and attention.

These are four conditions of tongue-consciousness: the tongue is not in a state of ruin, it gets water conditions, taste comes into being, and attention.

These are four conditions of body-consciousness: the sensitivity of the body is not in a state of ruin, it gets earth conditions, one of three tangible objects comes into being, and attention.

Here, it should be noted that to list 'the conditions of light, space, etc.' is to know that without these conditions the objects, *visible object*, etc., are unable to reflect on sensitive matters (i.e., that is able to be perceived by the sensory organs). Visible objects, although they come to exist, do not appear upon the eye if there is no light. This way should be known in the remaining.

In Commentary, however, it is said: "Though the eye is not ruined, the eye-consciousness does not arise if the external visible object does not come into view. Then, though the visible object comes into existence the eye-consciousness does not arise if there is no light condition."⁵²

This merely expresses, it should be noted, consciousness does not arise without light. But it does not express that the manifestation comes into being although there is no light. Otherwise there could be this improper meaning: even at a dark night visible objects come to see with eye.

33. *Akusala vipāka* is that which is 'the result of *akusala* (Immoral mind)'. Herein, in what sense is it *vipāka* (result)? It is in the sense of maturity. What is the state of maturity? Just as the state of ripeness of a mango fruit, etc. passing over the state of tenderness is to be called 'maturity (*vipaccana*)' in the world, even so the maturity here should be understood.

This meaning must be clarified by the four *samaṅgitā* (possessions). There are four *samaṅgitās*, wit, the possession of volition (*cetanā samaṅgitā*) the possession of *kamma* (*kammāsamaṅgitā*), the possession of

manifestation (*upaṭṭhānasamaṅgitā*) and the possession of a result (*vipāka-samaṅgitā*).

Of these 'the possession of volition' is to be connected with the three moments of volition, meritorious or demeritorious, at the time of acting this and that *kamma* in former life.

Then, this volition does not cease completely to be nothing, when it ceases. But it ceases after having placed its functional capacity in all its aspects within the thought-process to produce a result in future; that functional capacity follows that continuity for even thousands of aeon until it gets a chance. Referring to that, it is addressed in *Dhammapada* ⁵³:

"The evil action does not just produce an effect as if the milk just got does not effect to be curd. Indeed, it follows a fool burning him like the smoldering fire covered with ashes."

And that functional capacity cannot be said as a *dhamma* of the ultimate sense like the latent elements (*anusaya-dhātu*). This is the possession of *kamma* (*kamma-samaṅgitā*).

Then, this functional capacity seeks a chance to produce an effect when it receives appropriate supporting conditions. How does it seek a chance? That makes its appearance to a dying being, or it manifests itself as the symbol of *kamma*, or it causes the symbol of destination (*gatinimitta*) manifest. If that being receives that symbol without losing it, it receives a chance. This is the possession of manifestation (*upaṭṭhāna samaṅgitā*).

Then, for one who dies without losing that symbol the functional capacity, that is *kamma*, being a separate group of *paramattha* together with the associating *dhammas*, produces an effect filling the whole life with it. And 'filling the whole life with effect' means that it performs the function of *bhavanga* as long as one's life span, the function of *vipāka* (result) in six doors concern, and the function of *cuti* (demise) in the end. This is the possession of result (*vipāka samaṅgitā*).⁵⁴

Herein, it should be understood, the three former possessions out of the four are in a state of tenderness; the latter, the possession of result, is in a state of maturity. Therefore, the meaning of '*vipaccantī vipākāni*' should be known that they reach a state of maturity, the phase of ripeness, passing over a phase of softness and tenderness.

For this reason, the *kaṭṭā* matters are not included in the word *vipāka* ⁵⁵ although they are born of *kusala* or *akusala Kamma*. Actually these matters, being existent separately from the continuity of *kamma*, are to be only the particular matters which are born of *kamma*, but not to be called *vipāka*. It is true, the process of mind is one and the process of materiality is another. This is the exposition of correct meaning of the word *vipāka*.

Some commentators⁵⁶ clarify only mental *dhammas* to be *vipāka* referring to the equality of *kamma* from the point of mind and having an object. According to their idea it implies that the term '*vipāka*' is used for mental *dhammas* as usage (*ruḥī*).

Then, in those Commentaries⁵⁷, they denote the simile that among the stem, leaf, flower and fruit which are grown from *sāi* rice seed the name '*sāliphala*, *sāipakka*' is used only for the "corn" which is similar to the rice seeds. This simile too cannot describe the likeness. It is true, fruits too do not get the name, *pāka*, when they are in a position of tenderness. Besides, it is impossible to say that stem, leaf and flower do not get the name of *pāka* when they have fully developed. It is not that what cannot be said the maturity of stem, the maturity of leaf, the maturity of flower.

34. It makes happy, so it is called *sukha*. It means that it makes the associated *dhammas* or the person who possesses it to have a pleasant feeling. Or it removes well physical pain, or it should easily be endured, or it has a chance which is easy to give, so it is called *sukha*.

Kusala-vipākā-hetuka-cittāni is the *cittas* which are either the results of *kusala* or *ahetuka* being absence of *hetus* that associate.

However, in Vibhāvanī (p.83) it thinks of the supposition that *vipāka* can be *sahetuka* even through the producing cause which is borne together with previous *kamma*.

This is not correct. Because there is not such a place in *Abhidhamma* where *Vipāka* is denoted to have the possibility of *sahetuka* or *ahetuka* through the producing cause which is borne together with previous *kamma*. If there is, indeed, no possibility of other meanings (*sambhava*), there is too no inclusion of unnecessary meanings (*byabhicāra*); hence such a supposition is useless. Herein, *byabhicāra* (inclusion) and *pasāṅga* (supposition) are synonymous terms.

Herein, *akusala-vipāka*, being *abyākata* itself, has not the possibility of *sahetuka* through immoral *hetus*, *lobha*, etc.; being a result of *akusala*, has not the possibility of *sahetuka* through the faultless *hetus*, *alobha* etc. If there is not such a possibility, the inclusion of *ahetuka* is impossible. Hence, the term '*ahetuka*' is not used for *akusala-vipāka*.

Then, *kusalavipāka*, being a result of *kusala* itself, has the possibility of *sahetuka* through the faultless *hetus*, *alobha*, etc., which associate with *kusala* and *abyākata*. If there is such a possibility (*sambhava*) the inclusion of *ahetuka* is possible. Hence, the term '*ahetuka*' is used only for '*kusala vipāka*.'

35. *Pañcadvārāvajjana* is an *āvajjana* which arises in five-door beginning with 'eye', etc. It arises, indeed, being aware of an object which impinges upon five-door.

Manodvārāvajjana is an *āvajjana* which arises in mind-door, that is *bhavaṅga*. It arises, indeed, being aware of an object which manifests in that mind-door. Herein, *manodvāra* is to be known as the entire *bhavaṅga citta*.

However, it is at first said in *Ṭīkā* (p.290): "In the word, *manodvāra, mana* is the *bhavaṅga* which is the immediate condition of *āvajjana*; only that *mana* is to be a *dvāra* (door) being the entry of *vīthi citta* beginning with *āvajjana*, *javana*, etc."

And it is also said in *Vibhāvanī*: "*Manodvāra* is the *bhavaṅga citta* which is the immediate condition of *āvajjana*; because it is the entry of *vīthi-citta* (p.86)."

All are not reasonable. Because, if it is the meaning - 'only this *bhavaṅga* just after which *vīthi citta* arises is to be actually called *manodāra*, the entry of *vīthi citta*, not the other *bhavaṅga citta*s which preceded' - such unnecessary meaning arises: "only these bases, eyes, etc., upon which the objects, visible object, etc., impinge and the *vīthi citta*s, *āvajjana*, etc., arise, are to be called *dvāra* (door), the entry of those *vīthi citta*s, not the others". However, there are not such eyes, etc., which are not to be 'door'. And all of these will be clear in *dvārasaṅgaha* later.

Hasita means smiling. It is a state of amusement on the face. It produces the smiling, so it is called *hasituppāda*. Or *Arahants* make smiling by this *citta*, so it is called *hasituppāda*. Or smile appears through this *citta*, so it is called *hasituppāda*. It should be combined: "*hasituppādo eva cittaṃ hasituppāda-cittaṃ*."

It is the name of a *citta* through which *Arahants* smile at usual objects. It is true *Arahants* never smile at the usual amusing objects which are desirable, etc., like many worldly persons. And in *Ṭīkā*s (*Puraṇa*, p.290; *Vibha*, p.86) it is inflected as *hasituppādaṃ* perhaps referring to the word *citta*.

Ahetuka-kriya-citta is a *citta* which is either *ahetuka*, as said before, or *kriya* being lack of the function that is the maturity and the producing an effect.

Herein, it should be noted that *vīthimutta citta*s have function that is

weak; five *vinnaṇas* have bases that are weak; *sampaticchana*, etc., have function and place that are weak; so they exist in the mere state of maturity without their own effort, hence all of these *cittas* are to be only *vipāka*.

Then, those *cittas*, having function that is powerful, arise by their own effort and they have great effort to produce an effect in future; they are to be called *kusala* and *akusala*.

Then, those *cittas* arise with their own effort passing over the mere state of producing an effect; of them both *āvajjanas* are a little weak, because they receive their cause from *vipāka* process; the others are totally absent from effort to produce an effect, because they arise within those who have no possibility of passions (*nirānusaya-santāna*); hence, they are all to be '*kriyā*'.

36. Now the examination of feeling should be said from beginning. At first, these *cittas*, *cakkhu-viññāna* (eye-consciousness), etc., have seats (*vatthu*) and objects (*ārammaṇa*) which are *upādā* matters; the mutual impingement of the *upādā* matters has no strength like the mutual impingement of the ball of cotton; hence those *cittas* (eye-consciousness, etc.) associate with only *upekkhā* (indifferent feeling) towards the pleasant or unpleasant objects.

The *kāyaviññāna* (body-consciousness) has an object which is the great element; the impingement of the object element upon the elements where the bodily sensitivity lies passing over the body-base, just as the clash of a hammer and an anvil passing over the ball of cotton is very strong, when one strikes with a hammer putting a ball of cotton on the head of an anvil. Hence, *kāyaviññāna* (the body-consciousness) associates with pleasure towards the pleasant object and with pain towards the unpleasant object.

Sampaticchana arises just after five-*viññāṇas* which are the weakest and it is always weak; hence it associates only with indifferent feeling

towards every object. However, Vibhāvanī (p.84) gives the reason that these *cittas* receive a condition from those which have different bases.

Then, *santīraṇa* arises itself depending on the base which is full of strength and receives the condition from the former *citta* of which base is full of strength either. It has a little more strength. Therefore, that *citta*, if it is a result of *kusala*, associates with indifferent feeling on the pleasant object and with pleasure on the more pleasant object; if a result of *akusala*, it associates only with indifferent feeling on both pleasant and unpleasant object.

If asked 'why', this is the answer. If that *citta* has different feeling concerning the more unpleasant object, it may associate with both pain (*dukkha*) and grief (*domanassa*). Of these two feelings with pain, firstly, it cannot associate. Why? Because, pain (*dukkha*) depends definitely on body. With grief, too, it cannot associate. Why? Because grief (*domanassa*) which comes into a state of grief being effected through repugnance (*paṭigha*) never arises without repugnance. And the grief which is ever associated with repugnance, the real *akusala*, never arises in *abyākatas*.

Then, the two *āvajjanas* have a little more strength than *santīraṇa*. They have no own powerful effort to produce *vipāka*. Actually, those which arise depending on powerful conditions, *kamma*, etc., have the great power, and those which arise depending on powerless conditions, *Kamma*, etc., are powerless. Although there is such a state, the *āvajjanas* are both actually powerless being absent from *kammic* power and receiving a condition from the process of *vipāka*. Therefore, it always associates with only indifferent feeling.

However, it is said in Vibhāvanī: "*pañcadvārāvajjana* arises once on the object which is not received by any other *cittas* before. *manodvārāvajjana*, too, has another function to perform as altering

the different thought-processes. Hence, they are unable to enjoy well the taste of object and associate with indifferent feeling on all objects"(p.85).

Herein, 'has another function to perform' is not proper. Because the discrimination of *cittas*, powerful or not powerful, cannot be said through the *citta* just after arisen. But it can be said by means of own condition alone. Otherwise *saññā* also may have another function to perform. Indeed, this *citta* too alters thought-processes.

37. Then, some commentators say: 'there is no reason to say that these *cittas* do not arise, though they meet the group of usual conditions. So they are only *asankhārika* (unprompted)'.

It is, however, said in *Mūlaṭīkā* in the chapter of the *Vipākuddhāra*: "*Ahetuka vipākas* have a function that is not clear and they do not have either a state of *asankhārika* which is the contradiction of *sasankhārika kamma* or a state of *sasankhārika* which is the contradiction of *asankhārika kamma*. So *Thera* consents that those *cittas* arise even through both of *kammas* (prompted and unprompted)."58

Through this statement it is said that the three *kriya cittas* have not both of these states (promptitude and unpromptitude). Because they also have functions which are not clear.

In other way, it can be seen directly that beings try to act these actions - to see forms, to listen to sounds and so on - sometimes by their own wish and sometimes being encouraged by others. Herein, when beings do so by their own wish, all *vīthi cittas* beginning with *pañcadvārāvajjana* are to be *asankhārika*; when beings do so by encouragement of others, they are to be *sasankhārika*.

Then, it should be explained the two *upekkhā santīraṇas* which are included in *dvāravimuttas* like the eight-fold *mahāvīpāka*. Thus, all *Ahetuka cittas* can be classified through the division of *sañkhāra* in that aspect.

Although it is proper, it should be noted that these *cittas* have a function which is not clear, so the division of *sañkhāra* concerning *Ahetuka cittas* is not said in *Pāṭi*.

38. Then, *hetus* are great *dhammas*. So they never arise in those *cittas* which are born of powerless *kamma* and have a weak base, function and place.

Herein, all evil *kammas* associate with restlessness (*vikkhepa*), waver itself and has no strength. Therefore, that evil *Kamma*, though it can exist for an eon, is unable to produce a result with *hetu* in a suitable time. And good *kamma*, too, even though it is with three-*hetu*, is unable to produce a result with *hetu* which depend on weak bases, *eye etc.*, function and place, *seeing, etc.* Then, *āvajjana* and *hasana* are weak functions. So, should be noted that these *cittas* are all absent of *hetu*.

39. The meaning of the word, *sabbathāpi*, should be understood in the way said before.

However, it is said in *Vibhāvanī*: *sabbathāpi* means 'through the division of *akusala vipāka*, *kusala vipāka* and *kriya* (p.86)

This is not correct. Because this division has been taken by only the word, '*iccevaṃ*'.

This is the interpretation in the summarized stanza:

"The *akusala vipākas* are seven-fold according to the division of base and function; the *kusala vipākas* eight-fold according to the division of base, function and feeling; *Kriyas* are three-fold according to the division of function and door. Thus, *Ahetuka cittas* are eighteen."

Herein, the division of feeling concerning with moral results should be said. Otherwise, *Sanñā* may have no divisions. Likewise, in *kriyas* the division of door should be said. Otherwise, *āvajjana* may have no

division. But such division was not said in Tṭkās.

This is the exposition of correct meaning concerning *Ahetuka citta* .

40. Now *Thera* said this stanza to name the aforesaid *cittas* as *asobhaṇa* and to name the *cittas* which will be mentioned later as *sobhaṇa*. Actually, if named the *cittas* will be said above as *sobhaṇa* it implies that the *cittas* that was said before have been named *asasobhaṇa* without saying directly.

Herein, it is the interpretation: *Pāpāhetuka-muttāni* is that the fifty-nine or ninety-one types of *cittas* which are excluded from *akusala* and *ahetuka* are to be named *sobhaṇa* .

Herein, *pāpehi* means 'from *akusalas*'. It is true the *akusalas* causes beings who are endowed with them to be born in *apāya* without respect to their wish. It is why they are to be called *pāpa* . By this word 'without respect to their wish' it rejects the supposition (*pasaṅga*) that *puñña* too may be called '*pāpa*' in the sense of causing to be born in a blissful state. It is true the action to be born is not widely known concerning those who wish to be born. In other way, those *cittas* are to be called '*pāpa*' in the sense of inferiority.

Sobhaṇa is that they are endowed with the beautiful qualities beginning with confidence, and are themselves beautiful being in a state of excellence only for that aforesaid reason.

41. Now *Thera* says these words, *somanassa-saha-gataṃ* , etc, in order to express those beautiful *cittas* according to this order , inferior (*hīna*) and superior (*paṇīta*) .

Herein, it knows, so it is called *ñāṇa* .It is the meaning it penetrates things as they really are.'It associated with knowledge or dissociated from knowledge' is the combination of words, *ñānasampayuttaṃ ñāṇavippayuttaṃ* .

It has no *saṅkhāra* ,so it is called *asaṅkhāra* ; it has *saṅkhāra* ,so it is called *sasaṅkhāra* . It denotes is the unity of original conditions, the association with a good person,etc. which produces *kusala* .

To be explained: that unity of condition brings about *kusala* through its own power without twofold prior action (*payoga, upaya*). At the time, it is to be *asaṅkhāra* (the absence of *saṅkhāra*) . And it alone is unable to bring about *kusala* ; it brings about *kusala* only depending on the prior action. At that time, it is to be *sasaṅkhāra* .

It arises through *asaṅkhāra* ,so it is called *asaṅkhārika* . It arises through *sasaṅkhāra* ,so it is called *sasaṅkhārika* . Thus, all have already been said before.

Herein, the condition of pleasure, etc., have already been explained before. In other way, these conditions - to have confidence, to have right view, to have offertory and person who accepts offering, etc.- are the causes of the pleasant feeling. The contradictory conditions are the cause of indifferent feeling. Then, the conditions of joy and equanimity, the factors of enlightenment, which are expounded in commentaries⁵⁹ should be said in this place, too.

Then, to have the *kammic* conditions which produce wisdom, to be born in a celestial world, to have the maturity of faculties and to be far from mental defilements are the conditions of knowledge. And to have *paṭisandhi* which is with three *hetus* , to have a source of non-delusion, to associate with wise persons and the practice of learning and contemplation are also proper to be said as the conditions of knowledge. Then, the conditions of the examining dhamma, a factor of enlightenment, which are mentioned in commentaries should be said here. The contradictory conditions are the causes of *ñāṇavippayutta* (the dissociation from knowledge).

The condition of *sankhāra* have already been expressed before. The conditions of effort and tranquillity, the factors of enlightenment, which are

mentioned in Commentaries should be expounded here, too. The way of arising of these *cittas* must be taken from *Visuddhimagga*.⁶⁰

42. The word, *pi*, in *aṭṭhapi* is in the sense of addition (*sampiṇḍa nattho*). By this word, it adds that these *cittas* have the manifoldness by means of other divisions except the divisions which is mentioned here.

Herein, this is the way: These eight types of *cittas* multiplied by tenfold condition of meritorious action (*puññakriya-vatthu*) are eighty ($8 \times 10 = 80$). Then, these eighty types of *cittas* multiplied by six objects (*ārammaṇa*) come to be four hundred and eighty ($80 \times 6 = 480$). Those (480) multiplied by three actions (*kamma*) are one thousand four hundred and forty ($480 \times 3 = 1,440$). Then, those (1440) again multiplied by three qualities - inferiority, medium and superiority - come to be four thousand, three hundred and twenty ($1,440 \times 3 = 4,320$).

These should be put on two places with this idea that 'these are pure (*suddhika*)'. Taking one out of these two, it should be divided into two: then, the *citta* that associates with knowledge is two thousand one hundred and sixty (2,160). The *citta* that dissociates from knowledge is the same in number as well.

Then, the *cittas* that associate with knowledge (2,160) multiplied by four Dominating Factors (*adhipati*) are eight thousand six hundred and forty (8,640). But the *cittas* that dissociate from knowledge multiplied by three Dominating Factors except *vīmaṃsa* are six thousand four hundred and eighty (6,480).

Again, if both of these are added, these types of *cittas* totally fifteen thousand one hundred and twenty ($8,640 + 6,480 = 15,120$).

Again, if one adds these 15,120 types of *cittas* to the 4,320 pure types of *cittas* which separately have been set aside, these types of *cittas* altogether come to be nineteen thousand four hundred and forty ($15,120 + 4,320 = 19,440$).

Then, in *ṬṬkā* without taking *suddhika* and *ñāṇavippayutta* separately as mentioned here these all *cittas* are equally multiplied by *puññakriya*, etc. to be seventeen thousands two hundred and eighty (17,280).

Then, in *Vibhāvanī* (p.88) without taking *suddhika* separately and keeping separately only *ñāṇavippayutta* these all *cittas* are multiplied as before to be fifteen thousands one hundred and twenty (15,120).

All of these are not reasonable. If so, these *kusala cittas* of *kāmāvacara* are always with dominating factor and perhaps they are to be called *ninyatādhipatika* (*cittas* being with permanent dominating factor). But, these do not have the permanent dominating factors like the higher moral *cittas* and *Supramundane cittas* mentioned above.

According to the way in *ṬṬkā* it is implicit that *cittas* without knowledge associate with *vīmaṃsa* domination. In other way, it is not impossible to say thus: 'it is *kusala* that is in the sense of being born of wisdom'; according to this definition, these *cittas* without knowledge are also to be called *kusala*, because they arise through the condition of wisdom, the skillfulness, which arise in the thought-process that has different *āvajjana*; Similarly, these *cittas* without knowledge are also here to be called *vīmaṃsādhipatayya* (*cittas* being born of such domination) being produced by the wisdom, the *vīmaṃsādhipati*'. With this idea, perhaps these *cittas* without knowledge are not separated. Anyhow, these *kusala cittas* in *kāma* are mostly absent from Domination factors. So all these *kusalas* in *kāma* cannot be rooted in *vīmaṃsa*, a dominating factor.

43. This is definition-these *cittas* are either *kāmāvacara* or *kusala*.

Herein, in what sense is it *kusala*? It is *kusala* in the sense of health; in the sense of excellence; in the sense of skillfulness; in the sense of faultlessness; in the sense of the producing bliss.

To be explained: these *dhammas*, craving, etc., are *roga* being in the

sense of causing the pain of thought process; are non-excellence being in the sense of non-skillfulness; are faults in the sense of worthy of being blamed; are those that have a painful result being in the sense of producing unpleasant effects. On the contrary, these *cittas* are to be called *kusala* being recovered from those diseases. The 'state of health (*aroga*)' is the meaning; then, contrarily they are to be called excellence, skillfulness, faultlessness and having blissful result.

Kusala is that they destroy, shake, remove and eradicate the evil *dhammas* which are disgustful. Or they lie latent in their disgustful aspect within mental process of living beings, so they are called *kusa*; this term is used for the *dhammas*, craving, etc. They cut those *dhammas* out, so they are called *kusa-la*. In other way, knowledge is called *kusa* being in the sense of making them attenuate and empty. Those *dhammas* should be obtained by means of knowledge being *kusa*, so they are named *kusala*.

Or just as the *kusa* grass cuts the hand that touches it, so they cut the *dhammas* concerning mental defilement. Therefore, they are to be called *Kusa-la*. In another way, *kusala* is so called, because they destroy the evil *dhammas* that is disgustful (*kucchite pāpa-dhamme saranti, himsantī kusarā*). Here, *ra* changes into *la* (*kusara = kusala*); or it is called *kusala* in the sense of being produced by knowledge.

44. In *mahāvīpākas*, there is nothing to say about the meaning of words. The division of feeling (*vedanā-bheda*) should be spoken through object. These *cittas* truly associate with pleasant and indifferent feeling respectively on the very pleasant and moderately pleasant objects.

The division of association (*sampayoga-bheda*) should be said through *kamma* and *javana* minds. It is true those which are produced by powerful *kamma* associate with knowledge; those by weak *kamma* dissociate from knowledge. Sometimes, however, when they perform the *tadārammaṇa*

function, they associate with knowledge if follow mostly the *javana* mind with three *hetus* (*tīhetuka-javana*) and dissociate from knowledge if follow the other *javana* minds with two *hetus*.

The division of *saṅkhāra* (*saṅkhāra-bheda*) is spoken by some masters only through *kamma*: "Those *cittas* which are produced by the *kamma* without *saṅkhāra* are *asaṅkhārika*; those which are produced by the *kamma* with *saṅkhāra* are *sasaṅkhārika*."

However, the division of *saṅkhāra* is said by the commentator who summarized⁶¹ through the conditions which meet. To be explained: these *mahāvīpāka*, when they arise receiving the objects, *kamma*, etc., which manifest through such and such action of relations, etc. at one's dying time in previous life, are *asaṅkhārika* at the time of rebirth. At the time of *tadārammaṇa*, they are *asaṅkhārika* when they follow the *javanas* of *asaṅkhārika*, and are *sasaṅkhārika* when they follow the *javanas* of *sasaṅkhārika*.

Here, the word *pi* is also in the sense of addition (*sampiṇḍanattho*). By this the multiplicity of these *cittas* are added through the set of six of object (*ārammaṇa-chakka*), the triplet of inferiority (*hīnattika*) and through the time, locality, continuity, etc.

However, these *mahāvīpāka cittas* cannot be multiplied by means of the conditions of meritorious actions (*puñṇakriya-vatthu*), *kamma* and dominating factors (*adhipati*), because they never perform the function of giving (*dāna*), etc., the function of bodily action (*kāyakamma*), etc., and they do not depend on *chanda*, etc.

It is said in Vibhāvanī: "These *cittas* never perform the function of *kamma-dvāra* due to the fact that they do not produce information (*viññatti*); never perform the function of *kamma* because of not being in the nature of effectuating (p.89).

This should be examined. Because, it was said before that *kusala* is

multiplied only through the tetrad of *kamma* , but not through the *kamma-dvāra* separately. The tetrad of *kamma* exist only through the three-fold *Kamma* door.

If asked - in the Commentary⁶² it is said,'the division of *kamma-dvāra* , *Kamma-patha* , condition of meritorious action which were mentioned in the *kusala* of *kāmāvacara* is not available here; why ? Because they do not bring about information (*viññatti*); not produce an effect and not perform the function of meritorious action' - it is the answer: it is true. in that Commentary by this statement - the division of *kammadvāra* is not available here ,because they do not bring about information - it indicates that there is not such a division, bodily action, verbal action and mental action.

By this statement - the division of *kammapatha* is not available here,because they do not produce an effect - it indicates that there is not the ten-fold *kamma patha* .

Here, however, without taking the division of *kammapatha* , even in *kusala* , only the tetrad of *kamma* which is classified through three-fold *kamma* door is taken. That also can be known only by this statement - they do not become through three-fold *kamma* door because of the fact that they do not produce information. Then, *kusala* is also multiplied by the tenfold *kammapatha*, if so, here too it should be said that *vipākas* do not exist through *kamma patha* because of producing not an effect.

45. In *mahākriyas* the division of feeling (*vedanābheda*) will be said by himself later only through object like in the *mahāvīpāka* .However, The division concerning with the association with knowledge, the dissociation from knowledge,the absence of *sankhāra* and being with *sankhāra* , should be possibly known as said in *kusala* .

However, without examining Vibhāvanī says it should be

known that the *kriya citta*,too, associate with pleasant feeling,etc.in the way as said in *kusala* .(p.90)

This is not reasonable.

The meaning of these words, *iccevaṃ* , *sabbathāpi* , has already been explained before.

Sahetuka-kāmāvacara kusala vipāka kriya cittāni : Herein, the word '*sahetuka*' if it relates with the word '*kusala*' is a qualifier of *bhūta-kathana* (revealing as it is). For that reason it has been mentioned in minor conclusion of *kusala* ; if it relates with these, *vipāka* and *kriya* , it is regarded as a qualifier of *byavacchedaka* (excluding).

However, it is said in Vibhāvanī: here the connection of words should be known in accordance with the possibility (*yathālābha*) like in this passage of Sutta 'he sees gravel, pieces of pots, shoals of fish standing and wandering'.(90)

There is no resemblance between them. Because there it is suitable 'gravel and pieces of pot do not wander'; but it is not suitable here '*kusala* is not *sahetuka* .'

46. In the summarizing verse: *vedanā-ñāṇa-sankhāra-bhedena* means that through the division of feeling; through the division of knowledge; through the division of *sankhāra* .

Herein, it is the meaning: *Vedanā-bhedena* means that through the division of *citta* which is clear by the division of feelings. *ñāṇabhedena* means through the division of *citta* which is clear by association with and dissociation from knowledge. *sāṅkhāra-bhedena* means that through the division of *citta* which is clear by the unity of conditions without or with *sāṅkhāra* .It is true. It is the quality of the compound words that they can describe the various meanings known easily through a few words.

By this statement, it clarifies that there is no chance of such a question put forward in Vibhāvanī (p.90) regarding to the division of knowledge

and *sankhāra* which have no division by themselves and to the classification of *cittas* .

Herein, it is the interpretation: The *kusala* (moral), *vipāka* (resultant) and *kriya* (inoperative) *cittas* in *kāmaāvacara* with *hetu* are known, as in their order, to be six, twelve and twenty-four.

But here it also should be said thus:

vedanā nāṇa saṅkhāra , bhedenetāni aṭṭhadhā .

puññapākakriyābheda , catuṣsatividhā matā .

(These *kāmāvacara* *cittas* are eight-fold through the division of feeling, knowledge and *sankhāra* . They are known to be twenty-four through merit, result and inoperative types).

If so, the meaning is more clear and it accords with the summarized verses which will be said above as well.

47. This which begins with '*kāme*' is a summarized verse concerning with all types of *cittas* in *kāma* plane.

Herein, it is the interpretation: in *kāma* plane all resultant types of consciousness, with *hetu* and without *hetu* , are twenty-three ; the meritorious and demeritorious types of consciousness are twenty-fold; all inoperative types of consciousness ,with *hetu* and without *hetu* , are eleven . Thus these *kāma* types of consciousness are fifty-four in all its aspects .

Sabbathā : here the word '*pi*' is omitted. The meaning of it was mentioned before : they are only fifty-four in all aspects as said in *Dhammasaṅgani*⁶³ ; they are only fifty-four in all aspects as classified in *Vibhaṅga*⁶⁴ and so on.

By this statement it rejects the words of *Vibhāvanī* by which the meaning of '*pi*' is explained through the inclusive divisions of *kusala* etc., as said here. Besides, it is said in *Vibhāvanī* (p.90) that *kāme* means "*kāme bhava*" (in the life of *kāma*).

This, too, should be examined. Because the term ,*bhava* , can be found in *Abhidhamma* being in the sense of *kusala* and *akusala kamma* and resultant mind and *kaṭattā* matters which are produced by *kamma* ,not being in the sense of other *dhammas* , mind and matter.

Actually, here the expression, *kāma* , is a synonymous word for '*bhūmi*' . And '*bhūmi*' is said to be the unity of *dhamma* which concerns animate and inanimate together with their locality. So the meaning should be noted that *kāme* is 'in *kāma* plane.' Or the word, *bhava* , is used for only '*bhūmi*' by defining in the way of *Suttanta* thus: "*bhava* is that where living beings and conditioned things come into being". This way should be known later, too.

The exposition of correct meaning of the *Kāma citta* in *Paramatthadīpanī* , the Fourth Commentary on *Abhidhammattha sangaha* ends.

48. Now, after having expounded the 'compendium of the *Kāma citta*' thus, *Thera* said "*vitakka vicāra pīti sukhe-kaggatā-sahitaṃ* ," etc. in order to expound the 'compendium of *Rupa citta*' which is in its turn.

The *dvanda* should be done thus: "*Vitakko ca vicāro ca pīti ca sukhaṃ ca ekaggatā cāti (vitakka vicāra pīti sukha-kagatā .)*" Then, it is combining: "*tāhi sahitaṃ (vitakka...sukhe-kaggatā sahitaṃ)*" "*Pathama jhāna kusala cittaṃ* is a *kusala citta* which associates with the first *jhāna* being the unity of initial application, sustained application, joy, bliss and one-pointedness.

Herein, in what sense is it *pathama* ? And in what sense is it *jhāna* ?

Pathama is that which must be attained first. *jhāna* is so called because it meditates upon the object, *kaṣiṇa* , etc., and the characteristics beginning with impermanence, and it burns the opposed *dhammas* (*paccanīka-dhamma*). And it is noted that only *ekaggatā* (one-pointedness)

is endowed with more ability in these two senses.

To be explained: it is called *ekaggatā*, because it has a dominating quality upon such a mind which is 'ekagga' in the sense of that 'it has one point or one side', that is one object.

It is only *ekaggatā* which is to be called *samādhi* in this sense that 'it well keeps the mind upon only one object without giving it wander about the various objects and keeps the mind away from the opposed *dhammas*; or it keeps the mind equally by making faculties equal and by not letting the mind be in the state of sluggishness and restlessness on that object either. And only that *ekaggatā* which is pointed, in *Pāḷi* (*Dhammasaṅgani*⁶⁵), as the absence of scattering (*avisāhāro*), the absence of distraction (*avikkhepo*), the solidity and the steadfastness of mind (*saṅṭhiti*, *avathiti*).

Then, the other factors beginning with *vitakka* are also called *Jhāna* because they extremely support that *ekaggatā*.

To be explained: At first *vitakka* makes mind firmly towards an object by not letting it draw back through sloth and torpor. Indeed, *vitakka* has the characteristic of sending mind towards an object. It is the direct opposite of sloth and torpor, the hindrances.

Then, *vicāra* makes mind follow an object by not letting it to be doubtful through *vicikicchā*. Indeed, *vicāra* has the characteristic of examining object like the nature of knowledge. It is the direct opposite of doubt, a hindrance.

Then, *pīti* makes mind delight in an object by not letting it dislike through hatred. Indeed, *pīti* has the characteristic of pleasing an object. It is the direct opposite of hatred, a hindrance.

Then, *sukha* makes mind please and increase by not letting it to be restless through the distraction and worry. Indeed, *sukha* has pleasantness as its characteristic. It is the direct opposite of the distraction and worry, the hindrances. Then, *upekkhā*, being the nature of calmness, is included in

sukha.

By doing so, these *dhammas* condition the mind to have one-pointedness. Only having the state of one-pointedness is termed '*ekaggatā*'. That *ekaggatā* being supported in this way by those *dhammas*, having more strength, concentrates closely upon that object focusing still on that object, *kaṣiṇa* object, etc., protecting the mind from wandering towards various objects through sensual pleasure. Therefore, all of those *dhammas* are called *Jhāna* in the sense of close concentration.

When those *dhammas* come into existence in this way the hindering factors, the opposite of those *dhammas*, having no chance, are unable to arise even in the mind and they are said to be burnt. So those *dhammas* are called *Jhāna* in the sense of burning the opposite phenomena.

Although those *dhammas* have separate task, it should be known, the term '*Jhāna*' is used only for 'the unity of these *dhammas*' like the term '*ratha* (cart)' is used only for the unity of parts of a cart. Because the unity of *dhammas* (*dhamma-sāmaggī*) is chief regarding to the three places - *magga*, *Jhāna* and *sambodhi*. Only when these factors come into unity they accomplish the function of "close concentration", etc., by reaching the stage of *appanā*. And although those *dhammas*, as said, perform respectively their own functions, they complete only 'the function of closely concentration (*upanijjhāna-kicca*)', that is the keeping mind firmly on an object.

The other commentators say "only their own tasks beginning with the sending mind towards an object, of these five *dhammas*, are each to be called the function of concentration. Hence in *Paṭṭhāna*⁶⁶ in *jhāna-peccaya* those *dhammas* perform respectively as the "condition of *jhāna*." So it is possible to say that even each of these are *jhāna*. Furthermore, in these words, *pañcaṅgikaṃ sīlaṃ*, *dasāṅgikaṃ sīlaṃ*, the unity of fivefold, etc., is the reason only for the name of *pañcaṅgika*, etc. of those moralities, not for

the state of morality. It is true it cannot be said that even one of the factors of morality, abstaining from killing, etc., are not "morality." Likewise, it is impossible to know here thus: the unity of five factors is the reason for the state of fivefold-factor, etc., and the state of being the first *jhāna* , etc., but not the state of being *jhāna* . Otherwise, the factors of *jhāna* in *jhānapaccaya* may be only the *dhamma* of reverse."

By this assertion as far they said it cannot be known that although this *citta* associates with *phassa* ,etc. those *dhammas* ,*phassa* ,etc.,having not such a special task,are not mentioned here,

*Dutiya**jhāna kusala citta* is a kusala citta which associates with the second *Jhāna* formed by *vicāra pīti sukha ekaggatā* .The same in the rest.

49. Herein, a question may be posed: By which is the division of *jhāna* factors made? It is made by the wish of a person. To be explained: one, having *vitakka* as his company ,dislikes *vitakka* again after giving the first *jhāna* with five-fold factor arise and having the mastery of that *jhāna* ; he wishes to attain the *jhāna* of four factors ,the absence of *vitakka* ,by overcoming it. At that time, when he practices the mental culture again only with such a wish after absorbing firmly the first *jhāna* to make the foundation and giving it up,he attains the *jhāna* with four factors,the absence of *vitakka* .

Herein, this mental culture, although it is with *vitakka* , is 'the culture for detachment of *vitakka* (*vitakka-virāgabhāvanā*)' owing to having been practiced with such a wish. And through this power of such a mental culture that *Jhāna* arises with four factors except *vitakka* . This way should be known in remaining *Jhana* attainments.Thus it should be known that through the wish of a person, the division of *Jhāna* factors is made.

Herein, the absorbing each of the former *Jhānas* is certainly necessary to have the ground of higher and higher *Jhāna* attainments. It is said in

commentary ⁶⁷:"each of the former *Jhānas* which is well practised is to be the proximate cause of the higher *jhānas* each."

Through the power of wish,however, a higher *jhāna* , if arises, cannot be equal to the *jhāna* which is foundation. It is true only the wish of a person is much more powerful than the *Jhāna* which is foundation. For that reason the Blessed One addressed: " *Bikkhus* , the aspiration is successful for one who has good morality because of purification.⁶⁸" Then,this meaning will be clear when it concerns supra-mundane consciousness above.

50. Herein a question may be posed: Why is the division of *sankhāra* not said here? Because it is not said in *Pāḷi* text. Why is it not said in *Pāḷi* text? Because it can be known only through the word on the division of ways (*paṭipadā*).

To be explained: If all *jhānas* ,mundane or supramundane,have easy ways (*sukha-paṭipadā*),it has already been said to be *asaṅkhārika* . And if have the difficult ways (*dukkha-paṭipadā*),it has already been said to be *sasaṅkhārika* .

If asked " how is it to be known ?", it is the answer: Because it is found in Commentary. It is, verily, said in *Aṭṭhasālinī* thus:

"At first,when one expels mental defilements,he does so with pain,effort,attempt and fatigue; his way is painful.And when one expels mental defilements,he does so easily and without fatigue; his way is easy."⁶⁹

The same in *Sammoha-vinodaṇī*⁷⁰ and *Visuddhimagga*⁷¹,as well.

Herein, in the former sentence it is found these words, "with pain, effort and attempt" , so in the latter sentence it should be regarded to be found these words, "with easiness, absence of effort and absence of attempt".

Herein,*sasaṅkhārena sappyogetna* means 'with the unity of conditions

beginning with seeing the fault of sensual pleasure which is together with effort and attempt'. By this word (*sasañkhārena* , etc.), it is said that all *jhānas* of which way is painful have the state of '*sasañkhārika*.'

Asañkhārena appayogena means with only those conditions which is absence from effort and attempt. By this word, it is said that all *jhānas* of which way is easy have a state of '*asañkhārika* .'

Then, it is known that the *jhānas* with quick intuition have a state of *sasañkhārika* ,if their way is painful. It is also known that the *jhānas* with sluggish intuition have a state of *asañkhārika* ,if their way is easy.

If so, how is the division of *sañkhāra* to be known concerning those *jhānas* which are absent from ways and completed by *magga* or by birth?

Those *jhānas* also have the state of 'painful ways and easy ways' through the existence and non-existence of conditions which hinder the *samāpatti* (attainment) at the time of absorbing them.

Of these two *jhānas* , the *jhāna* which is completed by *magga* is the *jhana* which is completed simultaneously with the attainment of *magga* within those whose vehicle is the pure *vipassanā* . That *jhāna* is two-fold: the *jhana* which is completed by lower *magga* and the other which is completed by *arahatta magga* . Of these two, the *jhāna* which arose within the five hundred monks mentioned in *Mahāsamaya Sutta* ⁷² is that *jhāna* which is completed by lower *magga* . The *jhāna* belonging to Ven. *Ānanda Thera* is that *jhāna* which is completed by *arahatta magga* . Furthermore, the *jhāna* ,too, which arises within the *anāgāmīs* who is killed unnoticedly with knife and immediately dies is equal to the *jhāna* by *magga* .

Then, one was born in one of *Rūpa brahma* worlds after having accomplished the eight-fold attainments. His attainments come from birth. It is a *jhāna* which is completed by birth.

It is true, even in one life the *jhānas* attained have the different means during the absorbing period through the condition that exists. Or these

jhānas may be included in the *jhāna* of *asañkhārika* being absence from means through which *jhāna* arises.

In other way, in *Netti*⁷³ the division of *sañkhāra* concerning all concentration, mundane or supra-mundane, is explicitly stated. It should be quoted: "Concentration is of two kinds: the concentration with *sañkhāra* , and the concentration without *sañkhāra* ."

Then, it is said in commentary: the two concentrations of sluggish and quick intuition which have an easy way are to be *asañkhāra* and those which have a painful way are to be *sasañkhāra* ⁷⁴.

So far as I said it is clear that the all *jhāna cittas* ,*Mahaggata* and *Lokuttara* ,have two sorts each , *asañkhārika* and *sasañkhārika* .

Especially, it should be noted that the term, *sañkhāra* ,is common to even *akusala* ;but the term, *paṭipadā* ,is specially used for the *dhammas* practised; indeed, the *dhammas* , *Mahaggata* and *Lokuttara* ,are certainly the *dhammas* practised; so in *Dhammasaṅgani*⁷⁵ they are not classified through *sañkhāra* ,but *paṭipadā* .

Here it is the exposition of the correct meaning .

51. It is said in *Vibhāvanī* (p.93) : "It is impossible to say that the all *jhānas* are *asañkhārika* , because they never be attained through mere *adhikāra* without the preliminary action, the primary effort and are *sasañkhārika* , because they never be attained through the mere preliminary action, the primary effort, without *adhikāra* ."

Herein, at first "it is impossible to say that the all *jhānas* are *asañkhārika* , because they never be attained through the mere *adhikāra* without the preliminary action, the primary effort " is not reasonable. Because the preliminary action, the primary effort, cannot be regarded as *sañkhāra* in the division of *sañkhāra* . Why? Because it (the primary effort) is an original condition which brings about *jhāna* .

To be explained: in the world or in this teaching, there is not a *kamma* , good or evil, at least the offering of a morsel meal ,which arises by itself without the appropriate preliminary action,the primary effort.

Then,the *citta* does not arise without the suitable preliminary action, the primary effort; that action is included in the unity of the original condition of that *citta* .And all *jhānas* ,mundane or supramundane,never arise without the appropriate former mental culture ,the preliminary action; therefore, that mental culture is included in the unity of the original condition of these *jhānas* . Otherwise, it is implicit that there not any *kammas* , *kusala* and *akusala*, which are not *asaṅkhārika* .

Then, in that Vibhāvanī it is said: "it is impossible to say that it is *sasāṅkhārika* ,because they never be attained through the mere preliminary action,the primary effort, without *adhikāra* .(p.94)"

This is also not reasonable; because it cannot be said that the mundane *jhāna* arises without *adhikāra* . Actually, in commentaries it is said that the *jhāna* which has an easy way arises within those who have *adhikāra* in *samatha* meditation in previous life; and the *jhāna* which has a painful way arises within those who have not such an *adhikāra* .

It is truly said in those Commentaries: " Then, one had no practice in *samatha* ; his way is painful. And one had practice in it; his way is easy."⁷⁶.

Actually, to examine here the division of *sāṅkhāra* referring to *adhikāra* that was completed in previous life is not reasonable. It is, indeed, reasonable to examine such a division only through the conditions in the *jhāna* of *kusala* and *kkriya* . By what I have said, the later exposition beginning with '*atha vā* ' is also totally rejected.

52. Herein, the former period before the imaginary sign arises is, for one who practices *jhāna* ,the field of *paṭipadā* , and the later period the field of *Abhiññā* .

Herein, in former part 'the practice of mental culture' of one who acts with tiredness due to the opposite conditions is 'painful ' and of one who acts without tiredness is 'easy'. And in later part, the *Abhiññā* of mental culture of one who attains slowly the state of *Appanā* is quick intuition(*dandhā bhiññā*), and of one who attains quickly the state of *Appanaā* is sluggish intuition (*kippaābhiññā*).

Herein, through painful way in former part a *jhāna* that has been later attained sluggishly or quickly is to be called painful practice (*dukkhāpaṭipadā*); through easy way in former part is to be called easy practice (*sukhāpaṭipadā*). However,in the place of the second *jhāna* , etc., the division of ways (*paṭipadābhedo*) should be understood through the state of being painful or easy to abandon the attachment to the former *jhāna* .

Herein it must be decided: "nowadays a person, layman or ascetic, although he had not any *adhikāra* which was done in previous life, practises *jhāna* being in a state of freedom from the principle of disturbance , standing in correct ways, removing the impediment and practicing with great determination; it cannot be said he cannot accomplish the mental culture of *jhāna* ." [*kusala jhāna*]

53. In *Vipāka jhāna* : The *kusala* in *kāma* plane, being not in a stage of *appanā* , is soft and powerless. It becomes mature in various functions and places that have less power and in inferior lives.So it produces a result which is not equal to itself. However, the *kusala* of higher stage (*mahaggata kusala*),having reached to the stage of *appanā* ,becomes sharp and powerful. It becomes mature in the place of *bhavaṅga* of a superior *brahmā* . So it always produces a result which is equal to itself. For this reason *vipāka* is expounded equal to *kusala* in all aspects through this: *vitakka vicāra pīti sukhe'kaggatāsahitaṃ ...*

However,some commentators say "that *kusala* of higher stage

produces only such a result which is equal to itself, because it effectuates immediately in the next life."⁷⁷

This is not correct. If so, the seventh *javana* of *kusala* in *kāma* plane also may produce only such result which is equal to itself.

Then, the *kriya jhāna* is only the *kusala*. which arises within those whose mental process is absent from *anusaya* (e.g. *Arahantas*). So that *kriya citta* is expounded equal to *kusala*.

54. The word beginning with *pañcadhā* is a summarized verse.

Herein, *Jhānabhedena* means 'through the division of association with five *jhānas* beginning with the first *jhāna*. It is interpretation: 'the *Rūpāvacara citta* is five-fold through the division of *jhānas citta* that associated with the first *jhāna*, associated with the second *jhāna*, associated with the third *jhāna*, associated with the fourth *jhāna* and associated with the fifth *jhāna*; thus it is five-fold. The only five-fold *citta* is fifty-four through the division of *kusala*, *vipāka* and *kriya*.

However, it is said in Vibhāvanī: "*Jhānabhedena* means 'through the division of association with *Jhāna* factors'"(p,94).

It is not correct. Because the division of *Jhāna* is one thing; the division of *jhāna* factor is another. Herein, the division of *jhāna* is that the first *jhāna*, the second *jhāna* and so on. The division of *jhāna* factor is that the first *jhāna* which has five factors, the second *jhāna* which has four factors and so on.

Of these, the only division of *jhāna* is necessary here, not the division of *jhāna* factor. It is true *citta* is five-fold only through the division of *jhāna*, not through the division of *jhāna* factor. It is, indeed, the only *jhāna* which is five-fold through the division of *jhāna* factor.

Then, in that Vibhāvanī it is said: "*Pañcadhā* means that it is of five kinds namely *Jhāna* with five factors, *Jhāna* with four factors, *Jhāna* with three factors, *Jhāna* with two factors, *Jhāna* again with two

factors. (p.94)"

This is also not correct. Because it is only *Jhāna* which has five factors, etc., not *citta*.

The exposition of correct meaning of *Rūpāvacara citta*.

55. Now it is spoken '*ākāsanañcāyatana kusala cittaṃ*, etc.' to explain *Arūpa citta* which comes into its turn.

Herein, *ākāsa* is so called, because it shines extremely. To be explained: That *ākāsa*, although it cannot be known itself as substance, appears shining extremely through the light of moon and sun. Some scholars say "it cannot be scratched by cutting and breaking it; so it is *akāsa* (non-scratched). Only the word *akāsa* is used as *ākāsa*.

That *ākāsa* is of four kinds: *ākāsa* without tangle, *ākāsa* that is divided, *ākāsa* that is obtained by removing one of nine *kasīṇa* objects and *ākāsa* that separated *Rūpakalāpas*.

Of these the *ākāsa* that is obtained by removing one of nine-fold *kasīṇa* device is necessary here. That, indeed, seems to be one with the infinite *ākāsa* without tangle. And meditator widens it to be "infinity." Therefore, the infinite space is to be called *Ākāsānanta*. In other way, it has neither the limitation of arising nor the limitation of falling, so it is also called *ananta*. Only the word *ākāsānanta* is used as *ākāsanañca*, because the word is completed with 'ya' which is in the sense of the stem word concerned.

Then, just as the abode of gods is to be called *devāyatana*, even so the infinite space, here too, is called *āyatana* in the sense the ground of *Jhāna* together with its concomitants which reached at the stage of *Appanā*. Thus, *Ākāsānañcāyatana* is that it has infinite space as its ground. It is a term for a unit of mind and mental properties.

It is truly said in Vibhāṅga: "*Ākāsāñcāyatana* means mind and

mental properties of one who has attained the *jhāna* on the infinite space which is its ground, or who was born in it, or who dwells happily in it experiencing it."⁷⁸

Ākāśānañcāyatana kusala cittaṃ is a *kusala citta* which arises on the infinite space that is its ground.

Viññāṇaṇcāyatanaṃ : Herein, *Viññāṇa* is only the *citta* dwelling on the infinite space that is its ground. That *Viññāṇa*, although it has a limit beginning with arising, is called 'infinite' due to being on the infinite space. Or the word *anta* is in the sense of a "part." It is called *ananta* because it arises through the mental culture on that object which is received all its parts without focusing on one part, the part of arising, etc.

Or it arises on the object of space which is infinite, so *jhāna* is *ananta* ; it arises on the infinite object through the mental culture on the object of infinity, so *citta* is called *ananta* . Or it is reasonable to say that it is *ananta* from the point of prevailing on the object of space which is infinite.

Viññāṇānantam is a *viññāṇa* that is infinite. Only *Viññāṇānanta* is used as *Viññāṇaṇca* according to the grammatical method. *Viññāṇaṇcāyatana* is a *jhāna* that has an infinite mind as its ground. A *kusala citta* which arises in the unity of mind and mental states, the infinite mind being its ground. This is a compound word.

In Vibhaṅga it is truly said: "*Viññāṇaṇcāyatana* means the mind and mental properties of one who has attained the *Jhāna* on infinite mind being its ground, or who was born in the plane of infinite mind being its ground, or who dwells happily in it experiencing it."⁷⁹

However, it is said in Vibhāvanī (p.95) and Mahāṭṭkā (1-401): "it should be attained through the second *āruppa viññāṇa*, so it is called *viññāṇaṇca* .

It does not accord with the following Pāṭi. It is actually said:

"*Anantaṃ viññāṇam* means to only that *viññāṇa* a *yogi* pays attention discerning by knowledge and widens it with the intention of infinity. For this reason it is called *anantaṃ viññāṇam* ."⁸⁰

By this statement it is known that *viññāṇa*, indeed, associates with the qualifier, "infinite". It is another version, "*tameva ākāśam* " meaning 'only that space.

Ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ: Herein, '*kiñci, kiñcanaṃ*' are synonymous terms in the sense of "a little." The first *Āruppa* mind has no remaining, even a little at least the moment of falling, so it is called '*akiñcana* .' And it is *akiñcana* which is a state of 'nothingness'. That is 'the nothingness of the first *Āruppa* mind'. It is true that mind has such a name by means of the intention - "it does not exist even a little." That mind has nothingness which is its ground... and such way has been said.

Nevasaññā nāsaññāyatanaṃ : Herein, referring to the gross perception it has no perception, so it is called '*nevasaññā* .' And referring to the subtle perception it is not having-no-perception, so it is called '*nāsaññā* '. It has no perception, nor is having-no-perception, so it is called *nevasaññā nāsaññā* , making the ending of the former word long. This term is used for the unity of mind and mental properties.

Compounding : only *nevasaññānāsaññā* is the *āyatana* in the sense of a ground of the special happiness of a *yogi* , so it is called *nevasaññā-nāsaññāyatanaṃ* . And in it a *kusala citta* arises.

In other way, only perception, due to not performing a function of true perception, is "non-perception" and due to having the rest of *sañkhāra* in a subtle state, it cannot be said "non-perception". So it is called *nevasaññā-nāsaññā* . Only that *nevasaññā nāsaññā* is the ground as well. And *kusala citta* which associates with it. This is how to compound words.

Furthermore, herein *yogīs*, having regularly practiced, reach this attainment, the acme of the mundane *dhammas* in the sense of being

subtle, by abandoning the hindrance factors and the gross *jhāna* factors, *vitakka*, etc., making the rest of the *dharmas* gradual subtle through the power of mental culture. So in this *jhāna*, *citta* is also either 'non-mind or not non-mind'; *phassa* (contact) is also either 'non-contact or not non-contact'; feeling, etc., are in the same way. It is, therefore, noted that the word '*saññā*' used here is to give the mere headline of the speech.

In *Vipāka*: *Viññāṇa* in the word *Viññāṇaṇcāyatanaṃ* is only *kusala* of the first *Āruppa*. That, too, it should be noted, a *viññāṇa* which arose in the former life. Then, *akiñcanabhāva* is the state of nothingness of only that first *viññāṇa*.

In *Kriya citta*: *Viññāṇa* is, it should be known, the first *Āruppa* mind which is two-fold: *kusala* and *kriya*. Then, *akiñcanabhāva* is the state of nothingness of that two *viññāṇas*.

In the verse of summary: *Ārammaṇappabhedena* means 'according to the objects which are four-fold beginning with the space arisen by removing *kaṣiṇa* that is perceived by mind'.

Herein, the four sets of object is twofold: the four sets which are passed over (*atikkamitabba-ctukka*) and the four sets which are received (*ālambitabba-catukka*).

Herein, regarding the first *Āruppa* the *kaṣiṇa* device, the object of the fifth *RūpaJhāna*, is an object which is "passed over"; by removing that object a *space* that must be obtained is the "received."

Regarding the second *Āruppa* the space which is the object of the first *Āruppa* is the "passed over"; the first *Āruppa* mind is the "received".

Regarding the third *Āruppa* the first *Āruppa* mind is the "passed over"; the nothingness of it is the "received".

Regarding the fourth *Āruppa* the nothingness is the "passed over"; the third *Āruppa* mind is the "received".

Herein, it should be noted 'the division of this mind is clear according

to the division of the objects that are received; because, in this mind only the objects that are received are explicitly describe by means of "*ākāsānañcā nyatanaṃ*" etc., although this *Āruppa* mind is four-fold according to the four divisions of the objects that are passed over'.

It is the interpretation: "*Āruppa* mind is four-fold according to the object that is received and only it becomes twelve as the division of *kusala*, *vipāka* and *kriya* .

The exposition of correct meaning of the *Āruppa citta* .

57. Now, the words *sotāpattimagga cittaṃ* is said in order to expound the Supramundane *citta* (*lokuttara citta*) which comes into its turn.

Herein, it flows without going back; so it is called *sota*. The term is used for the current in the river *gangā*, etc. That (current) truly flows without going back from the source up to the great ocean. It is similar to the current; so it is called *sota*. That is a term for the Path (*magga*) with eight-fold factor.

It should be quoted: "Friends, there is the noble Path with eight-fold factor, namely, Right Understanding Right Concentration. Friends, this noble eight-fold Path is called *sota* ."81

It is true. This eight-fold Noble Path, too, since it commences until the element of *Nibbāna* without any of the rest of consequences of *kamma* and passion, flows spreading its power without going back.

It should be quoted:

"*Bikkhus*, just as there are large rivers, namely, *Gangā*, *Yamunā*, *Aciravatī*, *Sarabhū* and *Mahī*. All these rivers slope down to the ocean, bend on the ocean and inclined to the ocean. So, *Bikkhus*, a monk who makes the eight-fold Noble Path developed and repeated, slopes down to the *Nibbāna*, bends on the *Nibbāna* and inclined to the *Nibbāna* ."82

Herein, "going on without turning back," is noted as not approaching again to the passions which have been eradicated by such and such *magga* and as reaching regularly the state of maturity of the faculties beginning with confidence.

It should be quoted:

"*Bikkhus*, just as a pot of water, if turned over, ejects water and never takes it back. So, *Bikkhus*, a monk who makes the eight-fold Noble Path developed and repeated, vomits the evil unwholesome *dhammas* and never takes them back.⁸³

It also should be quoted:

"To the passions which have been eradicated by the knowledge of *Sotāpattimagga* one does not go back, does not approach back, does not reach back, etc."⁸⁴

To be explained: the worldly persons go back to the passions even which have been eradicated. After having been *tihetuka* they again go down to the position of *dvihetuka* and *ahetuka*. Therefore, they are found again in the woeful states although they have been born in the plane of highest life above. They become again without morality although they have had good morality. They became mad or absent-minded again although they have had mental concentration. They became foolish and dull again although they have been wise. The noble persons are not like that.

Those noble persons do not go back to the passions which have been eradicated through such and such *magga*. They never get back the state of worldly persons or that of noble persons junior in rank. They are gradually to be in a state of maturity of the faculties beginning with confidence. This all states accomplish through the power of the Noble Path only. Therefore, it is regarded that the term '*sota*' is used for only that *magga* which is the source.

To reach that *sota* at the very beginning is to be said *sotāpatti*. The

magga which must be attained by reaching the *sota* at the very beginning is *sotāpattimagga*.

In other way, referring to this passage "a noble person is he has attained the *dhamma*"⁸⁵ the whole *dhammas* of *bodhipakkhiya*, mundane or supramundane, which occur within noble persons are called *sota* in the sense of flowing without going back, as said before, as inclining to the higher knowledge and to the *Nibbāna* without remains. And persons attain that *sota* through the practice at the very beginning, so it is called *sotāpatti*. It is either *sotāpatti* or *magga*, so it is called *sotāpatti-magga*. It is, verily, said in Commentary: *Sotāpattiyāṅga* is a factor of *sotāpatti* which is the first *magga*.⁸⁶

Magga means way (*patha*) or means (*upāya*). Some scholars say: 'it quests *Nibbāna* or it should be quested by those who want *Nibbāna* or it goes to *Nibbāna* by removing mental defilements, so it is called *magga*'.⁸⁷

However, it is said in Vibhāvanī: "Sotāpatti is one who has the attainment of *sota*, the noble path at the very beginning, so he is called *sotāpatti*. This term is used for a person.(p.97)"

This is not correct. Because the word, *sotāpatti*, which describes a person cannot be found anywhere. By this, the definition '*sotāpattimagga* is the path of a person who has the attainment of *sota*, noble path at the very beginning' is also rejected.

Sotāpattimagga citta is a *citta* which associates with the path, *sotāpatti*

However, it is said in Ṭīkā: "*Sotāpattimagga citta* is *magga citta* which is obtained by reaching the *sota*.(Purāṇa.p.297; Vib.p.97)"

That is not correct. Because the word, '*Sotapatti*,' that connects with the word '*citta*' is not found in any Pāḷi Text.

58. *Sakadāgamī* is one who is in the habit of coming once to this world as being reborn. This term is used for a person who has attained the second

fruition. That person, although he is standing in the highest life above, has the nature of coming again to this *kāma* world to be reborn. Because he, having the sensual pleasure uneradicated lying latent and passions which makes him come back to the *kāma* world, does not overcome the nature of coming to this world.

It is truly said in *Catukka nipāta*⁸⁸ :

"*Sāriputta* , here some persons have the Fetters that causes to be born in the Lower part uneradicated. He lives on the attainment of the *Jhānas* which has neither perception nor non-perception as its ground. He was born, after death, without failure from this attainment, in the society of the *devas* who have attained the *Jhāna* which has neither perception nor non-perception as its the ground. He, after death, becomes a person in the habit of coming due to coming to this life.

Here also, *Sāriputta* , some persons have eradicated the Fetters which cause to be born in the lower part . He, after death from that life, does not become a person in the habit of coming due to not coming to this life."

In Commentary, it is said: "*Itthattaṃ* means the appearance of five *aggregates* which belong to this *kāma* world."⁸⁹

This meaning is said referring to the appearance of passions, not the appearance of a person. It is true, the *brahmās* who are *sotāpanna* and *sakadāgāmī* never come even to the lower *brahma* world as being reborn in it. Needless to say, they will not come to the *kāma* world as being reborn in it.

If asked 'how is it known? ',it is the answer -it is known through this which is said in *Anusaya yamaka* :

"Within someone who passed away from *kāma* world and was born in *rūpa* and *arūpa* world, the seven states of *anusaya* lie latent;

within someone five states of *anusaya* lie latent; within someone three states of *anusaya* lie latent." After having said thus, it is said: "Within one who passed away from the *rūpa* and *arūpa* world and was born in the *kāma* world, only the seven states of *anusaya* lie latent."⁹⁰

Herein, in the former statement, for worldly person 'seven' was said; for *sotāpanna* and *sakadāgāmī* 'five' was said, and for *anāgāmī* 'three' was said. But in the latter statement, only for the worldly person 'seven' was said. Because *brahmas* who are *sotāpanna*, *sakadāgāmī* and *anāgāmī* never go to *kāma* world to be reborn.

Then, in the commentary on *Dhammahadaya Vibhanga* it is said:

"Those persons, *sotāpanna* and *sakadāgāmī* , who are born in *rūpa* world, never come to this world again; they cease to exist only there. They are, truly, called *anāgāmī* through *Jhāna* ." ⁹¹

And, it is also said:

"The noble disciples, who were born in nine *brahma* worlds, have either "rebirth therein" or "rebirth in higher plane" but not "rebirth in lower plane." But the worldly persons in it have "rebirth therein" or "rebirth in higher plane" or "rebirth in lower plane."

That state of not coming back is only through the power of *Jhāna* which has the companion of *magga* , not the power of *magga* .

Herein, the meaning of the word, 'to this world', is given in two ways in commentaries⁹²: 'to this human world' or 'to this *kāma* world'. Of these two, if the former meaning, "come" means 'one comes from deity world'; if the latter, "come" means 'one comes even from *brahma* world.' However, in *Pāḷi* it seems to say only the latter meaning .

It is truly said in *Pugglapaññatti* :

"Not coming to this world, the person is regarded, by that reason, as *Anāgāmī* (non-comer). Coming to this world, the person is

regarded, by that reason, as *Sotāpanna* and *Sakadāgāmī*." ⁹³

Herein, though the word, *anāgantvā itthattam*, it denotes the meaning- "one does not come to this *kāma* world, so he is called *Anāgāmī*." But by this words, *āgantvā itthattam*, it describes the meaning - "the two persons, *Sotāpanna* and *Sakadāgāmī*, come again once to this *kāma* world, so both of them are to be called "*Sakadāgāmī*." Why ? Because these two words, *itthattam*, which stand in consecutive sentences are possibly in different meaning.

Then, the Blessed One says in *Kaṇṇakatthala Sutta* of *Majjhima paṇṇāsa* :

"O great king, the *Brahmā* who has mental pain comes to this world; the *Brahmā* who is free from mental pain does not come to this world" ⁹⁴.

Herein, by the word, "who has mental pain (*sabyāpajjho*)," it denotes the *Brahmas*, *sotāpanna* and *sakadāgāmī* together with worldly persons. It is true, they have not eradicated *byāpajjha*, the mental pain, due to having not removed the repugnance lying latent and they are to be called *sabyāpajjha*.

Then, the word, "one who comes to this world (*āgantā itthattam*)", means that one who is in the habit of coming or in the nature of coming again to this *kāma* world to be reborn. In the reverse way, the meaning of latter sentence should be understood.

To be continued: it should be noted ' of those two persons of once-returners the former is named only *sotāpanna* possessing the first attainment of noble path, *sota*, which is not common to others'.

However, as "going by person (*puggalagati*)" here for those who are in *brahma* world have not a position of *sakadāgāmī* as if the position of "no-more-seven-times-of-rebirth" (*sattakkhattuparama*), etc. It is true the persons who possess the first and the second fruitions in that *brahma* world are counted as *Anāgāmī*. Therefore, this *sakadāgamī* is a name only for a

person in the second stage of fruition, born in *kāma* world; so it should be known that the state of "once coming" of them is mentioned in Commentaries ⁹⁵ by means of rebirth in lower and higher life only within *kāma* world.

For this reason, it is said in *Pāḷi* Text, too:

"Five persons have 'the end herein': one who has no-more-seven-times'rebirth (*sattakkhattuparama*), one who goes from-higher-to-higher to be born (*kolamkola*), one who has only one seed of rebirth (*ekavjji*), once-returner (*sakadāgāmī*) and one who becomes *arahā* only in this life." ⁹⁶

Furthermore, this 'once-returner' is of six kinds:

- i. one, having attained here, ceases to exist here (*idha patvā idha parinibbāyī*),
- ii. one, having attained there, ceases to exist there (*tattha patvā tattha parinibbāyī*),
- iii. one, having attained here, ceases to exist there (*idha patvā tattha parinibbāyī*),
- iv. one, having attained there, ceases to exist here (*tattha patvā idha parinibbāyī*),
- v. one, having attained here and having been born there, ceases to exist here (*idha patvā tattha nibbattivā idha parinibbāyī*), and
- vi. one, having attained there and having been born here, ceases to exist there (*tattha patvā idha nibbattivā tattha parinibbāyī*).

Of these, "one, having attained here, ceases to exist here" means in this human life one has attained the 'Path of once-returner' and only in this human life having attained the Path of *Arahant* one ceases to exist.

Then, "one, having attained there, ceases to exist there" means in that world of gods one has attained the Path of once-returner and only in that world of gods having attained the Path of *Arahant* one ceases to exist.

Nibbattitvā means having appeared as rebirth. Especially, some commentators say the meaning of the word, *imaṃ lokam*, to be in the sense of "to this human world". In such a meaning the person of "once-returner" is only five-fold and the sixth person is not said.

It is also said in *Vibhāvanī*: "Here needs only the fifth among the five-fold "once-returner". Because he, having gone from this world, comes back once to this world (p.97)."

However, in the Commentary on *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta*⁹⁷ and in that on *Mahāvaggasaṃyutta*⁹⁸, it mentions even the sixth person in the sense of "once-coming."

Actually it should be noted: even the omniscient *Buddhas*, when have been attained the second fruition, are in the position of "once returner", as if they are in the position of "no-more-seven-times' rebirth" when they have attained the first fruition until the higher path entered. Therefore, it is impossible not to be called *sakadāgāmī* who stationed in the second fruition in the sense of "once-coming." Hence those six persons are all to be certainly called *sakadāgāmī* here.

Sakadāgāmi-magga is a path which belongs to the person of once-returner. That Path, it is true, being itself a "producing" (*janaka*), brings about the "produced" (*janetabba*) that belongs to the person of 'once returner.' So to be 'qualifier and qualified' is reasonable here by relating as "produced" and "producing" like these terms *tissassa mātā*, *phussassa mātā* (*Tissa's mother and Phussa's mother*).

However, it is said in *Vibhāvanī* with this idea - to be 'qualifier and qualified' is not reasonable; but there is something which is useful; as the useful thing there is nothing contradictory: "Although only the person stationed in fruition is to be called *sakadāgāmī* due to the fact that the person who possesses the Path has not such a

"coming,"; but the Path arisen before, being the cause of fruition, is spoken as *sakadāgāmi-magga* qualifying with the name of *phalaṭṭha* to cut the other 'Path' off. It is in the same way with regard to the word, *anāgāmi-magga*. (p.98)"

It is not reasonable.

It is how to combine the words: *Sakadāgāmi-maggena sampayuttaṃ cittaṃ sakadāgāmi-magga-cittaṃ*.

59. *Anāgāmī* is so called because he does not come again to this *kāma* world to be reborn having completely eradicated the Fetters concerning the lower part (*orambhāgiya-saṃyojana*). It means that he will be definitely born only in *brahma* world. And it is spoken according to the mere power of this Path. If he has, however, the insight knowledge for higher path he also will definitely attain the *arahatta magga*.

It is definition: *Anāgāmi-magga* is a Path that belongs to *Anāgāmī*, the person who stationed in fruition. *Anāgāmi-magga-cittaṃ* is consciousness that associates with the Path of *anāgāmī* (Non-returner).

60. *Arahā* is so called because one is worthy of excellent honour owing to possessing the virtues that produce a great benefit. This term is used for the person whose mind is free from mental canker and being stationed in the fourth fruition.

It is the definition: the state of *arahanta* is to be called *arahatta*. The term is used for the fourth fruition. *arahatta-magga* is the Path that belongs to *arahatta*. *Arahatta-magga-cittaṃ* is consciousness that associates with *arahatta magga*. By the word, *pi*, the number of *magga citta*s which are divided in *Pāḷi* text⁹⁹ are added.

Herein it is a way of division in *Dhammasaṅgani*¹⁰⁰:

Regarding the first Path, there are nine *citta*s in the first section of

suddhika-paṭipadā out of the five sections of *jhāna* in the two ways - four sets and five sets. In the same way there are 9 *cittas* each in these sections - *suddhika-suññatā* (pure emptiness), *suññatā paṭipadā* (the way of emptiness), *suddhika-ppaṇihitā* (pure non-desire) and *appaṇihita-paṭipadā* (the way of non-desire). Thus, in these five sections there are 45 *cittas* according to ten ways. And in the same way there are 45 *cittas* each in five sections which are mentioned by the name of *magga*, *satipaṭṭhāna*, etc. numbering 19. Thus, there are 900 *cittas* according to two hundred ways in one hundred sections which are mentioned by the twenty names.

Again, there are 3,600 *cittas* according to eight hundred ways in the four hundred sections which are mentioned by mixing with four Dominating Factors. Thus, in the first *magga* there are 4,500 *cittas* according to one thousand ways. The same way in the rest of the *maggas*, too. Thus, in four *maggas* there are 18,000 *cittas* according to the four thousand ways.

However, in the *Sacca* and *Satipaṭṭhāna-vibhaṅga*¹⁰¹ there are 90,000 *cittas* according to twenty thousand ways. In the *Magga-vibhaṅga*¹⁰² there are 126,000 *cittas* according to twenty-eight thousand ways. Then, in Commentaries¹⁰³ there talk about only the number of ways, not that of *cittas*.

In *Vibhāvanī*, however, it is said: by the word, *pi*, it is included the sixty-thousand ways which are mentioned in *Sacca-vibhaṅga* (p.98).

That should not be said in the conclusion of *kusala*. Because, the way of sixty thousand divisions is described in Commentary¹⁰⁴ to be explained only in the place of *vipāka*.

And it is also said in it:

"Without touching the division of *paṭipadā* it is divided two-fold:- *suññata* (emptiness) and *appaṇihita* (non-desire) (p.98)"

This is not reasonable. Because in Pāḷi Text¹⁰⁵ the division of

paṭipadā is mentioned only at the beginning. But at the beginning there is no immediate section that is divided into two: *suññata* and *appaṇihita*.

And it is also said in it:

"*suññata* is one way; *appaṇihita* one; *suññatas* which are associated with *paṭipadā* are four; *appaṇihitas* four; thus there are ten ways. With this idea it is classified in to ten by the name of *Jhāna* (p.98)".

This is not reasonable. Because these, *suññata*, etc., are not a 'way' here. Indeed, only these two ways- tetrad and pentad- are to be a 'way' here in each of them. By this all of these assertions - *tathā magga-satipaṭṭhānāni*, etc.- are rejected. [*magga-cittam*]

61. In the word, *phala citta*, *phala* is the Path with eight factors which is the result or the unity of associated *dhammas*. *Sotāpatti-phala* is a fruition that is attained by first reaching to *sota*. *Sotāpatti-phala-cittam* is a *citta* that associates with *sotāpattiphala* or a *citta* which is included in *sotāpattiphala*. The same way in the second and the third one, too. Then, *arahattaphala* is that which is either *arahatta* or *phala*. And "that which associates with *arahattaphala*; a *citta* which is included in it" is the definition.

62. In the verse of summary *Catu-magga-ppabhedena* means through the division of the Path of eight factors which is of four kinds due to being attained four times.

If asked, "why are they attained four times?" it must be answered: first, the faculties, confidence, etc., in *sotāpatti-magga* are in a state of tenderness. So that the Path of *sotāpatti* is able to eradicate only wrong view and doubt. But it is unable to even to make thinner the others, sensual desire and hatred.

Those faculties in the second Path are a little more sharp; so that the second Path is able to make thinner sensual desire and hatred.

Those faculties in the third Path are much sharper; so, the third Path is able to eradicate sensual desire and hatred. However, it is unable to eradicate craving, conceit, restlessness and ignorance.

Then, those faculties in the fourth Path are in a state of sharpness; so, the fourth Path is able to eradicate entire evil dhammas, either those or the others. Thus, these Paths must be attained four times being completed their tasks by arising four times.

It is the interpretation: "The *kusala citta* is known to be four-fold according to the division of four Paths. The result, too, is known to be the same four-fold owing to being the fruit of the four-fold *kusala*. Thus, the noblest *citta* is known to be eight-fold."

Anuttara is that which have not any *dhamma* higher than itself.

63. Why is the *kriya citta* not listed here? Because there is not a noblest *citta* that is to be *kriya*.

Why is there not a noblest *citta* that is to be *kriya*? Because *magga citta* has one mental moment. If it arises in different moments, as if *lokiya kusala* does, there, perhaps, may be a noblest *citta* that is to be *kriya* arising within the process of those who have no *anusayas*.

Then, why does the *magga citta* have only one mental moment? Because *magga* has a great power. "How does the *magga* have a great power?" if asked, it should be answered: The Noble Path, even arising only once, removes the passions that should be eradicated by itself making them never come up again. This is one power of the Path.

Then, the Noble Path gives rise to the result since it has just arisen making it perform *Javana* function like the *javanas* of *kusala* and *kriya* and sometimes to be attained. This is the second power of the Path. Therefore,

it need not to make it arise again to get rid of passions as well as to be attained.

Furthermore, if someone may take preliminary action with the idea that he does not want to absorb 'fruition' but *magga* that obtained before, within him, at that time, only the Fruition mind may arise, not *magga* mind, due to the power of volition belonging to *magga* which has become extinct after having appeared once. Why? Because *magga* has a power that cannot be repelled. It is true the power of *magga* cannot be repelled by someone through will (*chanda*), desire (*vasa*), intention (*ajjhāsa*) and preparation (*parikamma*).

64. The stanza beginning with *dvādasākusalānevaṃ* briefs all types of consciousness on the four planes by means of species (*jātivaseṇa*).

"According to the aforesaid division, *akusalas* are only twelve; *kusalas* are only twenty-one; *vipākas* are thirty-six; *kriya* minds are only twenty", *Ṭīkā* (p.299) gives the word relation.

Some commentators, however, make the word, *eva*, contact to only the first and the last words, because the number of *kusala* and *vipāka* will be made more above.

The stanza beginning with *catupaññāsadhā* briefs all types of consciousness by means of plane (*bhūmivaseṇa*). It is the interpretation: "The types of consciousness pertaining to *kāma* plane must be said to be of fifty-four kinds; *Rūpa* plane to be of fifteen kinds; *Arūpa* plane to be of twelve kinds; then the types of consciousness pertaining to 'the noblest' must be said to be of eight kinds."

Herein, *Anuttare* is the stage of supramundane. And it is two-fold: the stage of conditioned things (*sañkhatabhūmi*) and the stage of unconditioned things (*asañkhatabhūmi*).

Then, the stage of conditioned things is of four kinds. It should be

quoted:

"On the occasion one practices *Jhāna* of supramundane in order to attain the first stage ... the second ... the third ... the fourth stage."¹⁰⁶

Herein, it is said that *bhūmi* is a fruition of monkshood (*sāmañña phala*)¹⁰⁷. Or it is also reasonable: the pair of the first *magga* and *phala* is the first stage; the pair of the fourth *magga* and *phala* is the fourth stage. But in ultimate sense *bhūmi* here is a special dhamma with the particular moment, that is a state of non inclusion in the *dhamma* of three planes, due to being free from the grasping of the threefold desire. It becomes fourfold according to getting rid of mental defilements.

However, it is said in *Vibhāvanī*(p.100) with this idea - there is not a particular plane of supramundane like the other planes; only the unity ninefold *dhamma* is spoken as the plane of them:

"a part of the unity of ninefold dhamma of supramundane which is included nowhere is said 'cittas in supramundane (*anuttare cittāni*)' like in this word, *rukkhe sākhā* (branch in a tree, but branch of a tree), etc.

This is not reasonable. Because *bhūmi* is two-fold: the moment (*avthā*) and the locality (*okāsa*). Of them, only the moment is regarded as real *bhūmi*, not the other. Because that locality must be known only through such and such a particular moment of *dhammas*. And 'such and such particular moment' should be noted as the particular moment beginning with the state of *kāmaṅgacāra* in the way as said before.

In another way, the thirty one planes, too, must be known only through the particular moment, that is a state of inferiority, superiority, grossness and subtlety of *kusala* and *akusala*.

65. Thus, after having expounded briefly the cittas of fourfold plane,

Thera spoke this stanza beginning with *itthaṃ* in order to explain again the *cittas* in detail.

Herein, it is the interpretation: "in other way, the 89 *cittas* numbering as said is divided into 121 types by wise."

However, *ṬṬkās*(*Purāṇa*,p.299;*Vib*,p.101) interpret this stanza making the former part of this verse as the "conclusion" of the former verses and only the latter part as starting for the next. It does not accord with this: "How does the eighty nine fold mind becomes one hundred and twenty one?"

Now, *Thera* spoke *Vitakka vicāra pīti sukhakaggatā sahitaṃ*, etc.," after posing a question "How...is," in order to explain that classification of one hundred and twenty one types.

Herein, it is the combination of words : *Patamajjhāna sotapatti magga* is a *sotapattimagga* that associates with the first *Jhāna* with five factors. *Patamajjhāna sotāpattimagga cittaṃ* is a *citta* that associates with it (*Patamajjhāna sotapattimagga*).

However, *ṬṬkās* (*Purāṇa*,p.300;*Vib*,p.101) interpret: "either *pathama jhāna* or *sotāpatti magga citta*."

This is not reasonable. Because *jhāna* is not a *citta*. And *citta* is not *jhāna* as well. Because *jhāna* is one thing and *citta* is the other.

Then it is said in *Vibhāvanī*(p.101): "due to being similar to the first *jhāna* according to *Jhana* factor it is either *pathajjhāna* ..."

This is also not reasonable. Because it is impossible to say that the supramundane *jhāna* with five factors is to be called the first *jhāna* due to being similar to the first *Jhāna*. The supramundane *jhāna*, indeed, directly obtains the name of first *Jhāna* by itself as it has five factors of *jhāna*.

It is true. Every *jhāna* of five factors, mundane or supramundane, can be known as the first *jhāna* by itself; every *jhāna* of four factors...of three factors...of two factors...of two factors again can be known as the fifth *jhāna*. In other way to say so is, it should be noted, because of that in the

case of supra-mundane, to be the second, etc., cannot be known according to the order of arising.

Then, in Vibhāvanī (p.101) to explain that those *dharmas* of five factors are to be called *jhāna* only through the state of similarity in supramundane it is said: "Being similarity of such and such *jhāna* among the three points - the basic *jhāna*, the contemplated *jhāna* and the will of a person - the four *maggas*, due to appearance of the factors beginning with *vitakka*, gets the name of the first *jhāna*, etc. and they are classified into five respectively".

This is, too, not justifiable. Because the *maggas* are not to be called *jhāna*. *Magga* is, indeed, one thing and *jhāna* is another.

In another way, *jhāna* must be in the sense of being meditating and burning down the contraries; If so, only the supramundane *jhānas* may definitely be *jhāna*, not the others. Actually, the others meditate on the mere object of *kaṣiṇa*, etc. and burn the opposite natures down as keeping them away. However, the supramundane *jhānas* concentrate on *Nibbāna* that is profound and hard to be seen and they burn down the contrary natures together with their roots and dormant states by totally eradicating.

Furthermore, herein, it is usually known that Appanā *jhānas* are to be with five factors; so there is nothing to do with such special cause, the basic *jhāna*, etc., in the first *jhānas* of *magga* and *phala*. However, to be with four factors cannot be known without such a special cause. If there is no such cause, all *jhānas* may be with only five factors.

Herein, with regard to mundane *jhānas*, at the beginning, some of the mental cultures, the access (*upacāra*) to such and such second *jhāna*, etc., although they associate with *vitakka*, etc., through seeing and knowing the fault of *vitakka* or the special wish: "now I let the *jhāna* without *vitakka* arise; now I let the *jhāna* without *vicchra*", are to be '*vitakkavirāga*'; some are to be *vicāravirāga*; some are to be *pītivirāga*; some are to be *rūpavirāga*

; some are to be *asaññāvirāga* for those who will be born in *asañña brahma* world. That mental culture is able to make own *jhāna* absence from *vitakka*, or absence from *vicāra*, or absence from *pīti*, or associates with indifference respectively. Then, at the time when one has the mastery of *jhānas*, he attains any *jhāna* what he wants through his mere wish without seeing and knowing the fault.

Similarly in this *lokuttara jhāna*, too, the mental culture, the insight of *vuṭṭhagāminī*, which is the access to such and such *magga*, possesses various ability, although it associates with *vitakka*, etc. And some of them are a mental culture through which *vitakka* is abandoned; some are a mental culture through which *vitakka* and *vicāra* are abandoned; some are a mental culture through which *vitakka*, *vicāra* and *pīti* are abandoned; some are a mental culture through which *vitakka*, *vicāra*, *pīti* and *sukha* are abandoned. Herein, the culture which is able to detach and pass over *vitakka* is to be called the culture through which *vitakka* is abandoned (*vitakka-virāga-bhāvanā*). This way is known in the rest, too.

66. "What is the power through which the insight knowledge possesses various abilities?" if asked, it must be answered.

"Through the power of the basic *jhāna*" says one *Thera*; "Through the power of the contemplated *jhāna*" says the second one; "Through the power of individual wish" says the third.

Herein, one of all *jhānas* which is just absorbed to be the base of insight, is to be the basic *jhāna* (*pāḍakajjhāna*). If it is first *jhāna*, the insight is only usual. If second, the insight has an ability to remove *vitakka*. In *magga* it can define *jhāna* to be absent from *vitakka*. This way is known in the other basic *Jhanas*. This is the assertion concerning with the 'base'. If there is a basic *jhāna* the *jhāna* in *magga* must be equal to it. If not, the *jhāna* must be only the first *jhāna* in *magga*. It means that either

the contemplated *jhāna* or the individual wish cannot decide the factor of *jhāna* in *magga* .

If there is a basic *jhāna* ,one of the *jhānas* ,the basic *jhāna* or the others, is contemplated. If it is the first *jhāna* ,the insight is only usual. If the second, the insight has an ability to remove *vitakka* .It cannot define the *jhāna* to be absent from *vitakka* .The same way in the rest contemplated *jhānas* as well; this is the assertion concerning with the 'contemplated'. It means that only the *jhāna* that is contemplated is more powerful than the basic *jhāna* and the individual wish due to being together with the insight as an object of it.

However, with regard to this assertion it is said in *Vibhāvanī* :

"There is not any *jhāna* which is the ground of insight.(p.101)"

This does not accord with commentary.

If there is a basic *jhāna* , one of the *jhānas* in *magga* what one wishes, the basic or the other, comes to be attained. The insight, too, according to one's wish, becomes a mental culture which removes *vitakka* ,etc. This is the assertion concerning with the individual wish.

It means that the *jhāna* from which one has just withdrawn, among the mundane *jhānas* , is to support the proximate mental culture for a higher *jhāna* .But it is unable to make the *jhāna* factor of higher *jhāna* equal to itself. Wish alone decides the factor of *jhāna* in higher *jhāna* . Similarly here, too, the basic *jhāna* is a powerful condition of insight knowledge to make it keen and clear. Wish alone, making the insight knowledge remove *vitakka* , etc., decides the factor of *jhāna* in *magga* .

Mahāaṭṭhakathā says: "only the insight leading to *magga* (*vuṭṭhānagāminī-vipassanā*) decides the factor of *jhāna* in *magga* . Therein it is, the meaning must be understood, only the insight leading to *magga* which has the special ability to remove *vitakka* ,etc. through the special power of individual wish.

To be continued: in *Aṭṭhasālinī*¹⁰⁸ it says these three assertions of *Theras* have as if not contradiction one another. However, these three assertions have nothing equal to each other in the point. They, indeed, stand separately leading to all supramundane *jhānas* to be completed. Therefore, it is impossible to avoid the contradiction each other.

Therein only by the Blessed One it is well expressed that those who have *jhāna* absorb the basic *jhāna* as they practise insight meditation. It is truly said in *Cūlasuṇṇata Sutta*:¹⁰⁹

"In this teaching a bhikkhu, Ānanda, dwells with the attainment of the first *jhāna* after having abandoned sensual pleasure and evils ... the second *jhāna* ... the third *jhāna* ... with attainment of the fourth *jhāna*. He contemplates the internal emptiness.

If his mind does not run towards the internal emptiness and does not clarify, by that monk the mind should be focused only upon the former object of concentration; must be made quiet; must be made to higher concentration; must be fixed, and so on."

Herein, by the word, 'contemplate emptiness', it indicates insight meditation. 'That only former object of concentration' means 'the object of concentration which belongs to the basic *jhāna* .

In *Navaka nipāta* (of *Aṅguttara Nikāya*), too, it is said:

"*Bikkhus* , I address the cessation of *āsavas* depending on the first *jhāna* also ... *Bikkhus* , I reveal the cessation of *āsavas* depending on the *jhāna* dwelling on the unity of mind which has neither perception and nor non-perception as its ground."¹¹⁰

67. Of these three assertions, the assertion of individual wish seems to be more justifiable. To be explained: the basic *jhāna* is certainly necessary. It is, too, only to make a proximate culture of higher *jhāna* sharp and clear; The wish alone, indeed, makes the proximate meditation dislike *vitakka*, etc.

And the proximate culture can decide the *jhāna* factor of higher *jhāna* .

Similarly here, too, only the insight leading to *magga*, sharp and clear through the power of the basic *jhāna* , possessing an extraordinary ability to remove *vitakka* , etc. through the power of special wish, accomplishes various *jhānas* in *magga* .

If there is not special wish, the usual wish exists according to such and such basic *jhāna* . Therefore, if there is not special wish the basic *jhāna* alone decides. However, it is reasonable that if there is special wish, only it decides. It is true to attain the *jhāna* expected in *magga* for those who have the mastery in all *jhānas* is similar to the accomplishment of the whatever mundane *jhāna* expected.

Therein it should be known that the all speciality which is through the basic *jhāna* , etc., is only for a unique insight. The only unique insight decides the *jhāna* factor in *magga*. So the only insight is said as a decisive reason in Aṭṭhasālinī¹¹¹ and Visuddhimagga¹¹². And the all speciality is not known without the basic *jhāna*. So the only basic *jhāna* is said as a decisive reason in the Commentaries on Maggavibhaṅga¹¹³ and Maggasamyutta¹¹⁴.

However, it says in Pāḷi Canons:

"O householder, in this teaching a bhikkhu dwells with the attainment of the first *jhāna* after having abandoned sensual pleasure and evil natures. He contemplates and realizes thus 'this first *jhāna* is also conditioned (*abhisaṅkhatam*) and produced by volition (*abhicetayitam*); whatever is conditioned and produced by volition, it is subject to impermanence; it is with the nature of cessation. He, standing on that *jhāna* , attains the cessation of *āsava* ... with the attainment of second *jhāna* ... the third *jhāna* ... the fourth *jhāna* ... *Mettā* , the mental freedom from hatred ... *Karuṇā* , the mental freedom from *vihimsā* ... *Muditā* , the freedom from jealousy ...

Upekkhā , the freedom from craving...; with the attainment of the *jhāna* which is on the infinite space as its ground, ... with the attainment of the *jhāna* which is on Nothingness as its ground.

He contemplates and realizes thus 'this attainment of *jhāna* which on nothingness as its ground is also conditioned and produced by volition. Whatever is conditioned and produced by volition is subject to....He...attains the cessation of *āsava* .' thus says in Ekādasakanipāta (Aṅguttara)¹¹⁵;

"In this teaching, Ānanda, a bhikkhu dwells with the attainment of the first *jhāna* which associates with *vitakka* and *vicāra*; is born of lack of hindrance, possessed joy and bliss, after having abandoned sensual pleasure and evil natures. He contemplates those *dhammas* , matter, feeling, perception, mental activities and consciousness which consist of that *jhāna*, as impermanence, as suffering and as soullessness. He, standing on that *jhāna* , attains the cessation of *āsava* . If he does not attain the cessation of *āsava* , due to only that attachment to *dhamma*, that delight in the *dhamma* , is born as *Brahmā* who abandoned five Fetters pertaining to the lower plane. He became ceased and never returns from that *Brahma* world ..." Thus says in Mālukiyaṭṭha Sutta¹¹⁶, Anupada Sutta¹¹⁷ and so on.

Thus in many Suttantas, it mentions only examining one of attainments from which one has just withdrawn out of eight attainments. But it does not mention the examination of the other *jhānas*. Therefore, it can be understood that the basic *jhāna* alone becomes decisive, although *yogīs* may, perhaps, have a wish to examine the other *jhānas* apart from the basic *jhāna* .

So far as I have said, it is clarified that the assertion dealing with examining is the weakest of all.

Then, it must be known that some, although they have eight-

attainment, try to attain *magga* without making *jhāna* as ground; or some, making only the first *jhāna* as ground and not having special wish, try to attain *magga*; or some, having attained the mere first *jhāna* and making it as ground, try to attain *magga*; or some, as one who practices only insight, try to attain *magga*. That *magga* of those associates only with the first *jhāna* .

In other way, some usually have the mastery of eight-attainment; they want to attain some of *jhānas* without proximate basic *jhāna* ; these *jhānas* cannot be said not to be attained in *magga*.

However, it is said in *Vibhāvanī*(p.102): " if a person has not such a type of wish, the *magga* , which is brought about examining one of higher *jhānas* after having withdrawn from one of the lower *jhānas* , is similar to the examined *jhāna* without attending to the basic *jhāna* .

That should be examined. It is true an examined *jhāna*, the mere object, although it is higher, ought not to be more stronger than the *jhāna* from which one has just withdrawn. Because the *jhāna* alone from which one has just withdrawn can make thought-process to be distinct. Only for that reason the assertion on the "examined" is placed at the side of 'some's idea' in Commentaries.

Then, the assertion on "individual wish" is also placed at such side, is not it ? It is true. But it is much more justifiable, because it accords with the procedure of arising of the mundane *jhānas*.

By this statement, it rejects what is said in *Vibhāvanī*:

"The *magga* , which is brought about by examining one of the lower *jhānas* after having abandoned one of the higher *jhānas*, is similar to the basic *jhāna* without giving care the examined *jhāna*. Because the each of higher *jhānas* is more powerful than the each of lower *jhānas*.(p.102)"

Because the basic *jhāna* is more powerful not because of being in

higher stage, but because of being the ground.

Then, with this idea: "the decision of feeling in *magga* is not known as the basic *jhāna*, etc. If so, the insight with uncertain feeling may come to join one of the feelings of *magga* which was decided by the *jhānas*." it is said in *Vibhāvanī* : " but the decision of feeling (*vedanāniyamo*) in all places is through the decision of the insight leading to *magga* (p.102)."

That is also not justifiable. Because the decision of feeling together with insight can be known only through the basic *jhāna*, etc.

To be explained: "the insight belong to one who contemplates after having abandoned such and such a basic *jhāna* at first associates sometimes with pleasure and sometimes with indifferent feeling. But at the time of withdrawing from *magga* , if the basic *jhāna* associates with pleasure, the insight definitely associates with pleasure and unites with *magga* .

It is truly said in *Saḷāyatana vibhaṅga Sutta*:

" *Bikkhus* , depending on and referring to the six *upekkhās* which lies on renunciation, do abandon and cross the six pleasure which lies on renunciation. Thus one removes them ; thus one crosses them."¹¹⁸

It is said in Commentary:¹¹⁹ "The former part of insight of those four *bhikkhus* who practise insight meditation by making the three *jhānas* beginning with the first *jhāna* among eight attainments or mere conditioned things as a ground associates with either pleasure or indifferent feeling. But the insight which leads to *magga* associates only with pleasure. Then, the former part of insight of those five *bhikkhus* who practise insight meditation by making the fourth *jhāna* as ground is similar to the former. But the insight which leads to *magga* associates only with indifference. Indicating this meaning it is said : "*yā cha nekkhammassitā...pajahatha* ."

The same way in the case of withdrawing from *magga* together with

special wish. On the occasion of the powerful insight, indeed, the delight in the insight is much excellent. It comes into existence pervading and embracing the whole body.

It should be quoted:

"For a bhikkhu who well contemplates dhamma, while he is living in a solitude and has a peaceful mind, the delight which arises is a unique delight."¹²⁰

Therefore, the insight at such time does not associate with indifference without the special basic jhāna or special wish. It certainly associates with pleasure.

Especially, herein a person who has mastery of all jhānas, making anyone of jhānas as base, wants to attain that or the other jhāna in magga at the time of withdrawing from jhāna the alternation of feeling of insight and magga must be known through the power of wish according to one of jhānas which is expected. The decision of feeling, however, should not be spoken separately.

66. In the summarized stanza it is the interpretation: "The eight-fold matchless mind must be said to be of forty kinds by dividing each one into five-fold according to the division of association of jhāna factor.

Now, Thera said the word, *ythāca rūpāvacaram...*, in order to expound all types of cittas pertaining to Mahagatta and Lokuttara by gathering them in the fivefold jhāna group.

It is interpretation: "The *citta* of *rūpāvacara* is reckoned in the division of *jhāna* beginning with the first *jhāna*; It means that it is reckoned in five-fold divisions of mind of which beginning is the *citta* with the first *jhāna* according to the division of *jhāna*. Likewise, the *citta* of *lokuttara* is also reckoned in the division of *jhāna* beginning with the first *jhāna*. The *citta* of *arūpa*, due to associating with the fifth *jhāna* which is the unity of indifference and one-pointedness, is reckoned in fifth *jhāna*, i.e. in the

division of *citta* with the fifth *jhāna*.

Therefore, each of the *jhāna cittas* of which the beginning is the first *jhāna citta* is eleven. In the end, i.e. in the division of *citta* which associates with the fifth *jhāna*, the last one, the *jhāna cittas* are twenty-three.

Herein, by the word, *jhāna*, only *citta* which associates with *jhāna* is described. Because the *jhāna* is not eleven or twenty-three.

However, it is said in Vibhāvanī: "The *citta* of *rūpāvacara* is said to be 'first *jhāna*', etc.; the *citta* of *arūpa* is also to be called 'fifth *jhāna*' (p.102)."

This is not reasonable. Besides, regarding this stanza the interpretation in other way, which is said there, is also not reasonable. Because the word *tathā* is said before the word *paṭhamādi'jjhānabhede*.

Then, by classifying some of cittas which should be done so, the 89 cittas are all have already been classified into 121. After having classified in that way now, Thera said the last stanza in order to express the compendium.

It is interpretation: "*kusala citta* is thirty-seven; then *vipāka citta* is fifty-two; thus the wise spoke the eighty-nine-fold cittas to be one hundred and twenty-one".

Thus the exposition of correct meaning of 'the Compendium of *citta*' in Paramatthadīpanī, the fourth Commentary on *Abhidhammattha Saṅgaha*, ends.

¹ The sphere of the Buddha is threefold: the sphere of birth (*jātikhetta*), the sphere of supremacy (*āṇākhetta*), and the sphere of the object of enlightenment (*visayakhetta*). Of them the first comprises ten thousands of universe, the second one hundred thousand crores of universe, the last is infinite. (see S.M.P, Book 1- 129; S.M.V. 411)

² Anuruddhatthero : the author of the *Abhidhammasaṅgaha*. He was believed to have been earlier than twelfth, and later than the eighth century A.D. (see Editor's preface of C.P.)

³ Piṇḍattha: Piṇḍa + attha meaning gathered points; condensed meaning, resume (see P.T.S. Dictionary). However, in this context piṇḍattha is not resume, but it denotes the points that should be analyzed.

⁴ Dhammapada. (V. 196)

⁵ Aṭṭhasālinī (ganthārambhakathā, 7th Versa)

- ⁶ Dhammapada (V. 109)
- ⁷ Paṭṭhāna Book 1 - 156; 377; 456
- ⁸ It must be searched.
- ⁹ It must be searched.
- ¹⁰ Mahāniddeśa 277; Cūḷavāḍḍya 175; Paṭṭisambhīdāmagga 375 .
- ¹¹ Puggalapaññatti, the fourth book of Abhidhamma 117; 184
- ¹² S.N., Book 2-12; Book 302; Book 3-363; A.N., Book 3-517.
- ¹³ Mahāvagga (vinaya) 12; M.N., Book 1-227; Book 2-295.
- ¹⁴ See Cariyā piṭaka. A 276 equal in the meaning.
- ¹⁵ Abhidhammattha saṅgahatikā (Purāṇātikā), by Nava vimalabuddhi, p.1.
- ¹⁶ Visuddhimagga mahāṅkā, named Paramattha mañjūsā, Book 1-3.
- ¹⁷ Dhammika therā gāthā, V.303; Mahādhammapāla, the 447th Jātaka.
- ¹⁸ Mahāparinibbāna Sutta of Dighaṅkāya, 126.
- ¹⁹ A.N., Book 1-298.
- ²⁰ A.N. A., Book 3-291.
- ²¹ S.N., Book 1-189.
- ²² Puggalapaññatti Anuṭṭikā, 60.
- ²³ S.N., Book 2-123.
- ²⁴ Aṭṭhasālinī, 199.
- ²⁵ Dhammapada (v.1)
- ²⁶ S.N., Book 2-71.
- ²⁷ Mahāniddeśa, 4.
- ²⁸ Khuddakapāṭha, Ratana Sutta p.7 (v.15)
- ²⁹ Tīkā (purāṇa), p 287; Vibhāvani, p.75;
- ³⁰ Dhammasaṅganī, 253; Vibhaṅga, 436.
- ³¹ Paṭṭhāna, Book 3-300.
- ³² Aṭṭhasālinī, 104.
- ³³ Mahāniddeśa, 1; 2; 21; 342.
- ³⁴ Dhammasaṅganī, 253-4; Vibhaṅga, 435.
- ³⁵ Tīkā (purāṇa), 287; Vibhāvani, 76; Sankhepa, 217-8.
- ³⁶ Aṭṭhasālinī, 92; 104.
- ³⁷ S.N., Book 2-278.
- ³⁸ Aṭṭhasālinī, 199
- ³⁹ Aṭṭhasālinī, 200.
- ⁴⁰ Dhammasaṅganī, 96
- ⁴¹ Kāṇāriṭṭha; He was a Nāga and one of the four sons of the Nāga-king Dhatarajṭha and the queen Sanuddhajā. His original name was Ariṭṭha. Later he was blind in one eye. So was known as Kāṇāriṭṭha (Ariṭṭha who is blind in one eye). Kāṇāriṭṭha was a Brahman in previous life. He believed in Veda and sacrifice by birth. He was not another person, but a previous life of Sunakkhatta.
- ⁴² Sunakkhatta; A Licchavi prince of Vesālī. He was, at one time, a member of the Order and the personal attendant of the Buddha. Later he was an antagonist to the Buddha and left the order. (see Mahāli suttā of D.N. 1-145, Mahasānāda suttā of M.N. Book 1-97, the Commentaries on them and Dic. of Pāli Proper Names)
- ⁴³ Visuddhimagga, Book 2-85.
- ⁴⁴ Dhammasaṅganī, 103-4.
- ⁴⁵ Dhammasaṅganī, 103-4.
- ⁴⁶ Sanmoharinosanī (S.M.V), 129.
- ⁴⁷ Dhammasaṅganī, 90-104.
- ⁴⁸ Vibhaṅga, 171; 311.
- ⁴⁹ Dhātukathā, 48
- ⁵⁰ S.N., Book 2-72
- ⁵¹ M.N., Book 1-326.
- ⁵² Aṭṭhasālinī, 321.
- ⁵³ Dhammapada (V.71)
- ⁵⁴ Ayaṃ vipākasamaṅgītā nāma; This sentence must be here. Perhaps it left by printing mistake.
- ⁵⁵ See Dhammasaṅganī, p. 104-139.
- ⁵⁶ Some commentators; It refers to Ānanda, the author of Mūlaṭṭika on Abhidhamma. See Book 1-38.
- ⁵⁷ Dhammasaṅganī Mūlaṭṭika, 38.
- ⁵⁸ See Mūlaṭṭika, Book 1; 134.
- ⁵⁹ D.N.A. Book 2-381; 384; M.N.A. Book 1-300;302; A.N.A. Book 1-399; 402; S.N.A. Book 3-198; 200; Aṭṭhasālinī, 117; S.M.V...269;271.
- ⁶⁰ Visuddhimagga, Book 2-83.

⁶¹ Buddhagosa, the commentator.

⁶² Aṭṭhasālinī, 306.

⁶³ See Dhammasaṅgani, 1-43; 90-104; 104-116; 136-138; 139-142;

⁶⁴ See Vibhaṅga; 309; 311; 312-314.

⁶⁵ Dhammasaṅganī, 19; but the order of words is different. It is said there; Saṅgīthi avisāhāro avikkhepo.

⁶⁶ See Paṭṭhāna, Book 1-157; 378.

⁶⁷ Aṭṭhasālinī, 229.

⁶⁸ A.N. Book 3-71.

⁶⁹ Aṭṭhasālinī, 227.

⁷⁰ Sammohavinodanī (S.M.V.), 401.

⁷¹ Visuddhimagga, Book 1-83;84.

⁷² Mahāsamaya Sutta: the seventh Sutta of Mahāvagga (p. 204) in D.N.

⁷³ Nettī, 69.

⁷⁴ Nettī Aṭṭhakathā, 134.

⁷⁵ See Dhammasaṅganī, 44.

⁷⁶ Aṭṭhasālinī, 228.

⁷⁷ Aṭṭhasālinī, 328.

⁷⁸ Vibhaṅga, 272.

⁷⁹ Vibhaṅga, 273.

⁸⁰ Vibhaṅga, 273.

⁸¹ See S.N. Book 3-302.

⁸² See S.N. Book 3, 32-38

⁸³ See S.N. Book 3-45.

⁸⁴ Mahāniddeśa, 88; Cūḍaniddeśa, 38.

⁸⁵ A.N. Book 3-531.

⁸⁶ S.N.A. Book 2-67; Book 3-309.

⁸⁷ Aṭṭhasālinī, 87; S.M.V., 107; Udāna.A. 277.

⁸⁸ A.N. Book 1-478.

⁸⁹ A.N.A. Book 2-350.

⁹⁰ Yamaka, the sixth text of Abhidhamma, Book 2-281; 282;

⁹¹ S.M.V., 505.

⁹² Commentaries: D.N.A. Book 2-133; S.N.A. Book 3-312;

⁹³ Puggalapaññatti, 181.

⁹⁴ Kaṅṅakathala sutta, in M.N. Book 2--332.

⁹⁵ Commentaries; D.N.A, Book 2-133; S.N.A. Book 3-312.

⁹⁶ A.N. Book 3-351.

⁹⁷ D.N.A. Book 2-134.

⁹⁸ S.N.A. Book 3-312.

⁹⁹ Dhammasaṅganī, 72; Vibhaṅga, 104; 200; 244.

¹⁰⁰ Dhammasaṅganī, 72.

¹⁰¹ Vibhaṅga, 104; 200.

¹⁰² Vibhaṅga, 244.

¹⁰³ Commentaries: Aṭṭhasālinī, 283; SM.V. 115; 116.

¹⁰⁴ Commentary; SM.V. 115; 116.

¹⁰⁵ Dhammasaṅganī, 72; Vibhaṅga, 112.

¹⁰⁶ Dhammasaṅganī, 72, 134.

¹⁰⁷ Aṭṭhasālinī, 259.

¹⁰⁸ Aṭṭhasālinī, 272; 274.

¹⁰⁹ These passages are not from Cūḍasuññata sutta, but from Mahāsuññata sutta in M.N. Book 3- 153; 154.

¹¹⁰ A.N. Book 3-220.

¹¹¹ Aṭṭhasālinī, 272.

¹¹² Visuddhimagga, Book 2-305.

¹¹³ Maggavibhaṅga: Vibhaṅga, 305.

¹¹⁴ Magga Samyutta: S.N., Book. 3-163.

¹¹⁵ A.N. Book 3-543; 546.

¹¹⁶ M.N. Book 2-99.

¹¹⁷ M.N. Book 3-75.

¹¹⁸ M.N. Book. 3-262

¹¹⁹ M.N.A. Book 4-188.

¹²⁰ Dhammapada (V. 373)

Chapter 2

CETASIKA SANGAHA

68. Thus, after having expounded, now *Thera* , explaining 'the compendium of mental state' that comes into its turn, spoke the first stanza, firstly, in order to expound the definition of words and categories together with the four marks of association.

Herein, by these two lines it shows the four marks of association. By the word, *cetoyuttā* , it denotes the definition of the word (*cetasika*). Because it explains: "it lies in *citta* or it associates with *citta*,so it is called *cetasika* ".By the word *dvipaññāsa* it denotes the list of items. By the word *cetasika* it denotes the 'term' that is used.

Herein, *uppāda* is coming up from the former state, a state of not being born, i.e.the appearance as own nature. "Arising" is the meaning. It is true all conditioned things have a state of not being born as their forerunner. From such a state, having the unity of causes, they become present. After having ceased the present becomes past .

Nirodha is a state of cessation. The destruction of own nature (*sarūpa vināso*), (quín)(*bhaṅgo*), a state of impermanence (*aniccatā*), death (*maraṇam*) is the meaning..

What is the birth of *citta* is only the birth of contact, etc. What is the decay of *citta*... what is the death of *citta*... what is the object...the base of *citta* is that of contact, etc. In this way as said before, they have an equal arising, so they are called *ekuppāda*. Then, they have an equal cessation,so they are called *ekanirodha*. They are either *ekuppāda* or *ekanirodha*,so they called *ekuppāda-nirodha*. The wordeka of the latter word is omitted. The same way later on.

Then, they have one object,so they are called *ekālambdaṇa*.They have one base,so they are called *ekavattuka*. And they are either *ekālambdaṇa* or *ekavattuka*, so they are called *ekālambdaṇa-vattuka*. Especially the object here is, it is noted, numerous for even one *citta*. But it is said "one object" making them collectively as one.

However, it is said in Vibhāvanī: "They have arising and passing away together, so they are called *ekuppāda-nirodha*.(p.104)

This is not correct. Because here need not *ekuppāda* by mere arising together simultaneously. Indeed, it needs the *ekuppāda* only in the way as said before.

It is true it is said in Mūlaṭṭkā: ¹ "The arising, etc., of one material group is only one. Because matters which belong to one material group have arising, etc.together."

It is here interpretation: "Those fifty-two dhammas which associate with the *citta* by having one arising and cessation, and one object and base, are known as *cetasika*."

Or the sense of *bhāva-padhāna* here is also reasonable. And the ending of locative case is in the sense of qualifier.

"Those fifty-two dhammas which associate with *citta* as the state of having one arising and passing away, and one object and one base are known as *cetasika*."

Herein, if said those which associate with *citta* are *cetasika* , the matters which are produces by co-existence condition are also perhaps to be called *cetasika*, the *cetoyutta*, having relation with *citta* due to depending on it. Therefore, in order to exclude those matters, it is said "having one arising and cessation and one object and base." Those matters, although they arise simultaneously with *citta*, due to different process,do not have such a mark, "what the birth of *citta* is that of them." Because the process of matter is one thing and the process of mind is another.

Then, it should be noted: for those *dharmas*, contact etc., not only 'arising' together with *citta* is the same, but cessation, object and base are also all the same. To clarify it the word, *ekanirodha*, is said." If not said so, it is impossible to know such significance.

Only one cow, however, that is possessed by many can be said separately as, 'Tissa's cow; Datta's cow'. Likewise, the arising or the cessation, although it is only one in one material and mental unit, can be said separately in such way, "arising of contact, arising of feeling, arising of the element of earth, arising of the element of water, etc."

Therefore, it is said in *Suttantas*:²

"The arising of feeling is known, the cessation is known, the mutability of being static is known. ... of perception ... of mental formations ... of consciousness...."

Then:

" Bhikkhus, what arising, existence, appearance and coming into being of the element of earth is the arising of suffering, the existence of disease, the coming into being of decay and death.

" Bhikkhus, ... of the element of water ... of the element of fire ... of the element of air ... of the eye ... of the mind ... coming into being of decay and death."

Otherwise, it may be said the state of the multiplicity of *jīvitindriya*, etc., in one unit .It is truly said: "the vitality (*āyu*) of the immaterial states, their existence (*thiti*), their firmly existence (*avaṭṭhiti*)³..." Similarly it may be said the multiplicity of *vikāra* matters, or of all the *upādā* matters beginning with eye. Because it is said 'the matter which depends on four great elements'⁴; or 'the matter of sensitivity which depends on the four great elements'⁵.

However, those mental states are said dividing into two as *kāyalahutā* and *cittalahutā*, etc. to show special significance. This special significance will be explained later. This is the exposition of the correct meaning.

However, it is said in *Vibhāvanī* without noticing this point:

"If needs the *cetoyutta* through having mere equal arising, there may include those matters which arise together with *citta* to be *cetoyutta*. So the word *nirodha* have to be said. Although it is said, it cannot exclude the supposition: the two *Viññatti* matters which ever follow *citta* may include; besides, those matters, arising earlier and ceasing at the moment of *citta* ceased, may include according to those who think of the definition: they have arising or ceasing together, so they are called '*ekuppada-nirodha*'. The word, *ekālambaṇa*, therefore, have to be said. Then, the word, *ekavattuka*, is used to show that 'those which have these three marks are certainly to have an equal base'. It is useless to give elaboration."

All are only useless.

69. After questioned "how are they fifty-two?" ,it is said *katham*, etc. to expound firstly the *dharmas* of fifty-two dividing into three groups.

Herein, it touches, so it is called *phassa*. Or through *phassa* the associated *dharmas* come to touch, so it is called *phassa*. Or it is mere touching, so it is called *phassa*.

Herein, 'touching (*phusanam*)' is noted to be thoroughly grasping the taste of object, desired or undesired. Depending on it feeling which experiences the taste of object appears. It is truly said: "depending on contact, feeling arises."

That *phassa* has touching as its characteristic. If asked:—" is it an immaterial phenomenon?; the immaterial phenomena, having not the nature of impingement, never touch anything", it is an answer: True. But this *phassa* arises in the mode of touching. And it accomplishes the function that should be done by touching. Therefore, it is expressed as *phassa* and one which has the characteristic of touching.'

What does it accomplish? It makes *citta* to be in a different state according to the taste of the object, or it makes a special feeling arise. Such a state is clear at the time when one tastes sour, seeing him, the other produces saliva and so on.

However, it is said in Vibhāvanī: "It should be compared to appearance of saliva, etc.(p.105)"

If so, it may be mere 'simile.' But it should be noted that it describes the arising of *phassa* that is very clear.

70. It feels, so it is called *vedanā*. It experiences the taste of object; or it makes the taste of object which is not experienced yet to be experienced for the *dhammas* associated and for those persons who possess it. In other way, through it living beings obtain the taste, pleasant or unpleasant, so it is called *vedanā*. Or it is mere feeling, so it is called *vedanā*.

However, it is said in Pāḷi:

"O Bhikkhus, it feels; it feels; that is why it is called *vedanā*.

What does it feel? It feels pleasure; it feels pain; it feels neither pleasure nor pain."⁶

If said: "-all *dhammas*, *cittas* and *cetasikas*, experience the taste of an object; so, they all can be called *vedanā*?", the answer is "cannot be". Because they have another function to be performed and are unable to experience thoroughly the taste of object. They do partly their own works each and partly experience it. Indeed, *vedanā* alone dominantly experiences, having no other function and dominating over a task of experiencing; only *vedanā*, therefore, is worthy to be called so. For this reason, it gives a simile: in delicious food for the King, the other *dhammas* are compared to the cook and it is only *vedanā* which is compared to the King.

71. It perceives, so it is called *saññā*. "To know it again the it makes a mark," is the meaning. It is true. *Saññā*, even when it perceives through the marks taken before, makes a mark to know it again. It, when repeatedly arises making a mark and reaching a state of firmly perceiving, causes beings to have memory for the whole life or until next life. And it causes those beings, if their perceiving is with a false view, cannot be made enlightened by even the omniscient Buddhas.

Therefore, *saññā* is compared to a carpenter in marking to know it again, to the blind men who describe the figure of the elephant in perceiving as the sign they noted, to the young deers that think of scarecrows in being aware of the object that manifests.

However, it is said in Pāḷi:

"O Bhikkhus, it perceives; it perceives. That is why it is called *saññā*. What does it perceive? It perceives blue; it perceives yellow, etc."⁷

72. It impels, so it is called *cetanā*. It urges repeatedly the *dhammas* associated to be in this and that object or task. "It makes them continuously arising in it without interruption" is the meaning. Or it organizes them: i.e. it makes preparation to obtain object and to accomplish function. Or it gathers them. "It collects them in an object: i.e. it makes them assemble together" is the meaning. For that reason *cetanā* is said that it has gathering as its function and it has arrangement as its manifestation..

When *cetanā* verily arises by ever making an attempt in an object, the *dhammas* which associate with it, too, arise, like *cetanā*, by performing its own affairs each. Therefore, *cetanā* is compared to a senior disciple and a chief carpenter, etc. who perform his own and the others' work.

In Vibhāvanī, after defining: "it makes an attempt in construction of saṅkhata," to prove that it is said: "In division by the way of Suttanta in Vibhaṅga, as classifying the Aggregate of Saṅkhāra, after having defined " they construct saṅkhata, so they are called saṅkhāra...(p.105)"

It is not reasonable. Because there is not such a statement - they construct *saṅkhata*, so they are called *saṅkhāra* - in division by the way of Suttanta in Vibhaṅga. But it is mentioned in Khandha Saṃyutta.⁸

73. It has one side (*koṭṭhāso*) or one point (*koṭi*), a single object, so it is called *ekagga*. This is a term is used for *citta*. *Ekaggatā* is the state of *citta* which has one side or one point.

To be explained: The object, even single, has various nature. So the mode of steadiness of *citta* arising on a single object for one moment, without sprinkling on the various natures of object, is said as the source of the word, *ekagga*, and the cause to know *ekagga*. And for that reason it is said: "*ekaggatā* is, it should be noted, the steadiness of *citta*, like the steadiness of the flame in the absence of wind".

However, it is said in Vibhāvanī(p.92): "It has one point, an object, so it is *ekagga*".

Therein if the word, *agga*, is in the sense of "side" or "point", it is reasonable.

If in the sense of "object", as some say, it is not correct. Because it is not found anywhere there the word, *agga*, is in the sense of *ārammaṇa*.

74. *Jīvita* is that through which the *dhammas* associated live. *Inda* is the ruler (*issaro*); but here it says the state of a ruler. It makes the state of a ruler, so it is called *indriya*. *jīvitindriya* is that which is either *jīvita* or *indriya*. It arises overpowering the *dhammas* born together as if it seems to say: "without me you have no life; so in the case of your living do make me a ruler". For that reason it is said to be 'the dominant influence over continuity in process

(*pavatta-santatā' dhipatayyaṃ*) and it is compared to the water which sustains the lotus, white or blue.

Herein, it is composing of words: the thought-process (*citta-santati*) which continuously exists until the Aggregate becomes ceased is called '*pavatta-santati* (continuity in process)'. The state of domination is called *ādhipateyya*. Then '*pavattasantādhipatayyaṃ*' is a state of domination in continuous process.

It is true the thought process, although it has repeatedly ceased, continuously exists until the cessation of Aggregate through the power of *jīvita*, getting alive repeatedly. There is not such a continuity in process 'continuous' in the inanimate things which are absent from *jīvita*.

75. It makes an object not to cease in the *mana*; or it makes *mana* ever inclined towards an object, so it is called *manasikāra* (attention). It is of three kinds: that which regulates by thought-process (*vīthi-paṭipādako*), that which regulates by *javana* (*javana-paṭipādako*) and that which regulates by object (*ārammaṇa-paṭipādako*).

Of these, *vīthi-paṭipādaka* is a *citta* of *pañcadvārāvajjana* (the five-door averting consciousness). Because it regulates a thought-continuity in five-doors on an object. Then, *javana-paṭipādaka* is a *citta* of *manodvārāvajjana* (the mind-door averting consciousness). Because it regulates the *Javana*-continuity on an object.

They are both described here and there as *yoniso manasikāra* and *ayoniso manasikāra*. It is true the *citta* of *āvajjana*, being supported by usual conditions - experience, inclination, determination, etc.- makes the thought-process to be inclined on an object in proper or improper way.

Then, *ārammaṇa-paṭipādaka* is a mental state through which the thought-process starting from *paṭisandhi*, although it has given up the object and ceased, if arises again, comes into existence only on that object, if there is no special cause. It is a *manasikāra* which needs here. Because it makes an object to be in *citta* or the *citta* to be in object.

For this reason, it is stated that this (attention) has the characteristic of leading; it has the function to make the *dhammas* associated connect with an object; it is compared to the charioteer due to being in the sense of making the *dhammas* associated connect with an object.

Herein, *sāraṇa-lakkhaṇa* (characteristic of leading) means a characteristic of leading straight the *dhammas* associated towards an object like a charioteer drives horses. *Sādhāraṇa* is that which bears equally. *Sabba-citta-sādhāraṇa* is common all types of *cittas*.

76. It thinks about, so it is called *vitakka*. "Thinking about various ways it applies to object" is the meaning. Then, when it applies to the object in such a way, the *dhammas* associated with it, too, apply to the object. At that time *Vitakka* alone makes the *dhammas* associated to apply to the object. So it is said that *vitakka* has the characteristics of lifting on to the object (*ārammaṇābhiniropana-lakkhaṇa*). It is a simile here to explain it: depending on a person dear to the king, a countryman ascends the king's palace.

The *citta* that is absent of *vitakka*, too, can be said that it is lifted on to the object by only *vitakka* because of that it applies to the object through the power of practice arisen together with *vitakka* in the process of the *dhammas* with *vitakka*. In other way, the five-*viññāṇa*, although it is absent from *vitakka*, applies on to the object through the impact of objects and bases. The Second *Jhāna*, etc., apply through the access mental culture.

The Commentary on *Majjhima*, however, saying "what is the use of reasoning" gives the explanation:

"*Citta* certainly applies on to the object. It always has *manasikāra* as companion. If it is not, *citta* may arise depending on this and that object like the boat which is absent from its captain, ."⁹

Thus, the five-*viññāṇa*, having the companion of *manasikāra*, applies on to the object only through its own ability of awareness of the object.

Then, regarding to *akusala* the *citta* and mental states beginning with craving, too, have the strength to apply to an object. Because it is said that 'mind delights in evil.'¹⁰

Then, the *cittas* beginning with the second *jhāna* apply through the Attention, Effort, and Mindfulness. *Vitakka*, however, thinking about in such and such a way, makes the *dhammas* arisen together with itself more powerful in the cases of applying on to an object. Thus, it has greater effort in the function to apply on to object, so it is called *vitakka*.

Actually, it should be said: "The other immaterial *dhammas*, too, being with the nature of depending on object, apply to the object, don't they? If so, why is it alone named *vitakka*?" The other *dhammas*' application has another function to perform. But *vitakka* has no other function except this function. Therefore, this alone is said as *vitakka*.

77. It moves about, so it is called *vicāra*. Or it makes the *dhammas* associated move about; or through it the *dhammas* associated move about, so it is called *vicāra*. Herein, it should be noted that the 'moving about' is repeatedly arising on the very object lifted by *vitakka* by examining it to clarify its own nature.

Furthermore, *vitakka*, of the two, is gross and the forerunner and the first applying of *citta* on to object. So it is compared to the commencing sound in ringing a bell. *Vicāra* is subtle and the follower and the traversing of *citta* on the object. So it is compared to the resonance in ringing a bell.

78. *Adhimokkha* is state of freedom from doubt. It is a state of mind which is free from both sides of doubt, "is it thus? or not", arisen on object having dominated and eradicated it. For that reason it is said to have determination an object as its characteristic, and it is compared to a "post of gate (*indakhīla*)" as being in a state of motionless on object.

79. *Viriya* is the state or the work of one who is brave. A person, indeed, who has *vīriya* is brave to do works. He assumes the task as small although it is big; as easy although it is difficult; as not burdensome although it is burdensome. He does not reckon the physical tiredness. He has always an active body and mind to succeed in his task. Therefore, *vīriya* is the cause of such a state and the physical and mental activity of such a person.

In other way, *vīriya* is that which should be made arise through the way, the prior effort encouraged thus: "what the work is that cannot be accomplished for one who exerts effort."

Or *vīriya* is that through which a person who possess it moves about especially for welfare of himself and of others. Herein the dhammas associated which are supported by *vīriya*, without setting their reliability aside, seem to raise their head and ever make the attempt to accomplish their own functions. When those dhammas become so, the individuals who have *vīriya* ever make physically and mentally endeavour for the welfare of himself and of others. Therefore, it is said: "*īranti kampanti* (= move about)".

For that reason it is said: it has the characteristic of sustaining (*upatthambhana-lakkhaṇaṃ*) or it has the characteristic of holding up (*paggaha-lakkhaṇaṃ*) or it has the characteristic of effort (*ussāha-lakkhaṇaṃ*); it is similar to a post by which a house is sustained; it is the principle of all accomplishments attempted in correct ways.

80. It makes body and mind pleased; it causes delight (*tuttiham*) and satiety (*subhitaṃ*); it makes one grown up like a fully blossomed lotus. So it is called *pīti*. Or through it persons who are full of *pīti* have a splendid body and mind like a full moon. So it is called *pīti*.

It is of five kinds: (1). small joy (*khuddikā pīti*), (2). momentary joy (*khaṇikā pīti*), (3). thrilling joy (*okkantikā pīti*), (4). lifting joy (*ubbegā pīti*), and (5). pervading joy (*pharaṇā pīti*).

81. *Chanda* is that which wishes. It means "desire, wish and wanting. It is of two kinds: *taṇhā-chanda* (wish by craving) and *kattukamyatā chanda* (wish that wants to do). Here needs *kattukamyatā-chanda*.

Herein, it wishes and wants to do, so it is called *kattukāma*. It is a term for the person who has a wish. A state of *kattu-kāma* is termed *kattu-kāmya*. Only the word, *kattukāmya*, is used as *kattu-kāmyatā* like the word, *deva*, as *devatā*. Herein, the word *kattu* covers the meaning of all words of verb. So it should be noted: through the word *kattukāmyatā* it is pregnant with all the words of verb - "wish-to-talk", "wish-to-think", "wish-to-see", "wish-to-hear", etc.

Then *chanda*, although it desires for an object, does not want like craving by pleasing (*assāda*), attaching (*rajjana*) and sticking (*laggana*). It, however, wants to accomplish such and such a task what desire to do. Just as the King's archers, who have desire for wealth and fame, want to have many arrows that must be thrown away by shooting at enemies of the King, so this *chanda* wants to have offertories which are not yet and to protect them what already have.

This meaning is explained in Vibhāvanī, It is, indeed, stated, in it: "It (*chanda*) wants to have what will be offered at the time when it wants to give alms. It is compared to an archer who wishes to obtain arrows which must be shot (p.107)."

Herein the prior volition (*pubbabhāga-cetanā*), which arises at the time of searching for alms with intention: "I shall give alms", is included in *dāna*, the offering things. Therefore, the period of the prior volition is known here as the period of offering things.

Vissajjitabbena means "what ought to be given". It is meant that it wants to have in order to give it to others. *Khipitabba-usūnaṃ gahaṇe* means that in obtaining arrows by producing what are not yet and by searching for what are not received yet.

Herein some give the meaning of it thus: An archer wants to have those arrows back, if available, after having shot them. It is not reasonable. Because, if so, it may say shot-arrows (*khipita-usūnaṃ*) like this: 'talked and addressed

by Tathāgata (*kathitaṃ lapitaṃ tathāgatena*). And the same way in the word, *visajjitabbena* (things being offered).

Some give such a meaning: An archer, if he does not wish to have arrows, cannot shoot. One, who wishes to have arrows, can shoot them having a desire for some profits. This is also not reasonable. If so, it might be said "like an archer, although wishes to have arrows, shoots them." The meanings are both mere absurd.

Then *citta* associated with *chanda*, when it receives an object, seems to seize the object greedily and violently through *chanda*. Therefore *chanda* is compared to stretching the arm out concerning *citta* in the case of seizing an object.

Herein, the word 'like stretching the arm out' is used figuratively. Because *citta* has no arm. However, it should be noted that by thinking of "unreality as reality" the simile is said to clarify a special meaning.

In other way, this *chanda*, if reaches a powerful state, is more vigorous than craving. It is, therefore, a sort of dominance (*adhipati*) and basis of psychic powers (*iddhipāda*). If *chanda* is equal to craving with power, these sentient beings under the control of craving will be unable to escape from the suffering of circle by renouncing wealth, requisites, sovereignty and the bliss of gods and *Brahma*.

82. It is inclusive in both beautiful and non-beautiful *cittas*, so it is called *pakiṇṇa*. Only *pakiṇṇa* is used as *pakiṇṇaka*. Then *aññasamāna* is that which is equal to others. When they associate with beautiful *cittas*, they are equal to others, the non-beautiful *cittas*. On the other hand, when they are associated with non-beautiful *cittas*, they are equal to others, the beautiful *cittas*. And *samāna* means "equal". The exposition of correct meaning in the group of common to others.

83. Now to present 'the evil group (*akusala-rāsi*)' it is said: "moho"...

Herein, it bewilders, so it is called *moha* (delusion). Or through *moha* sentient beings become bewildered, so it is called *moha*. Or *moha* is only bewildering. It means that it makes mind blind by totally concealing the side of good like the four-darkness the eye blind.

It is, however, noted the *moha* at the side of evil, looks like knowledge. It is, indeed, denoted in Pāḷi¹¹ as *micchāñāṇa* (misunderstanding). It is explained in Commentaries:¹² *Micchāñāṇa* is a *moha* which considers the ways of evil actions.

Then, *avijjā* (ignorance) is said to be of two kinds: the absence of practice (*appaṭipatti*) and wrong practice (*micchā paṭipatti*). Of these the "absence of practice" is said to be only 'ignorance (*aññāṇa*)' at the side of good.' And he 'wrong practice' is to be only *micchāñāṇa* at the side of evil.

It is true. The five *dhammas* - delusion (*moha*), craving (*lobha*), wrong view (*diṭṭhi*), initial application (*vitakka*), and sustained application (*vicāra*) - look like knowledge at the side of evil. And they are six, if *citta* is added. Those six *dhammas*, if they arise within intellectuals and learned persons, make them skillful and capable in evil action by showing this and that way.

84. It does not feel shame nor disgusted the bodily misconduct, etc. So it is called *ahirī* (shamelessness). Or *ahirī* is the opposite of shame. Only the word, *ahiri*, is used as *ahirika*. It arises, without giving a chance *hirī* arise, when there are evil deeds to do, making mind delight in them. Therefore, it is said that it has the abomination of bodily misconduct, etc. as its characteristic and has shamelessness as its characteristic.

85. It does not fear, so it is called *anottappa*. It means that it does not fear and is not dreadful of bodily misconduct, etc. Or *anottappa* is the opposite of fearfulness. It also arises, making mind fearless in those misdeeds when there are evil deeds to do, without giving a chance *ottappa* arise. Therefore, it is said that *anottappa* has fearlessness as its characteristic or has the absence of dread as its characteristic. It is said:

"A shameless person never disgusts evil, like a pig not the excrement. A fearless person never fear evil, like an insect not the fire."¹³

86. It raises, so it is called *uddhaṭṭa*. It is a word for *citta* which wanders over various objects like a ball (*geṇḍuka*) thrown on the surface of a rock. *uddhacca* is a *dhmma* which causes a wandering *citta* to be a mode of distraction. It is compared to the surface of water or a banner shaken by the wind.

87. It lusts for, so it is called *lobha*. Or the *dhmmas* associated lust for through it, so it is called *lobha*. Or *lobha* is mere lusting for. Herein, 'lusting for (*lubbhana*)' is regarded as 'being attached to an object'.

It is compared to sticky lime to catch monkey (*makkaṭṭā'lepa*) in the sense of sticking on an object; to a piece of flesh thrown into hot pan in the sense of lusting for (*abhikankhaṭṭhena*); to a taint of lampblack in the sense of not letting loose; to a river of swift current which carries all dry wood, branches, leaves, grass and rubbish to the great ocean in the sense of carrying sentient beings towards a woeful state (*apāya*) by growing into a river of craving.

88. *Diṭṭhi* is viewing. It wrongly views untrue nature of *dhmmas* like knowledge views the true nature those *dhmmas*. And it looks like the knowledge of penetration (*paṭivedhaññāṇa*) at the side of untruth, when gets stronger, arising within some of wiseacres (*paṇḍitamānī*) who have much wrong thought. It should be regarded that it has a characteristic of false tendency and it is a great fault.

89. It conceives, so it is called *māna*. It is the meaning: one imagines oneself firmly holding with arrogant idea: "I am a unique person in the world; I ought not to be looked down like a piece of wood."

It imagines itself as the highest pinnacle among people, growing more and more due to being supported by merits - caste, family, wealth, requisitions, fame, etc., and morality, learning, gain, honour, etc. Therefore, it is said: "It has the characteristic of conceit and it is similar to madness."

90. It offends, so it is called *dosa*. It should be regarded that it is similar to a smitten cobra in the sense of fury (*caṇḍikkatthena*); similar to the falling of a thunderbolt in the sense of bad spreading; similar to a forest fire in the sense of burning what depends on; similar to an enemy who has had a chance in the sense of committing an offence; similar to urine mixed with poison in the sense of the mass of disadvantage.

91. It envies, so it is called *issā*. "It feels envious of another's welfare" is the meaning. *Issā*, indeed, cannot endure seeing or hearing about the welfare obtained by others. It wants the loss of such welfare. It cannot bear hearing that a certain one will enjoy such a welfare and wants what he or she not obtain it. Therefore, it is said: *Issā* has the characteristic of feeling envy.

92. *Macchara* is that, considering own welfare, which does not distribute thinking of thus: "may this virtue or this thing be for me alone, not for others." This term, *macchara*, is used for spirit in such a manner. The state of *macchara* is termed *macchariya*.

Furthermore, this, too, is two-fold like *issā*: the prosperity has been received and the prosperity will be received by oneself.

Of these two, concerning with 'the prosperity has been received' at first one who has *macchariya* feels pain and unhappiness when he sees or hears or thinks about the prosperity to be common to others, or to be no longer his and to be others'.

With regard to 'the prosperity will be received', one on hearing or thinking about "it will appear on certain location at certain time" longs for it to be exclusively his own; he or she does not like it to be others'. And he or she even feels pain and unhappiness on hearing or thinking about the possibility that "others will have it". Therefore, it is said : *macchhariya* has the characteristic of hiding one's own prosperity either has been or will be obtained.

Herein, *issā* is a weariness in mind concerning with 'the prosperity have been obtained' after having heard or considered that one, whose gain does not please, gains or will gain the prosperity. *Macchhariya* is a weariness in mind on considering that one does not possess such and such things that he or she wishes to have. They both do not come into existence together.

93. In the word *kukkucca*: *kata* means "action" (*kiriya*). It is an action which is worthy of disgust, so it is called *ku-kata* in the sense of 'an action of disgust.' It is, indeed, an abnormality of mind that is worthy to be maligned by wise. As a phenomenon, it is mind and mental property associated with *kukkucca* (worry) feeling regret thus: "good is not done by me! And evil has been done!"

Such a mind, although it arises in that manner, cannot restore the good what is undone (*akataṃ*) before as done (*kataṃ*), and the evil what is done before as undone. Actually it causes a good mind exhaust. Therefore, being a mere action of disgust it is called *ku-kata*.

In Commentary it is truly said: "Recalling fault and faultless which have been done and undone is called *paṭisāra* (recollection). This recalling does not restore an evil what has been done to be undone nor a good what has been undone to be done. Hence it is called *vippaṭisāra* defining thus: recalling ugly or disgustingly."¹⁴

Furthermore, *vippaṭisāra* here is only *kukkucca*. If the *kukkucca* is to be disgusted, the mind and mental property associated, too, becomes disgusted. For this reason *kukkucca* is to be disgusted; only for that reason mind and

mental property, too, become disgusted. Therefore, it should be known that the word *kukata* embraces only that mind and mental property. This meaning is clearly expressed in the Commentary on the Section of *Sudinna*. It should be quoted: "*Kukkucca* is so called because it is an action of disgust that ought not to be done by the wise."¹⁵

However, it is said in *Vibhāvanī* without noticing this meaning: "Kukuta is so called because it is a conduct that is disgusted. This term is sued for "evil deed" and "good deed" which is done and undone (p.108)".

That is not reasonable.

Then through this statement these all explanations in *Vibhāvani* run as follow are rejected:

"what is undone is spoken as *kukata* 'what I have undone is a disgusted action'. However, *kukata* here is a regretful mind and mental property which arises depending on what is 'done' and 'undone' (p.108)".

Then a condition, which causes the aforesaid mind and mental property which is done ugly and disgustingly arise, is called *kukkucca*.

In other way, the root *kuca* is used in the sense of grimace (*saṅkocana*) and scratching of mind (*mano-vilekhana*) in 'the books of *Dhātupāṭhas*'.¹⁶ Therefore, *kukkuca* is so called because it causes grimace in the mode of being disgusted, but not in the mode of disgusting evils. Or *kukkuca* is so called because it scratches in the mode of being disgusted, but not in the mode of scratching the mental defilements off. This term is used for the group of dhammas arising in such a manner.

That, indeed, grimaces in the mode of disgust and moan thus: " Good is not done by me! And evil has been done!" Then it does not let the mind incline towards acquiring a merit. Or it scratches the mind. By decreasing the excellent dhammas, *saddhā*, etc. it makes the energy of mind exhausted in acquiring merit. So it is said *kukkuca*.

Then being associated with a *dhamma*, such unity of those *dhammas* occur in that manner. That *dhamma* is *kukkucca* in the sense of being a state of *kukkucca* (*kukkucassa bhāvo kukkucam*).

Then the *kukkucca* comes into being as regret and sorrow depending on good that is undone and evil that is done. Therefore it is said that it has the characteristic of remorse and it has a function of sorrow for having been done and undone.

Herein, 'the characteristic of remorse' means that it has a characteristic of feeling remorse because of having spent his life by not doing good and doing evil before. By this statement, it clearly describes that *kukkucca* has an object belonging to the past. And it rejects to have an object either in present or in future. In the word 'the function of sorrow for what has been done and undone' it is the word connection "evil has been done and good has been undone".

In *Mahāniddeśa* it is explained:

"*Kukkucca* arises in two ways: having done and having undone.

How does *kukkucca* arise in two ways - having done and having undone? "The bodily good deed is undone by me and the bodily evil deed has been done": thus *kukkucca* arises. And "the verbal good deed is undone by me ...mental evil deed has been done": thus *kukkucca* arises. Then "the abstention from killing sentient beings is undone by me and killing sentient beings have done": thus *kukkucca* arises... Then "the Right View is undone by me and the Wrong View has been done": thus *kukkucca* arises."¹⁷

Through these passages the two types of *kukkucca* are clarified: that which has good deeds undone as its object and that which has evil deeds done as its object. Therefore it is said "in two ways".

Furthermore, *kukkucca* arises within those who, after having done an evil deed previously, are threatened later with the danger woeful state or who, after being born in the woeful state, recall the *kamma* done by himself formerly. But not within the others. Therefore, it is said: "the bodily good deed

is undone by me! the bodily evil has been done."

Just as *māna* is two-fold: conceit depending on true fact (*yāthāva māna*) and conceit depending on untrue fact (*ayāthāva māna*), even so *kukkucca* is two-fold: remorse depending on true point (*yāthāva kukkucca*) and remorse depending on untrue point (*ayāthāva kukkucca*).

Of these, the remorse depending on true point, when it arises, comes into being in two ways: "Good is undone by me! And evil has been done!"

What is that? The remorse depending on untrue point is a remorse that arises later in the manner of feeling sorrow within those who did not do good deeds thinking and viewing them as evil, and did bad deeds thinking and viewing them as good. And the 'remorse depending on untrue point' comes into being within those who perceive good as evil after previously having done the good deed thinking it as good, and those who perceive evil as good after having undone an evil deed thinking it as good. This is the remorse that depends on untrue point.

This should be explained through these: one who perceives fault what is not fault, improper thing what is proper, offense what is not offense, and so on. All of these, when arise, come into being in only two ways. Therefore it should be noted that it is included in these two.

Then a *kukkucca* which is stated in *Mahāniddeśa*:¹⁸ "not restraining hands is also *kukkucca*; not restraining legs is also *kukkucca*; not restraining both hands and legs is also *kukkucca*" is *asaṃyata-kukkucca* (unrestraining).

It is *vinaya kukkucca* (doubt about the discipline) which is mentioned in these passages: "Monks do not accept in doubt about *vinaya* rules";¹⁹ "How does an offence occur due to violating with doubt? One perceives what is proper as improper, what is improper as proper..."²⁰

This *vinaya kukkucca* is only a doubt dealing with *Vinaya* discipline. That is too only the mentality of *kusala* and *kriya* wavering "whether it is proper or not" in the case of *vinaya* rules which are not one's range.

Then there are monks within whom the mentality arises; some of those who love the practice of discipline never do such a deed (i.e. never violate *vinaya* rules). Referring to such persons, it is said: "Monks do not accept in doubt about *vinaya* rules". And those who do such a deed (i.e.violate *vinaya* rules) commit an offense even in the case of a proper thing. Referring to such persons, it is said: " One has an offense violating *vinaya* rules with doubt".²¹

94. It overpowers *citta* making it gradually dwindle,so it is called *thina*. it is, indeed, denoted in Pāḷi:²² "overpowering (*thiyanā*), the state of overpowering (*thiyittam*)."

95. It suppresses the mental states making them unfit for work , so it is called *middha*. To be explained: When the associated *dhammas* come into existence sustaining such and such posture as acting on object,*thina* overpowers mind and *middha* mental states making them, as if hitting with a club, go back from the object and unable to sustain even the posture .

96. In the word *vicikicchā*: *Cikicchā* is an act of cure. "The treatment with knowledge" is the meaning. *Vicikicchā* is so called because it has an absence of cure, being difficult to be cured. Or *vicikicchā* is so called because through it those who investigate the nature become weary. Or it occurs with wavering mind in two ways , so it is called *vicikicchā*.

It is twofold: a hindrance(*nīvaraṇabhūta*) and a similarity (*paṭirūpakā*). Of these, the "hindrance" is that which exists with doubt about eight points beginning with the Buddha.

The other doubt, all in number, which comes into existence with doubt, "How is it? Is thus? Is this?," regarding such and such objects within those who are not omniscience is the *vicikicchā* ,the similarity.And it belongs to *kusala* or *akusala* , or even *abyākata* if arises within *Arahantas*. However, only the *vicikicchā* , a hindrance, which actually belongs to *akusala* is necessary.

The Exposition of Correct Meaning of the "Evil Group."

97. It holds well,so it is called *saddhā*. It is the meaning: just as the clear and still water keeps well the reflection of the moon,the sun, etc., in it, so this *saddhā* holds and keeps well the qualities of the Buddha, etc., in it.

Or through it persons or associated *dhammas* believe, so it is called *saddhā*. Or it is mere believing that is called *saddhā*. And here needs only that which occurs in object worthy of faith, the Buddha etc., being in a state of absence of pollution. On the contrary, the other faith which is on the object worthy of faith, the holders of wrong view and the doctrine of those, is unreal. Actually, it is,as a phenomenon, only a wrongly decision.

Then human beings, if they have no hands, cannot take jewels although they find them. And all requisites for human beings do not have if they have no wealth; the plants of paddy, etc., cannot grow if there is no seed. Similarly, if there is no *saddhā* , the meritorious deeds cannot be performed. Therefore, this *saddhā* is compared to hand, wealth and seeds.

98. It remembers, so it is called *sati*. It means: it approaches without neglect the meritorious deeds that have been done and will be done by oneself, and the qualities of the Buddha.

Sati is two-fold: the Right Mindfulness (*sammāsati*) and the Wrong Mindfulness (*micchāsati*). Of them, the Right Mindfulness is necessary here. The other cannot be even called *sati*. Actually, it is only the evil mind,the unreal mindfulness, remembering evil deeds that have been done and will be done.

Then it is able to protect mind against all evils and to associated with goods. Therefore, the *sati* is regarded to be compared to a chief minister for general affairs of the King. It is addressed: "*Bhikkhus*, I declare that *sati* needs for ever".²³

99. It feels shame, so it is called *hiri*. It means: it feels shame, disgust or displeasure about the bodily misconduct, etc.

100. It fears those misconducts, so it is called *ottappa*. "It fears" is the meaning. Here, too, there are some sorts of *hiri* and *ottappa* which are unreal. It is, indeed, said:

"They do not feel shame at what should be shamed;
They feel shame at what should not be shamed;²⁴
They do not fear what should be feared;
They perceive what should not be feared as fear".²⁵

Then, good persons keep themselves pure and abstain from evil cultivating respect for themselves through *hiri*, and for others, the gods who protect, etc., through *ottappa*. Therefore, these two *dhammas* (*hiri* and *ottappa*) are expressed as "the guardians of the world (= *lokapāla*)."

101. *Alobha* is the opposite of attachment. To be explained: *Lobha* becomes attached to the objects which are well-beings of oneself. Removing that *lobha* which deals with those objects, *alobha* arises, as an element of renouncing, maligning and disgusting the life and wealth, the basis of attachment, like a mass of excrement.

102. *Adosa* is the opposite of hatred. To be explained: *Dosa* displeases the objects which are not beneficial to him. Removing that *dosa* which deals with those objects, *adosa* arises, as an element of well-wish, generating a peaceful heart, like a full moon, towards sentient beings whenever see them. It is only *adosa* which is mentioned in the "Noble Abodes (*brahma-vihāra*)" as *mettā* (*loving-kindness*).

Here, *amoha* also should be expressed. *Amoha* is the opposite of delusion. It makes cause and effect and the four noble truths in the dark. Removing that *moha* on those *dhammas*, *Amoha* arises, as knowledge, expelling such a delusion like thousands of moons and suns arisen.

103. In the word *tatra-majjhataā*: *atta* is said to be in own nature (*sabhāva*). It has an own nature which is between the two *dhammas*, sluggishness (*līna*) and distress (*uddhacca*) in different nature, so it is *majjhata*. This term is used for the unity of associated *dhammas* which are in a state of balance. And a state of *majjhata* is termed *majjhataā* (= equanimity).

The *majjhataā* (equanimity) which is found in such and such associated *dhammas* is termed *tatra-majjhataā*; or the state of balance of mind and mental states in the beneficial functions is called *tatra-majjhataā*. For this reason, it is stated that this *tatra-majjhataā*, is indifference regarding mind and mental states which are in a state of equality and is compared to a charioteer who treats with impartiality the well-trained horses running harmoniously. Only this which is described as *upekkhā* (= equanimity) in *Brahmavihāras* (= Noble Abodes).

104. In the word *kāya-passaddhi*, etc.: By the word, *kāya*, it denotes the group of mental states, the three Aggregates beginning with feeling. And by the word, *citta*, it denotes a beautiful consciousness.

This is how a compound word is formed: It is the tranquillity of *kāya*, so it is called *kāya-passaddhi*; it is the tranquillity of mind, so it is called *citta passaddhi*.

Passaddhi is tranquillity; it means the state of calmness and cool. Those, within whom these two *dhammas*, are weak do not get delight in meritorious deeds. Their mind wanders towards external objects and like the fish that is put on the back of a heated rock. And those, within whom these two *dhammas* are strong, get delight in their meritorious deeds. Their mind is similar to the fish that is put in the cool water.

105. *Lahutā* is the state of buoyancy. It means the state of non-burden and non-dawdling.

The mind of those, within whom this *dhamma* is weak, does not extend to the meritorious deeds and shrinks. And it is similar to the lotus that is put on a heated rock. And the mind of those, within whom such a *dhamma* is strong, extends to the meritorious deeds. It is similar to the lotus that is put in the cool water.

106. *Mudutā* is the state of plasticity. The mind of those, within whom such a *dhamma* is weak, becomes hard. It is similar to the great soldier who is among enemies. And the mind of those, within whom such a *dhamma* is strong, becomes plastic and tender. It is similar to the great soldier who is among his beloved relations.

107. *Kammañña* is fits for a function. Only the word *kammañña* is used as the word *kammannatā*.

Those, within whom such a *dhamma* is weak, cannot keep their mind in meritorious deeds according to wish. And it scatters like a handful of husk thrown against the wind. And those, within whom such a *dhamma* is strong, are able to keep their minds in meritorious deeds according to wish. And the mind does not become scattered like the block of gold thrown against the wind.

108. *Pāguñña* is the state of good health. Only the word *Pāguñña* is used as *Pāguñnatā*.

The mind of those, within whom such a *dhamma* is weak, shakes and tires to do meritorious deeds. And it is similar to the monkey thrown into deep water. And the mind of those, within whom such a *dhamma* is strong, does not shake and tire like the crocodile thrown into deep water.

109. Only the word *uju* is used as *ujuka*. And *ujukatā* is the state of rectitude.

The mind of those, within whom such a *dhamma* is weak, occurs in various ways dealing with meritorious deeds: it is sometimes reluctant (*līna*); sometimes distracted (*uddhaṭṭa*); it sometimes decreases (*onata*); sometimes increases (*unnata*). And it is similar to walking of a drunkard. And the mind of those, within whom such a *dhamma* is strong, is known as the opposite of that which was said before.

110. Herein, although the meaning is complete if mentioned *citta-passaddhi*, etc. to say the *kāya-passaddhi*, etc. is in order to denote the tranquillity of body through them.

Therein, it should be known: for those who recover from illness after having listened to Sutta, the tranquillity of body is clear; for those who have supernormal power, the buoyancy of body is clear at the time of going in the sky; the tenderness of the body is clear in the creation of the body, small or big; the capability of the body is clear at the time of going into underground or through a mountain without being blocked; the fitness the body is clear at the time creation the form *nāga* (cobra ?) or *garuḷa* (eagle?); the state of rectitude is clear when remain all as created for a long time.

Then, it holds equally, so it is called *sādhāraṇa*. It is common to all *sobhaṇa citta*, so it is *sobhaṇa-sādhāraṇa* (common to all beautiful cittas).

111. In the word *sammāvācā* : "The Right Speech" is three-fold: speech (*kathā*), volition (*cetanā*) and abstention (*viratī*).

Of them, a speech full of words and meaning which is well spoken is 'the right speech'. A volition of *kusala* and *kriya*, which produces speech, is 'the right speech'. An abstention mentality, which arises within those who observe the precepts, the abstention from talking lies, etc., or who determine to observe them; or who do not violate an offense to be violated, is 'the right speech'. This alone is here necessary.

One talks correctly through it. So it is called *sammāvācā*. In this definition *etāya* (= through it) the *kaṛaṇa-vacana* (= instrumental ending) is in the sense of instrumental case (*kaṛaṇatthe*) or in the sense of cause (*hetuatthe*).

Herein, referring to "the formula words" of those who observe by words, the sense of instrumental case and the sense of cause are proper. Then, referring to the faultless words - "let us well observe the precepts as we promised and determined"- only the sense of cause which follows the sense of the instrumental case is proper.

In other way, if one speaks, it does not matter whether he talks so or not, it makes him speak correctly, not incorrectly. For this reason it is called *sammāvācā*. Or it purifies verbal door by eradicating the verbal misconducts. So it is called *sammāvācā*.

112. *Sammākammnta* (= right action) is, too, three-fold: action, volition and abstention. Of these the action of the body of one who performs any deeds, the absence of evil, is called *kriyākammnta*. The volition, which produces the action, is called *cetanākammanta*. The mentality of abstention from evil, which belongs to those who observe the precepts, the abstention from killing sentient beings, etc., or who determine ; or who do not violate which is to be done, is called *virati kammanta*.

They act correctly through it, so it is called *sammā-kamma*. Only this word *sammā-kamma* is used as *sammā-kammanta* like these words *suttanta*, *vananta*. Here the rest have the same way as said above.

113. *Sammā ājīva* (=right livelihood) is twofold: effort and abstention. Of these, an effort, the power of activity, of those who have earnings through normal occupation of ploughing etc., or through going for alms, which are faultless, is called *sammā ājīva* which belongs to the effort. There is mentality of abstention from evil which belongs to those who, keeping their livelihood pure, remove the physical and mental misconducts, the causes of losing morality. This is the *ājīva* which belongs to the abstention. This alone is necessary here.

They continue to live in the correct way through it, so it is called *sammā ājīva* (= right livelihood). Here the rest are the same way as mentioned before. 114. Herein, each one is of three kinds: the abstention from that which comes into being (*sampatta-virati*), the abstention through observation (*samādāna-virati*) and the abstention through eradication (*samuccheda-virati*).

Of them, "the abstention", which arises within those who do not violate what will be presently violated through the mere power of moral shame and fear without observing the precepts, or, if observed without dealing with them, is called "the abstention from that which comes into being". This belongs to only present objects. It is indeed said: "The five precepts are on present object."²⁶

Then the abstention which arises within those, who observe the precepts or who determine to observe the precepts, or who do not violate what is in the present with this idea: "I shall well keep the precepts as observed and determined", is called "the abstention through observation". It has the present object or the future object. Therefore, it is said in Commentary:²⁷ "the five precepts have the present object is said referring to the abstention from that which comes into being".

Then the abstention, which arises through eradicating the conditions of all misconduct at the moment of *magga*, is called "the abstention with eradication". This has only *Nibbāna* as its object. The abstention belonging to Fruition, too, is included only in it.

Herein, it should be noted: the mundane abstention, making the violated things, life faculty, etc. as its object, removes things that should be abstained normally, killing sentient beings, etc. But the supramundane abstention, making *Nibbāna* as its object, eradicates only those things that should be abstained.

115. It makes a person who has compassion trouble his heart, when others feel pain, so it is called *karuṇā*. Or it removes the unhappiness of others; or it eradicates the unhappiness of others, so it is called *karuṇā*. Or it should be

extended over those who feel pain, so it is called *karuṇā* .

In other way, the word *karuṇā* is divided into two parts *kali + uṇā* . *Kali* is used in the sense of pain, like in this: *kali sambhave bhava* (live which is the cause of pain).²⁸ Or the word *kali* is used in the sense of "evil" or "failure".Indeed it is said *Pāpe kali parājaye* (= "Kali" is in the sense of evil and failure).²⁹ All of these (pain, evil, failure) are to be the condition of mercy for those who are with mercy.

Thus, through the compassion persons who have mercy protect sentient beings against pain or evil or the state of failure from all wealth; or look after sentient beings not to be in the three kinds of *kali* (pain, evil, failure).

116. They feel glad when they see other's success, so it is called *muditā*.

They are limitless , so they are termed *appamāṇa*. This term is used to describe sentient beings. It arises on beings who are limitless, so it is called *appamaññā* .It is true they have no limit thus:"it should be spread on such a number of beings, not on others. So they are called *appamaññā* ,although they are spread on a single being.

However it is said in ṬṬkās: "It has the infinite beings as their object,so are *appamāṇa* . Only the word *appamāṇa* is used as *appamaññā* (Purāṇa,p.302; Vibh,p.111).

This is not correct.

117. *Paññīndriya* is only *amoha* which mentioned before. It is called *paññīndriya* because it is either *paññā* in the sense of knowing or *indriya* in the sense of domination.

The exposition of correct meaning in the beautiful group.

118. The stanza, *ettāvatā*, etc., is to summarize the three groups.

Thus, having explained the list of fifty-two, now Thera spoke the word *tesaṃ* , etc., in order to expound the mode of association with *citta*.

This is interpretation: "After having expressed the list of mental states, the association of mental states with *cittas* each will be said as they associate with each other".

Cittuppādesu means "in *cittas* " defining thus: "the mental states arise depending on those, so it is called *uppāda*. The only *citta* is to be *uppāda*, so it is called *cittuppāda* .

The six particulars do not arise in the ten *viññāṇas* which are the weakest of all. Eradicating through the power of mental culture, *vitakka* (=initial application) never arises in the Second *Jhāna*, etc.; *Vicāra* (= sustained application) in the Third *Jhāna*, etc.; *Pīti* (=joy) in the Fourth *Jhāna*, etc. Having the nature of determination, *adhimokkha* (= resolution) never arises in the *citta* with doubt. *Vīriya* (=effort),being the chief of powerful dhammas, never arises in sixteen *cittas*, *Pañcadvārāvajjana* , etc., which are weak. *Pīti* (joy), having the nature of fondness, never arises in those *cittas* associated with displeasure and indifferent feeling. *Chanda* (= wish-to-do), having the nature of willingness, never arises in *ahetukas* (the absence of *hetu*) and *lobhamūlas* (the delusion-rooted consciousness) which are lack of will. Therefore, it is said: *pakiṇṇakesu pana vitakko...mohamūla vajjita cittesu*.

It is the connection of words: Those *cittas* which are without and with particular mental property.

119. *Akusalesu* means "of the mental properties that belongs to *akusala*". It is interpretation: "they are common to all evils. Hence they are found in all twelve evil types of consciousness".

However, Vibhāvanī wants to say that the latter sentence confirms the former.(p.114)

This is not correct. Because this is a place where the mental states which are found in *cittas* are mainly expressed.

Actually, the all evil *cittas* never arise without these four. Because those evil *cittas* do not arise within those who see the danger of evils; or who are displeased with those evils through shame (*hiri*) and fear (*ottappa*); or who concentrate on good *dhammas*. Therefore, those four mental states are found in those all evil *cittas*.

Then *diṭṭhi* (=wrong view) and *māna* (=conceit) arise without giving up the taste of Aggregates and touching them in such and such ways. They arise, therefore, in only *lobhamūla* (=the attachment-rooted consciousness).

Of these which arise in those *cittas*, the "wrong view" arises grasping the *khandhas* firmly as *Atta* and it wrongly touches that *Atta* from the point of wrong nature as permanence. But *māna* arises grasping firmly *Khandhas* as "I", and it wrongly touches its idea as "superiority," etc. These two are not the same from the point of holding. Therefore, it is said: *diṭṭhi catūsu...vip̐pa-yuttesu*.

Furthermore, those who hold wrong view(= *diṭṭhigatika*) grasp the only *Atta* which is held by *diṭṭhi* as "I". For those,too, *diṭṭhi* and *māna* are different in nature with regard to the mode of holding. Because, *diṭṭhi*,like *māna* ,does not have an attempt to hold up oneself. And *māna* ,like *diṭṭhi* ,does not have an attempt to consider wrongly on *dhammas*. For this reason *māna* which holds "I" arises within *Anāgāmīs*. But *diṭṭhi* which holds *Atta* arises within only *Puthujjanas*.

However, Vibhāvanī says: " *Māna* , being as "I", arises like *diṭṭhi*. So it is not found in the same *citta*". Having explained thus it improves its meaning with "the simile of lion".

This is not correct. Because the similarity is only for it which arises together.

Macchhariya (= stinginess), although it is born of attachment to one's own welfare, associates with only hatred. Because it dislikes those own welfare to be common to others. Therefore, it is said: *doso... cittesu*

Thina and *Middha* (= sloth and torpor), which have a characteristic of unwieldness, never arise in the *asaṅkhārika citta*s that have the nature of wildness. So it is said: *Thinamiddhaṃ pañcasu asaṅkhārikacittesu*.

The "four" are "the mental states common to all evil". The "three" comprise craving, wrong view and conceit. The "four" are "hatred, etc". The "both" is "sloth and torpor". In *Vicikicchā citta ca* the word *ca* is in the sense of limitation. It means " only in the doubtful consciousness." The "fourteen" are the mental states which belong to evil.

120. *Sobhaṇesu* means "in the beautiful mental states".

In the supramundane eightfold path, the "Right Thought" which is in the knowledge-group (*paññakkhanda*) of "the three-group" follows the "Right Understanding". Therefore, although the Right Thought does not exist as the basic *jhāna* , etc., "the group of knowledge" does not become less. But, in the *Sīla*-group and *Samādhi*-group, each one does not complete one's affair. For this reason the supramundane path does not exist less than seven factors. Therefore, it is said: *Viratiyo pana tissopi...labbhanti* .

It is words' connection: "The three abstentions are to be known permanently (*niyatā*), together (*ekatova*) and always (*sabbathāpi*)".

Therein, *niyatāva* means: they are not found "sometimes" like in the mundane. Actually, they are found "permanently". Why? Because the supramundane *dhammas* arise making the morality perfect for ever. They, indeed, are unlike mundane *dhammas* which arise sometimes as giving, sometimes as hearing and learning, sometimes as meditating on *kaṣiṇa* , etc.

Ekatova (= together) means it is not known separately like in the mundane. Actually, the three are known only together. Why? Because they

have object which is not different. It is true, they, as mundane, never arise on various objects, the faculty of life, etc., which is be committed. They, actually, arise only on one object, *Nibbāna*.

Sabbathāpi means they are not known as a partial eradication as in mundane. Actually, they, all of the three, are known as total eradication of misconduct and wrong livelihood.

To be explained: "the right speech" in mundane, which arises once, cannot remove all four kinds of verbal misconduct together. "The abstention from telling lies" is able to move only 'the telling of lies', not others. And even "the telling of lies" it cannot remove together with its root and its possibility. In the same way, "the abstention from malicious speech" is able to remove only the "telling of malicious gossip", not others. And even "the maliciousness", it cannot remove together with its root and possibility. All should be explained in detail.

In the supramundane, "the right speech" which arises once, can eradicate all of these verbal misconducts together with its root and possibility. Then "the right action" which arises once, can eradicate all of these bodily misconducts together with its root and possibility. And "the right livelihood" which arises once, can eradicate all of these bodily and verbal misconducts together with its root and possibility. Thus, the three are known in only the supramundane as total eradication altogether.

The word *pi* is in the sense of addition to all parts (*avayava-sampiṇḍanttho*). The single right speech arisen once is to be known as the eradication of telling lies. Not only that, but it is known as the eradication of the malicious gossip also, and all must be spoken.

Especially, in this point, "misconduct together with its root and possibility," these mental defilements, the latent desire for sensual pleasure, etc. that products the physical and mental actions, which must be eradicated by higher magga occur even within the *Sekkhā* in *Arūpa* plane. Needless to say they occur in the *Sekkhās* in *Kāma* and *Rūpa* planes. Therefore,

it should be noted that the abstention of higher magga and phala eradicates misconducts as eradicating those mental defilements.

Kāmāvacara kusalesweva means in only kusalas in *kāma* plane, not in *vipākas* and *kriyas* in *kāma* plane, and not in the *mahaggatas* (=higher level consciousness), too. And even in *kusalas* of *kāma* plane, it is only those which arise in *kāma* plane, not in those which arise in *Rūpa* and *Arūpa* planes. Because *brahmās* have no bodily and verbal misconducts which are to be abstained. And The abstentions of mundane never arise within those who do not have what should be abstained.

Some say the abstentions of mundane do not arise within deities in the six *kāma* planes. That has already been criticized in *Kathāvatthu* (= Points of Controversy).³⁰

"If so, it is implicit that these abstentions of mundane do not arise within those who attained the three Lower Fruition even in human world? Because they have not what should be abstained, killing sentient beings, etc." if asked, this is the answer: It is true. In this case, the "seven kinds of offense group" are also to be abstained. So are the "three kinds of cunning". And some of these are really common to those who stands on Fruition.

For human beings, the things, which are the bases of the observed precepts, must be what should be abstained.

Then the mental defilements, which produce the action of body and words of the *Sekkhās* in *kāma* plane, are the things what should be abstained by the abstention as complete eradication. Those are only the things what should be abstained by the abstention of gradualness.

Kadāci sandissanti means they are found only when they arise as one of the two abstentions, observation and presence. Although found thus, they never arise together due to having different objects. Therefore, it is said *visuṃ visuṃ* (= separately). Then it should be noted that they are found as removing misconducts one by one, although they are found separately, not together like in the supramundane.

121. In Vihbaḍḍa³¹ it says the *Appamaññā* at the stage of *Appanā* to be association with only the pleasant feelings. Therefore, it is said *pañcamajjhānavajjita mahaggata cittesu*.

It is true that they (*Appamaññā*) have an engagement much in the cause of other beings; so they never arise with the indifferent feeling that is so quiet and lacking the attempt.

There is the consensus in Commentaries that these *Appamaññās* being before *Appanā*, have the association with indifferent feeling also. Therefore, it is said: *Kāmāvacara cittesu ca*.

Kadāci means "at the time when those, who have compassion and are absent from jealousy, see failure and success of others".

Nānā hutvā jāyanti means "when sees the failure of beings, only compassion arises in the mode of altruism, but not the gladness (*muditā*)". But at the time when sees the success of beings, only the gladness (*muditā*) occurs in the mode of Joy, not the compassion. So they arise separately.

Then, it is said in *Suttas*:³² "these *karuṇā* and *muditā* are the means of escape from cruelty (*vihiṃsā*) and displeasure (*arati*) which are produced by hatred". And it is only the pleasant feeling which is the opposite of unhappiness. For this reason some scholars want those, although they are the priority of *appanā*, to be associated with only pleasant feelings. Therefore, it is said: *Upekkhā-saha gatesu ... keci vadanti*.

Their statement, however, contrasts with Commentary.³³ Hence many scholars do not approve of it. For this reason it is placed at the position of *keci* by the *Thera*.

Furthermore, the former *Bhāvanā* of the mundane and the supramundane *jhāna*, if it is the priority of the *jhāna* of pleasant feeling, associated with pleasant feeling only when it is the proximity to *appanā*; if the former stage of the *jhāna* with indifferent feeling, it associated with indifferent feeling.

On the other hand, when it is not the proximity to *appanā*, the former *Bhāvanā* of all these *jhānas* associates sometimes with pleasant feeling,

sometimes with indifferent feeling. Therefore, it is reasonable to make that statement a statement of *keci*.

Herein, the whole types of *citta* pertaining to Calmness and Insight may generally associate only with indifferent feeling in the beginning. If they associate with pleasant feeling since starting point, these sentient beings may not feel displeasure on the work of pleasant feelings; they may practice meditation abandoning the other task. They, indeed, feel happy only when they discern the distinguishing the former and the later of their own meditation. Needless to say these types of consciousness, the *Asubha bhāvanā* on the object of disgust, and the *Karuṇā bhāvanā* on the object of beings who are in a sorrowful plight, associate with indifferent feeling.

In other way. These *karuṇā* and *muditā* come into being even in normal occasions. Of them, *muditā* at first has the object of desirability and prosperity; so it is reasonable that it generally is accompanied by pleasant feeling. *Karuṇā* has the object of undesirability and failure; so it may be accompanied generally only by indifferent feeling. However, it is impossible to say that they have much attempt for other beings, so they contrast to the indifferent feeling.

That indifferent feeling, which is not in the stage of *appanā*, does not make attempt only in the experiencing the taste of object, not in other function. It is true, sentient beings take things that are not given them; or offer things; or do many other actions, meritorious and unmeritorious, with the *citta* which has indifferent feeling. Therefore, it is reasonable to say that *karuṇā* and *muditā*, which are in the stage of *appanā*, contrast to the indifferent feeling.

So far as I said it rejects the statement which is asserted in *Vibhāvanī*:

"In cultivating *karuṇā* and *muditā*, through the practice before *Appanā*, the *parikamma* (preliminary action) can be done with the mind which is accompanied by indifferent feeling, too, as if one can recite a mastered text (*paṇḍita gantha*) sometimes with paying attention to other things; or as if one can sometimes contemplate *saṅkhāra* through a mastered insight through the mind without knowledge, too, as

experienced. Therefore, this statement *-karuṇā* and *muditā* cannot be known in the *cittas* in *kāma* which is with indifferent feeling - is made the 'statement of *kecī*.'

Then the objects, *kaṣiṇa*, etc., are not profound at all; the knowledge occurs, however, in the *jhāna cittas* which have those objects through the power of effort, the power of mental concentration and the state of being far from mental defilements. For this reason it is said: *sabbesupi paṇā...cittesu ca*.

122. It is connection of words: the "three" is "the abstentions"; "both" is "the pair of *appamaññā*". Thus the "beautiful mental states" associate with the "beautiful *cittas*" dividing into four types.

Now this verse "*issā*, etc." is said in order to classify the all mental states into "permanent and impermanent association".

It has *karuṇā* as its beginning, so it is called *karuṇādi*. This term describes the *appamaññā* both. *Issā macchera kukkucca virati karuṇādayo* is a compound word of *issā macchhariya kukkucca, virati and karuṇādi*

It is interpretation: "They separately arise; sometimes arise. *Māna*, too, arises sometimes only. In the same way, *thina* and *midhha* arise sometimes only: when arise, they arise only together, not separately."

Herein, it was said before and later that the *appamaññā* and *virati* associate separately and sometimes. So will say "*issā*, etc." later. But the association of "*māna*, *thina* and *midhha*" should be said here: Of them *māna*, although it is found in the four *cittas* which dissociates from wrong view, is known only when it thinks "I am superior," not in other time.

Thina and *midhha*, although they are found in the five *cittas* with prior effort, is known only when they are not good for work being overpowered by sleepiness, not in other time. When found, both are known only together, not separately.

However, in *Vibhāvanī*, it is interpreted: "thina and middha arise sometimes together with, sometimes separately from, *issā*, *macchhariya*, *kukkucca* and *māna*.(p.117)"

It should not be acceptable as correct. Because arising together with and separating from those (*issā, macchhariya, kukkucca*) and that (*māna*) is not known through the difference and indifference of function and object.

In *ṬṬkā*, it gives interpretation: "*māna* and *thina-middha* arise sometimes "separately" and sometimes "together"(p.304).

That is not correct. And the reason has been given.

It is interpretation: *Yathāvuttā'nusārena* means "following this statement as said thus: *stta sabbattha yujjanti...* *Sesā* means the rest of forty-one dhammas except the eleven mental states of impermanent association. They are known to be the impermanent association with *cittas* where they are found following the points as said before.

123. Thus, after having expounded "the way of *sampayoga*" by analyzing those where mental states are found, Thera currently spoke the verse, *saṅghaṇca*, etc., in order to expound "the way of *saṅgha*" by analyzing the group of associated *dhammas*.

"Now I shall possibly speak the way of *saṅgha* of those mental states" is the meaning. *Chattimsa*, etc., is the stanza on the outline pertaining to the way of *saṅgha*.

The *appamaññā*, which has the object of sentient beings, is not found in a *citta* which has the object of *Nibbāna*. Therefore, it is said *Appamaññā-vajjitā*.

In the same way, the work, the thirty-five dhammas - the twelve mental states except *vitakka* and the twenty-three mental states except *appamaññā* - are found in the eight Second *Jhāna cittas*. Such way is indicated by the word, *tathā*.

Te eva means "only those thirty-three *dhammas* which are apart from *vitakka, vicāra, pīti* and *sukha* and with indifferent feeling.

In the word *Aṭṭhasu* it is noted: *aṭṭha* is the expression of *ekasesa* or the expression of *vicchālopa* in this sense: *Aṭṭha ca aṭṭha cāti aṭṭha*.

Pañcakajjhāna vasena means "in the mode of the division of *jhāna* " which is mentioned as *Pañcakanaya* in Pāḷi Text.³⁴ But in the mode of the division of *jhāna* which is mentioned as *catukka* the *saṅgaha* is only four.

This is the distinction between the two ways: Of the two persons who have already attained the First *Jhāna* of *Rūpa* and make an attempt to obtain the Second *Jhāna*, a dullard (*manda*) is able to overcome only *vitakka*. Within him, the second *Jhāna* with four factors comes into existence. And an intellectual (*tikkha pañña*) is able to overcome both *vitakka* and *vicāra* together. Within him, the Second *Jhāna* with three factors comes into existence.

124. The *viratī* (abstentions) never arise in the *mahaggata citta*s on account of this that they are different in function and object. Therefore, it is said *Viratittaya vajjitā*.

To be explained: The *viratī* (abstention) has function to cleans physical and verbal action. The *Jhāna* of *mahaggata* has function to cleans the mind of only those have pure bodily and verbal action. Then, *viratī* (abstention) arise depending on the violated things (*vitikkamitabba vatthu*) or *Nibbāna*, while the *Jhāna* of *mahaggata* on the object of imaginary or on the *dhammas* in *mahaggata*.

125. Having the different function and object, *viratī* (abstention) and *appamaññā* (boundless) are both not found in the same *citta*. Therefore, it is said *Appamaññā viratiyo panettha ... yojetabbā*.

Then, *viratī* (abstention) has the function of removing the state of immorality (*dussilya*). Hence it is not found in the mundane *abyākata citta*s which have not such a function. So it is said *Viratī vajjitā*. It is true, it is said in Pāḷi: "five precepts belong to *kusala* alone".³⁵ And it is noted that this is also said referring to the mundane precepts.

Appamaññā (boundless) has the object of sentient beings, while the *mahāvīpākas* have only the object of *Paritta*. Hence it never arises in *mahāvīpāka citta*s. Therefore, it is said *Appamaññā-virati-vajjitā*.

Then, if asked - *the kusala of kāma* has the object of which beginning is sentient beings. So must its *vipāka* have the same object as that of *kusala*,? - the answer is "No". Because the *vipāka* is absent from considerations to receive an object.

To be explained: The *Paññatti* (concept) is not known as reality and the *dhammas* pertaining to the *mahaggata* and the supramundane are very subtle. So they are on the object of only *kusala*, etc., which obtain them considering and penetrating in such and such aspects.

However, the *vipākas* of *kāma*, due to being so powerless, are unable to obtain an object with consideration. Needless to say they obtain an object with penetration. Therefore, it is noted that those (*kāma vipāka*) are unable to depend on the *Paññatti* (concept) or the *mahaggata* and supramundane *dhammas*.

Then the *vipāka* of *mahaggata*, although they are absent from consideration, are able to depend on special concepts created by the power of meditation. Because they are produced by a special *kamma* which is at a stage of *Appanā*.

However, Vibhāvanī explains the reason through "the simile of the son of a slave woman" saying thus: "Because it is a result of that *kamma* which is dominated by the desire for sensual pleasure (*kāmataṇhā*)" with such idea: the *kāma vipāka* is produced by the *kamma* which is dominated by the desire for sensual pleasure. So they have to depend on only the *dhammas* in *kāma* plane which are the object of the desire for sensual pleasure (p.119).

That should be examined. If so, the *vipākas* of *mahaggata*, too, are born of the *kamma* which is dominated by the desire for *rūpa* and *arūpa*. So they, too, may depend only on the *dhammas* of *mahaggata* which are the object of the desire for *rūpa* and *arūpa*.

In other way, there is not such a limit: "the desire for sensual pleasure depends only on the *dhammas* in *kāma*, not on the concept". It also cannot be said: "The desire is not the desire for pleasure which arises loving these concepts - female and male, etc., their hands and legs, etc."

Subhe means "in *kusala citta*". In the word *mane* the ending *e* is locative case in the sense of *niddhāraṇa* (taking out of the many). And the words *subhe*, *kriye* and *pāke* are noted to be in the sense of *niddhāraṇīya* (things which is taken out). It is interpretation: "In the *cittas* which are *kusala*, *vipāka* and *kriya* with *hetu* the *saṅgha* is only twelve".

The stanza beginning with *na vijjantettha* is a stanza for the synthesis pertaining to the excluded *dhammas*. *Ettha* means "in the beautiful *cittas*". *Dvayaṃ* means "both *virati* and *appamaññā*".

The stanza beginning with *anuttare* is a stanza for the synthesis pertaining to the "differentiating (*visesaka*)" mental states. *Jhāna dhammā* means those which begin with *vitakka*. In the *majjhima*, which is *mahaggata*, either the *appamaññā* or the *jhānas* differentiates. And in the *paritta* which is the beautiful *cittas* in *kāma*, the *appamaññā*, *virati* *paññindriya* and *pīti* differentiate. And it means "they differentiate the way of *saṅgha*".

126. It is the interpretation: the 17 *dhammas* together with greed (*lobha*), wrong view (*diṭṭhi*) are counted to be 19; and the 16 *dhammas* - 12 *Aññasamāna* except *Pīti* and 4 mental states which are common to all evil, together with greed and wrong view, are counted to be 18.

Then *issā* (jealousy), *macchariya* (stinginess) and *kukkucca* (remorse) have different function and object. So it is said *Issā ... yojetabbāni*.

Then in all *akusala cittas* the *dhammas* associated are not equal from the point of *dhamma*, but from the point of number, some are equal to some *dhammas*. Therefore, it is said *dvādasa ... saṅghitā bhavanti*.

Herein, out of five *asaṅkhārika cittas*, in the first and the second there are 19 mental states, in the third and the fourth 18, and in the fifth 20. And out of five *sasaṅkhārika cittas*, in the first and the second there are 21, in the third and the fourth 20 and in the fifth 22. And in both of *Momūha* there are 15. Thus, in the *Akusala* there are seven syntheses. Therefore, it is said *ekūnavīsā...*

Sādhāraṇā means "common to all evil". *Samānā* means "equal to others". *Apare* means "the others except *chanda*, *pīti* and *adhimokkha*".

127. *Hasana citte* means "in a *citta* which produces smiling". *Vothabbane* means "in a *citta* which turns to the object in the mind-door". *Sukha santīraṇe* means "in a *citta* of investigation with pleasant feeling". *Mano dhātuttikā hetuka paṭisandhi yugale* means "in the three groups of mind elements which consist of the 'five-door adverting *citta*' and both the 'receiving *citta*' and the pair of '*ahetuka* rebirth *citta*', the '*citta* of investigation' with indifferent feeling.

It is the interpretation: In all *ahetuka cittas* the seven mental states are found. And the remaining, that is *pakiṇṇaka*, are possibly. Thus the thirty-three-fold *saṅgha* is said by me.

128. Now the last stanza is spoken in order to explain the classification which is through planes (*bhūmi*), commonness (*jāti*), association (*sampayoga*), etc. of each of the mental states like *citta* with this idea: "this is the explanation of mental state."

It is the interpretation: "in the mode of the sixteen-fold *sampayoga* and thirty-three-fold *saṅgha*, one must express the possible equal divisions of those

mental states to that of *cittas* "

It is the meaning: *Phassa* (contact), firstly, due to association with eighty-nine or one hundred twenty-one types of *cittas*, is of eighty-nine kinds or of one hundred and twenty-one kinds. In this way, one must explain the divisions of mental states, 52 in number, through the possible classification: plane, commonness, association, etc., taking them out respectively.

Thus "the Exposition of the correct meaning" concerning with "the Compendium of Mental States" in the Paramatthadīpanī, the fourth subcommentary on the "Abhidhammatta saṅgaha", ends.

¹ Mūlajīkā, Book 1-159

² S.N. Book 2-31; 247; Book 1-384.

³ Dhammasaṅgani, 20

⁴ Dhammasaṅgani, 145

⁵ Dhammasaṅgani, 159

⁶ S.N. Book 2-71

⁷ S.N. Book 2-71

⁸ S.N. Book 2-72

⁹ See M.N.A., Book 4-93, but it is said in different word.

¹⁰ Dhammapada (V.116)

¹¹ A.N. Book 1-544; Book 3-428; Vibhanga, 405.

¹² SM.V. 495.

¹³ This verse may be said by scholars in ancient time.

¹⁴ Aṭṭhasālinī, 414.

¹⁵ SM.P. Book 1-182.

¹⁶ Kuca sanpaccana kotilla paṭikkama vilekhanesu = the root, kuca is in the sense of baking, distorting, shrinking and scratching (Dhātumāla in Saddanīti, 30); Kuca saṅkocane = kuca is in the sense of shrinking. (Dhātumāla in Saddanīti, 31)

¹⁷ Mahāniddeśa, 167; 292; 403.

¹⁸ Mahāniddeśa, 167; 292; 403.

¹⁹ Vin. Book 2-99 and see it in many places.

²⁰ Kaṅkhāvitarani, 100

²¹ Vin. Book 5-184.

²² Dhammasaṅgani, 233.

²³ S.N. Book 3-100.

²⁴ Dhammapada (V. 316)

²⁵ Dhammapada (V. 317)

²⁶ Vibhaṅga, 305.

²⁷ SM.V. 369

²⁸ Abhidhānappadipikā (V.3)

²⁹ Abhidhānappadipikā (V.)

³⁰ Kathavatthu, 194-5.

³¹ Vibhaṅga, 294.

³² A.N. Book 2-257.

³³ Aṭṭhasālinī, 201.

³⁴ Dhammasaṅgani, 46; 44.

³⁵ Vibhaṅga, 305.

Chapter 3

PAKINNAKA SANGAHA

129. Thus, having respectively given the explanation of *citta* and *cetasika*, now *Thera* spoke *sampayuttā yathāyogaṃ*, etc. in order to give again the explanation of both of them.

This is the interpretation: The *dhammas*, *citta* and *cetasika*, numbering 53 as their own nature, that are possibly associated, are respectively expounded by me. Now, the "compendium of both of them" will be presented.

Herein, *sabhāva* is the each of own nature. It means "the particular characteristics of *dhammas*". First, *citta* is only one regarding to its particular characteristic which is the awareness of object, although it is classified to be eighty-nine through the divisions of plane, species, associations, etc. *Phassa* (contact) is also only one regarding to the characteristic of touching (*phusana-lakkhaṇa*) although it is eighty-nine through the divisions of plane, species, associations, etc. The same are *vedanā* (feeling), *saññā* (perception), etc. In this way, those *dhammas* are only fifty-three as their own nature.

It is the connection of words: "a summary dealing with feeling, condition, function, door, object and base".

Herein, *vedanā hetuto* means "through the division of feeling and the division of condition". It is the same in the word *kicca-dvāra-lambāṇa-vatthuto*. In the word *cittuppāda-vaseneva* it is the connection of words: "It will be presented (*niyyate*) only through *citta*". By the word *eva* the mental states are excluded.

So far as I have said, the definition of words for the six *Pakiṇṇaka* Compendiums are expressed here by *Thera* thus: *Vedanā saṅgaha* is that through the division of feeling it summarizes *citta* and *cetasika*; *Hetu-saṅgaha* is that through the conditions it summarizes *citta* and *cetasika*, and so on.

However, in *Vibhāvanī* taking in even *cetasikas* by the word "cittuppāda" and not seeing other excluded *dhammas*, it is said: "it never arises without it"(p.122).

That is definitely not reasonable. Because, there is not any *saṅgaha* which is presented through *cetasikas* in this way: "A number of mental states associate with pleasant feeling, a number of them with pain feeling," and so on. But there is such a *saṅgaha* which is presented only through *citta* like this: "One body-consciousness associated with pleasant feeling and is the result of merit," and so on. Actually, it should be noted: "if *citta* is presented, *cetasikas* are also presented. For that reason the word *cittuppāda vaseneva* is said".

130. *Tattha* means "out of those six compendiums". *Vedanāsaṅgaha* is that through the division of *vedanā* it summarizes *citta* and *cetasika* which associate with feeling.

However, in *Vibhāvanī* it is said: "Vedanāsaṅgaha" is a summary by analyzing *vedanā*, pleasant feeling, etc., even *citta* and *cetasika* which associate with feeling.(p.122)"

Herein, by the word *ca* (=even) the word *vedanā saṅgaha* is used as *ekasesa* (=remaining one) in this sense: "either the summary of feeling or the summary of *citta* and *cetasika* which associate with feeling".

That is not correct. Because the division of feeling is said here only in order to mention the basic *dhamma* of this summary, but not in order to mention the summary of feeling separately.

Herein, if asked, "why is the word *tividhā vedanā* said; in the *Samyutta*,¹ feeling is classified into two or three, five, six, eighteen, thirty-six and hundred and eight?," the answer is that: True. But as "the characteristic of feeling" *vedanā* is only three. Because they, if feels an object, experience it as pleasant or unpleasant or indifferent. There is no other aspect to experience it.

However, the other divisions are presented in such and such aspects. To be explained: Therein the two feelings are as physical and mental feeling. It should be quoted: " *Bhikkhus*, what are the two feelings? physical feeling and mental feeling." ²

Or the two feelings are said as pleasant and unpleasant feeling, including the indifferent feeling in the pleasant feeling. It should be quoted:

"Two types of feelings are expounded by the Blessed One. They are pleasant feeling and unpleasant feeling. Sir, that feeling, which is neither pleasant nor unpleasant, is reckoned under the pleasant feeling which is calm and sublime."³

However, in *Vibhāvanī*, it is said: "The two feelings are expressed taking the indifferent feeling without fault in the pleasant and the indifferent feeling with fault in the unpleasant feeling.(p.123)"

That is reasonable although it is not expounded in the Text.

Then, the feelings are five through the division of faculty (*indriya bheda*); six through the division of contact (*phassa bheda*); eighteen through the division of getting in touch through craving (*upa-vicāra bheda*); thirty-six through pleasant, unpleasant and indifferent feelings which are twelve each classifying thus:- six belonging to craving (*gehassita*) and six belonging to renunciation from craving (*nekkhammassita*). Those thirty-six feelings are expressed to be a hundred and eight feelings multiplying by three periods.

Then, in some Suttas⁴ it is said: "There are feelings which are all counted into pain." That is said as the suffering of *saṅkhāra (saṅkhāra-dukkha)*.

Then, in "the explanation of *citta* ", the *cittas* are presented through the division of faculty; hence here, too, the word *sukhaṃ...pañcadhā hoti* is said to summarize *cittas* again only through the division of faculty.

Herein, the pleasant and the unpleasant feelings are called *Indriya* due to dominating over the *dhammas* concerned. Those dominated *dhammas* are two-fold: physical and mental. So each of the two feelings can be classified into

two: *sukhindriya, somanassindriya* and *dukkhindriya, domanassindriya* respectively.

However, the *dhammas* that are dominated by the indifferent feeling is only mental. So the indifferent feeling is said one as *upekkhindriya*. In other way, they are also two-fold in one mode. Because they can arise depending on a sensitive organ, eye, etc. But the feeling is said only one due to possessing a single function.

However, in *Vibhāvanī* it is said: "The pleasant and unpleasant feelings are divided into two: bodily pleasance and mental pleasance"(p.123).

Of these *sukha* and *dukkha* have the characteristic of experiencing a tangible object naturally desired or undesired respectively. The other feelings have the characteristic of experiencing the objects natural and imaginary desired or undesired, or medium.

Sesāni means the "remainings" which are apart from *sukha, dukkha, somanassa* and *domanassa*. They are altogether fifty-five - thirty-two *cittas* belonging to *kāmāvacara* and twenty-three *cittas* associated with the Fifth *Jhāna*. *Ekatta* means "in one *citta* ". *Itarā* means "the indifferent feeling". [*vedanāsaṅgaho*]

131. *Hetu saṅgaha* is that through the division of condition it summarizes *cittas* and *cetasika* which associate with conditions.

However, in *Vibhāvanī* it is said: *Hetusaṅgaha* is a *saṅgaha* which summarizes through the division of the conditions, craving, etc. as well as through the *dhammas* associated with conditions.(p.124)

That is not correct. The reasons have already been given.

This is the connection of words: "the conditions are six-fold". Herein, the function of condition (*hetu kicca*) is to retain the *dhammas* associated, keeping them on an object.

To be explained: the root of a tree growing inside the soil carries the earth sap (*pathavi-rasaṃ*) and water sap (*āporasaṃ*), absorbing them into the tree up to its top. The roots fortify the tree against the storm and heavy rain. In this way, the tree grows, flourishes, increases in size and exists longer. Similarly, these *dhammas*, standing themselves firmly on the objects, make the associated *dhammas* grow, flourish, increase in magnitude and exist longer on the objects.

On the contrary, it should be noted that the *citta* dissociated from conditions (*ahetuka citta*) do not stand firmly on the objects just as the rootless duckweed does not stand firmly on the surface of water.

But the other commentators⁵ said: "the work of condition is to make the *dhammas* to be a state of wholesomeness, etc." It is rejected criticizing thus: If so, those, which have no condition that arises simultaneously, cannot be in a state of unwholesomeness or *abyākata*. Then, the matters, which are caused by *hetu*-conditions, may be in the state of wholesomeness, etc.

In other way, darkness in the world is not caused by special conditions. Actually, where there is no light, there is darkness in nature. Similarly, in the case of *dhamma*, the blinding darkness, that is delusion, can become itself unwholesomeness.

Then, there exists "the desire (*icchā*)". It, associating with delusion and reaching a state of attachment, becomes an unwholesomeness under the name of craving (*lobha*). But it becomes a wholesome desire (*kusalacchanda*) by reaching the state of desire for *dhamma* if it associates with confidence.

Then, there exists impatience (*akkhanti*). It also becomes unwholesome (*akusala*) under the name of hatred (*dosa*) being in the state of repugnance if it associates with delusion. But it becomes wholesome under the name of non-attachment (*alobha*) being in the state of contradiction to evil *dhammas* and objects as said "one does not keep the thought of sensual desire," etc., if it associates with confidence.

Actually, delusion cannot be said that it is unwholesome if associates with such a *dhamma* and wholesome if associates with such a *dhamma*. It is definitely unwholesome in nature like the taste of original sour that needs not add to make it sour.

Then, the *dhamma*, which is neither merit nor demerit, is called *abyākata*. That alone is the reason to call the *dhammas* *abyākata*. Therefore, the state of *abyākata* dealing with the *cittas*, the absence of *hetu*, matter and *Nibbāna* is in their own nature.

Herein, *moha* (delusion) becomes the root of the remaining *hetus*. It is true, attachment and hatred are only the consequences of delusion. The state of wholesomeness dealing with non-attachment, etc., can be known only with latent ignorance.

Actually, those *hetus*, craving, etc., are the specific roots of the *cittas* which associates with craving, etc. It is true, the wrong view, conceit, etc., are the consequence of attachment, etc. And the confidence, etc., are the consequence of non-attachment.

Then the *hetus* are principal *dhammas* regarding to the *dhammas* associated. Therefore, it is reasonable to say that the state of *abyākata* dealing with *vipāka* and *kriya* associated with *hetu* can be said even through *hetu*.

So far as I have said, this statement in *Vibhāvanī* (p.124) is rejected:

"But the other commentators say: the state of condition (*hetu bhāva*) is to make kusala, etc. to be *kusala*, etc." If so, for the *hetus* it may need the other condition to be *kusala* etc. Then, someone may say: to be *kusala*, etc. of a *hetu* depends on the remaining *hetus* associated. Although it is, the *hetu* which associates with *momūha citta* may not be included to be *akusala*. If not, that *hetu* which associates with *momūha citta* may be *akusala* according to its own nature. If so, the remaining *hetus* may be called *kusala*, etc., in accordance with their nature. Hence the *dhammas* associated with *hetus* also, like the *hetus* themselves, may

not concern *hetu* to be *kusala*, etc. And if the state of *kusala* etc., depends on *hetu*, the *dhammas* absent of *hetu* may not be *abyākata*. The argument over this point much is useless".

Then, the *jhāna* factors extend the function of meditating (*upa nijjhana ttha*) only to the mind, not to the matter, out of mind and matter which have the *jhāna* conditions. However, those matters are included in the *dhammas* of *jhāna* conditioned; because they are born of *jhāna dhammas*.

Similarly, *hetus* also extend the state of *kusala* etc., to only the mind, not to the matter. However, those *dhammas* of matter are included in the *dhammas* of *hetu*-conditioned; because they are born of *hetus*. Therefore, it should not be questions that the matters are included in *kusala*, etc.

Then, it is said in Vibhāvanī: "To be *kusala* and *akusala* etc., of the *kusala* and *akusala* depends on the attention in correct and not correct way (p.124)."

That, too, should be examined. To be explained: When there is sunshine, it is a time for the day birds, swan, etc. And when the dark of night comes, it is a time for night birds, owl, etc. However, the light and the dark do not differentiate the colour, etc., of those birds. Actually, the differentiation is made only by genus (*yonī*).

Herein, light is compared to the attention in correct way, while the blinding darkness to the other (the attention in not correct way). Those beings (birds) are compared to *kusala* and *akusala*. And the differentiation of colour, etc., is compared to the state of *kusala*, etc. The genus is compared to *hetus*.

All of these speeches *abyākatanaṃ pana*, etc.⁶ are included in the aforesaid speech: "The *dhamma* which is not *kusala* and *akusala* is called *abyākata*."

Tattha means "in the summary of *hetu*". The *dhammas* absent of *hetu*, although they are excluded here, are said first in order to take easily the *dhammas* associated with *hetu*. So it is said: *sesāni pana ...sahetukāneva*. In other way, the name of *ahetuka* is known only through *hetu*, so there is nothing

wrong to take them here. For this reason it is said: *ahetukā' tthārasseka...*

Then the *hetu*, although it is of six kinds in their own nature, is nine-fold through the division of species, *kusala*, *akusala* and *abyākata*. So it is said: *lobho doso ca...[hetusaṅgaho]*

132. *Kicca-saṅgaha* is that through the division of forty function it summarizes *citta* and *cetasika* which have functions.

However, in Vibhāvanī it is said: "Kicca-saṅgaha" is a *saṅgaha* dividing functions, relinking, etc., and classifying those which have that function (p.125)."

That is not correct.

Then, by a single *kamma* one life comes into existence. If that *kamma* ceases by itself or by an obstacle, that life becomes ceased. It is a chance of another *kamma*. Hence, "to be born", as relinking next life through one of *kamma* which has chance, of a person who had died and was born without waiting for a moment between the two lives, is "the function of *paṭisandhi*".

Then "the continuity", as causing the ceaseless continuity until the *kamma* ceases, of the life process as produced, is "the function of *bhavaṅga*". It is true, when the life span exists, the life continuity (*āyu-papandha*) and the body temperature continuity (*usmā-papandha*) come into existence. Thus, these three phenomena keep this body alive.

It should be quoted:

"When life, temperature and *viññāṇa* leave this body, the discarded body is lying down like a useless piece of wood."⁷

Turning thought process; or it turns the thought process; or in this situation or through this it turns thought process; so it is called *āvajjana*. It means that it arises making the *bhavaṅga* process stop and facing towards another object. In other way, it attends to the other object, so it is called *āvajjana*.

The meaning of *dassana*, etc. is easily known.

Votthabbana means "keeping separately". It means: "dividing without letting them mix : this is blue, this is yellow, this is beautiful, this is ugly.

Javana, *java* and *vega* are equivalent words. The arising of *citta* with "intensity" like a thunderclap is called the "function of *javana*".

However, it is said in Vibhāvanī: "the arising of *citta*, as if having intensity, for several times or once performing such and such function on object is called the function of *javana* .(p.125)"

That is not correct. Because there is not such a *citta* which is with intensity arises only once and ceases. It is true, the *javana* of *magga* and *abhiññā* also participates in *javana* thought process which arise intensively starting from the preliminary *citta* with a single *āvajjana*. But they never do the work of *javana* as a separate *javana citta*.

Furthermore, in that Vibhāvanī by the word *javamānassa viya pavatti* it is implicitly expressed:

"The momentary phenomena, which cease after arising separately, have not an impetus, that is moving rapidly. But those phenomena are called *javana* as arising several times like a person who walks quickly".

That is also not correct. Because it has been said before: "the arising of a *citta* with intensity like a thunder clap is called the function of *javana*".

It should be noted: *bhavaṅga citta*, although it continues for a long time, has no impetus like a dry leaf carried by the current on a river. But *javana citta*, even when it is single, arises with intensity like the *vajira* weapon launched by *Inda*.

Tadārammaṇa is so called because it has the object of *javana*. It is meant that its object is only the object which *javana* receives. It is truly said:⁸ It is called *tadārammaṇa*, because it has only the object which *javana* has. In other way, *tadārammaṇa* is so called because the object of *javana* becomes the object of it. And here needs "the state of *tadārammaṇa*".

Cuti is passing away (*cavana*), freedom (*muccana*) and moving (*parigalana*) from present life.

Now the division of place (*ṭhāna bhedo*) is spoken in order to explain that these functions do not exist here and there, but they exist only in decisive place. *ṭhāna* is that where the *citta* with this and that function occurs. This term is used for a position (*okāsa*). It is meant "this and that interval". It is true. Time also, where there occur the *dharmas* of period, should be called *ṭhāna*.

Paṭisandhi-ṭhāna is the place where there is rebirth. It is meant "the time of rebirth" or "the moment of rebirth". The same way are the remainings, too.

However, it is said in Vibhāvanī: *Paṭisandhi-ṭhāna* is the place where there is rebirth. Having said thus and it continues: "The place does not exist separately apart from *paṭisandhi*; but it should be noted: it is "thinking of the difference what is indifferent", to know the meaning easily, like in this example "the body of the stone, etc.,"

That must not be accepted. Because time (*kāla*), although it does not exist in ultimate sense, is concept (*paññatti*) which is an object of *citta*.

That is true. In commentary,⁹ after having said thus: "It should be known the place where the eight *mahāvīpāka citta*s become mature. They become as an effect in four places: in rebirth (*paṭisandhi*), *bhavaṅga*, death and *tadārammaṇa*, then it says only the time giving detailed explanation thus: "they become mature as *paṭisandhi* at the time of rebirth, then as *bhavaṅga* even for countless span, then *cuti* at the time of demise." Otherwise, places (*ṭhāna*) also should probably be divided into fourteen like functions (*kiicca*).

Then, the division of place in detail will be known through the thought process program in the two chapters of *pavatti saṅgaha* later.

Santīraṇa with pleasant feeling does not serve as a rebirth. Because, being much weak, the *kusala* of *omaka* (degradation) with two *hetus*, although it associates with pleasant feeling, does not produce rebirth with pleasant feeling. For that reason it is said: *dve upekkā-sahagata santīraṇāni ceva...* The *Santīraṇa* with pleasant feeling, it is true, is not mentioned as *paṭisandhi* in the

hetu pacchanika in the section of *paṭicca vāra* of *pīṭṭika* in *Paṭṭhāna*.¹⁰

Then, *manodvārā'vajjana*, receiving the condition from the thought process and weak, is absent of impetus, although it arises twice on the object of *paritta* or *avibhūta*. So it is said: *āvajjana dvaya vajjitāni...*

However, it gives the reason in *Vibhāvanī*: "because of not experiencing the taste of object (p.127)."

That is not a suitable reason. Because the experience of the taste of object is not the reason to perform *javana* function and to have the name of *javana*. But it is only a consequence of *javana* function.

Then, the *phala citta*, although it is absent from *āsevana* condition, arises with impetus on an object. Because the volition of *magga* has a great power and *phala citta* arises through the power of *Parikamma bhāvanā*. So the *phala citta* is reckoned as *javana*.

However, in *Vibhāvanī* with this idea: the *javana* of *magga* and *abhiññā*, due to arising only once, cannot perform *javana* function, it is said: The supramundane *magga*, etc., although it has only one moment, has *javana* function because of possessing the nature of *javana*. Then explains that meaning with "the simile of omniscience (p.127)".

That is not reasonable.

Now the word *tesu pana*, etc. is said in order to present *cittas*, by summarizing them, which have the same number of function. "The *cittas* which are called *paṭisandhi*, etc." is how to relate the words in sentence.

However, in *Vibhāvanī* it gives the connection of the word:

"*Paṭisandhi*, etc. are through the division of function... (p.127)"

That is not correct. Because the differentiation of the name should not be spoken separately.

It is interpretation: The *cittas* which have one function and place, two, three, four, five functions and places are expressed orderly to be sixty-eight, then two, nine, eight and two. [*kiccasaṅgaho*]

133. *Dvāra saṅgaha* is that through the division of *dvāras*, eye, etc. it summarizes *citta* and *cetasika*.

However, in *Vibhāvanī* it is said: *Dvārasaṅgaha* is a summary by analyzing the doors and the *cittas* that arise in the doors. (p.128)"

That is not correct.

Dvāra is that through it the two persons pass. It is a term for the gate through which the persons inside or outside the town go out and in. And some give this definition: *Dvāra* is that where the two persons pass."

In other way, *dvāra* is twofold: the space (*ākāśadvāra*) and transparent (*maṇḍadvāra*). Of these two, the space is the "open way" as mentioned before. And the transparent is a "mirror" from which light reflects. It is used at the houses of rich people.

Just as the external substances have two doors, even so there are only two doors in the bodies of beings. It is true. The "space door" is denoted in this speech: "*Navadvāro mahāvaṇo* = the big boil has nine holes." Then, there are ninety-nine thousands of the holes from which body hair grow. They are also the space doors.

Especially, the transparent door which is similar to a mirror is known here. It is also called *dvāra*, because it is the path where the *dharmas* of enjoying object and enjoyed object come in and go out and it is similar to the door. And the transparent door is two-fold: one that pertains to immateriality and the other that pertains to materiality.

Then the "transparent door of the materiality" which depends on the specific great element produced by the particular *kamma* is also five-fold. Therefore, it is said: *cakkhudvāraṃ...*

In the word *cakkhu meva cakkhu-dvāraṃ* it is the meaning: "Only the eye, in which forms - full moon, etc.- reflect. Then those forms which reflect the *cittas*, *āvajjana* etc., receives. So only the eye is called *cakkhu-dvāra* (eye door). Because it (the eye) is an entrance of the two *dharmas* as the state of object (*visaya bhāva*) and of the awareness of object (*visayī bhāva*).

In other way, it is the meaning: only the eye (*cakkhu*), through which the external forms, full moon, etc., become the object of internal thought process, *āvajjana*, etc., and through which the internal thought process, *āvajjana*, etc., is aware of those external forms, is called *cakkhu dvāra* because of the reason as said. The same way in the rest, too.

However, it is said in Ṭṭkās:(Purāṇa,309; Vibh,128; Saṅkhepa,242)

"it is similar to door, so it is called *dvāra*. Because it is the entrance of mental phenomena, *āvajjana*, etc".

That is not correct. Because it is the entrance of objects, visible objects, etc., too. It is true, the six-fold *visaya pavatti* will be said. Herein, *visaya pavatti* is the arising of objects which begins with form, that is the appearance in the doors.

Then, by the word *cakkhu meva cakkhu-dvāraṃ* it rejects the meaning *cakkhussa dvāraṃ cakkhu-dvāraṃ*. In the same way, by these words *sotādayo sotadvārādīni* it gives such definitions: *sotameva sotadvāraṃ...mano eva manodvāraṃ*. But it does not indicate such a meaning: *manānaṃ dvāraṃ manodvāraṃ*

Then this *mana* is manifold, so to present the *mana* that needs here it is said: *manodvāraṃ pana bhavaṅganti pavuccati*.

However, it is said in Vibhāvanī: "Manodvāra" is the door that belongs to the *cittas*, *āvajjana*, etc.(p.128)"

That is not correct. The reason has already been given.¹¹

Herein, the whole eighty-nine-fold *citta* should be called *manodvāra*. However, the *bhavaṅga* alone is spoken as *manodvāra*; because it needs here only the door belonging to the place where *cittas* are born. Only the eighty-nine-fold *bhavaṅga citta* which continues the whole life span since *paṭisandhi* like the current of a river is spoken here as *manodvāra*. *Pavuccati* means "to be talked".

However, in Vibhāvanī it is said: "just as the door of a village is next to the village, even so the door through which *cittas* that begins with *āvajjana* arise may be only *bhavaṅga* which is next to *āvajjana*"(p.128).

That should not be accepted. Because, if so, on the sensitive matters, eye-sense, etc., the objects, forms, etc., cannot appear; those sensitive matters are unable to be the entrance of a thought process which begin *āvajjana*; for that reason, they may not be called *dvāra*. Actually it is impossible to say that they are not to be called *dvāra*. Because in Pāḷi Text,¹² those matters, eye-sense, etc., are mentioned as *dvāra* matter. In this text also it will be mentioned thus: the seven-fold matters - the sensitive matters and the medium of communication - are called the *dvāra* matters.

Furthermore, in the Vibhāvanī, the quotation is given thus: "The *bhavaṅga* together with *āvajjana* is called *manodvāra*."(p.128)

This quotation is also not suitable here. Because it presents the *āvajjana* to be inclusive in *manodvāra*.

Actually, it is suitable only in this: "Depending on eye and visible objects arises eye-consciousness... depending on ear...depending on mind and mental objects arises *mano*-consciousness."¹³

It is true, in this Pāḷi, out of four conditions that cause eye-consciousness arises, only eye and visible objects are presented by name; the other two conditions - *āvajjana* and *khandhas* associated - are included by the word "ca (also)". The same are in the ear-consciousness, etc. Especially in the case of *mano-viññāṇa* in the word *manañca*, *bhavaṅga* together with *āvajjana* is taken in by name and the *khandhas* associated are by the word *ca*. If so, the conditions are four.

It is true, in the Commentary on Dhātuvibhaṅga¹⁴ it is explained: "where there is used the word *paṭicca*, there should not be known *āvajjana* separately. Actually it is included in *bhavaṅga*.¹⁵ Therefore, *mano* here is the *bhavaṅga* together with *āvajjana*. *Mano-viññāṇa* is a *manoviññāṇa* which belongs to the *javana*".

Herein by this "where there is used the word *paṭicca*, it is implicit that "in other places *āvajjana* must not be included in *dvāra*. Furthermore, being used the word *paṭicca* the *bhavaṅga* in this Pāḷi must be known only the two *bhavaṅgas* which are next to *āvajjana*. Because it needs there only the conditions that comes into unity.

Then, here needs entire *bhavaṅga*; because it includes the all *dhammas* of *upapatti* which deserves to be *dvāra*. It should be decided on this point: "there is not any *bhavaṅga* which cannot be called *manodvāra*".

In the word *tattha* the ending *ttha* is locative case in the sense of *niddhāraṇa*. It is interpretation: in the *cakkhudvāra* of those six types of *dvāras*.

Yathārahaṃ means "according to object, sphere, person, attention and so on". *Sabbathāpi* means "in all divisions, that is of forty-six types each". It should be connected: they are fifty-four in the way of including which is not counted yet.

In other way, *Sabbathāpi*, means "in all modes, that is with the various division of functions of which begins with *āvajjana* and ends in *tadārammaṇa*. It should be connected with the word, *kāmāvacarāneva* (= only *kāmāvacara*.)

Those functions, *āvajjana* etc., exist depending on the specific *dvāras*, only those *cittas* which possess such a function are to be called *dvārika* in the sense of "arising in doors".

On the contrary, the function of *paṭisandhi*, *bhavaṅga* and *cuti* exist only through mere *kamma* without special *dvāra*. Therefore, the *cittas* which possess such a function cannot be called *dvārika*. In order to explain it the word is spoken: *ekūna... dvāravimuttāni*.

Herein it should be noted: *dvāravikāra* is for *manodvāra* the vibration of *bhavaṅga*, through the impingement of objects upon it; for *cakkhudvāra*, etc. the ability that makes mind arise in them.

However, it is said in Vibhāvanī: "they are "free from *dvāra*", because they do not arise in the *dvāras*, eye, etc. and are themselves

bhavaṅga which is called 'manodvāra' and do not arise depending on new objects.(p.128)"

That does not even conform to the Commentary.¹⁶ The commentary, indeed, says: "through the function of *paṭisandhi*, *bhavaṅga* and *cuti*." By this word, *Thera* explains the state of being in *dvāra* and free from *dvāra* dealing with mind under the head of function. Only for that reason *Thera* spoke even before the state of being *cakkhudvārika*, etc. of *cittas* only under the head of function through this passage: *pañcadvārāvajjana ... tadārammaṇa-vasena*.¹⁷

If asked "by this word 'because of not arising in the *dvāras*, eye, etc.' it explains only that meaning", the answer is "No". Because the explanation which is absent of sense that needs and which rejects the point that has not unnecessary meaning is useless. It is the meaning: they arise in six doors through the function of *santīraṇa* and *tadārammaṇa* and are free from doors through the function of *paṭisandhi*, etc.

Pañca-cha-dvārikāni is that "they arise in five doors" or "arise in six doors". *Chadvārika vimuttāni* is that "they sometimes arise in six doors" or "are sometimes free from doors". And the word *dvāra* should be used for the word *vimuttāni*.

However, it is also said in Vibhāvanī: "*Chadvārikāni ca cha dvārika vimuttāni ca*.(p.129)"

That is not correct. Because in the sentence of prose (*cuṇṇiya*) said before such a word has been unheard. It is interpretation: The *cittas* that arise in one door ... is totally free from *dvāra* are orderly thirty-six ... and nine-fold; thus it is divided into five. [*dvārasaṅgaho*]

134. *Ārammaṇa saṅgaha* is that through the division of objects, form, etc., it summarizes *cittas* and *cetasikas*.

However, it is said in ṬṬkās: "Arammaṇa-saṅgaha is the summarizing of objects through their enumeration, classification and minds that receive that object"(Purāṇa,310;Vibh,129).

That is not correct. Because it is the summarizing of only mind and mental properties, not the summarizing of objects.

The definition of the words *rūpa*, etc., will come later. It is *ālambaṇa*, because it grasped by mind and mental properties without letting loose like a stick, etc., held by a weak man. And if the word, *ārammaṇa*, it is the definition: *ārammaṇa* is that in which those minds and mental properties take delight having approached it.

However, it is said in Vibhāvanī: "ālambaṇa is so called because it is grasped by mind and mental properties like a stick by a weak man; or those mind and mental properties take delight in it having approached it.(p.129)"

That is not correct. Because these terms are used separately.

Rūpa meva means only colour which is a base of mind(*vaṇṇāyatana*). All *dhammas*, which are either existent or non-existent, and either reality or non-reality except from the five objects, are called *dhammārammaṇa*. Then it is of six kinds, if groups according to congenial characteristics; so it is said: *dhammā-rammaṇaṃ pana ... chadhā saṅgayhati*.

Tattha means "of these six objects, visible object, etc."

The *cittas* in eye-doors, which arise on the visible object that impinged in the eye-door, do not receive the other objects; even the visible objects, if they were at past or will be in the future, without impingement, they do not come to be known. Therefore, it is said: *cakkhudvārika-cittānaṃ sabbesaṃpi rūpa'meva ārammaṇaṃ. tañca paccuppannaṃ. The same are in sotadvārika, etc.*

Herein, *paccuppanna* is an object which arises depending on such and such a condition. And "being present" is the meaning. *Chabbidhampi* means "six-fold" as visible object, etc. *Atīta* is so called because it has passed over. It comes or came, so it is called *āgata*. It is a term for "present" and "past". It is not *āgata*, so it is called *anāgata*.

Only the conditioned *dhammas* with the nature of arising concern with "three times". So it is known that *Nibbāna* and *Paññatti*, which are absence of

arising and unconditioned, are known as *kāla-vimutta* (free from time).

However, it is said in Vibhāvanī: *Nibbāna* and *Paññatti* are called *kāla-vimutta*. Because being not subject to perish they cannot be described with "time", past, etc.(p.130)

That should be examined. Because all "conditioned *dhammas*" must have the state of "will-be" as their forerunner. Therefore, those *dhammas* are called *anāgata* when they are at the side of "will-be" on receiving the unity of conditions. Then, when they are arising on receiving the unity of conditions they are called *paccuppanna*. And when they become ceased, they are called *atīta*. Thus, "the state of dealing with three-time" is based on appearance of only those which are in the nature of arising. But for those which are absence of arising there is not a state of "will-be". Needless to say, they will have the moment of "arising" and "arose". Therefore, *nibbāna* and *paññatti* are in the state of being free from "three-time".

To be continued: this reason *vināsā'bhāvato* is a reason only for absence free from the "past". So it should be noted: through that reason it cannot prove that those, *nibbāna* and *paññatti*, are absent from the rest of the times. The possibly classification (*yathāraha vibhāga*) will come later through the passage which begins with *tesu*.

It is the connection of words: "the object of the *cittas* which are absent from *dvāra* is six-fold."

The object of the *cittas* in six-door, *āvajjan*, etc. can be an object that is in the previous life or in this life, and that is grasped or not grasped by one of the *cittas* in door. However, for these *cittas* which are absent from *dvāra*, the object is not the same as for the aforesaid *cittas*. In order to explain thus, it is said: *bhavantare cha-dvāraggahitaṃ*. It is true, the object of those, who were born in a desired life after having prayed for a special life and performed merit accordingly, is possibly grasped by the *cittas* through one of the *dvāras* in the previous life.

However, it is said in Vibhāvanī: *Cha-dvāra-ggahitaṃ* is spoken in order to explain that the object of those *cittas*, not as if that of *āvajjana*, comes into existence being grasped by none of the *cittas* in *dvāra*.(p.130)

That is not reasonable. The object of *Pañca-dāra'vajjana*, too, can be one which is either being grasped or not being grasped by any one of *citta* in a door before. For that reason it is impossible to say that the object, which is grasped before with such an idea "I shall receive, eat or see", is not an object of *āvajjana*. Besides, in a thought process with single *āvajjana* the state of being not grasped by any one of *cittas* before is not so important here.

Then, the object of the *citta* in five-door must be only in present, while that of *citta* in mind-door is in three-time or free from time. But the object of the *citta*, which is free from *dvāra*, is not like that of those. In order to explain that it is said: *paccuppanna'matītaṃ paññatti-bhūtaṃ vā*.

And the object of the *citta* in six-door is either with the specific term (*āgamasiddhi vohāro*) or free from that term. But the object of these *cittas* is not like that of those. In order to explain that, it is said: *kamma-Kamma-nimitta gatinimitta sammatam*.

However, it is said in Vibhāvani: "It is said *kamma ... sammatam* in order to present that the object of those is not free from the specific term as *kamma, kamma-nimitta*, etc., like that of *javana* thoughts that arise before.(p.130)"

That is also not correct. Because sentient beings receive the *kamma* done by himself or the supporting surroundings of *kamma, pagoda*, etc., as their object immediately before death. It is true a *kamma* even at that time is to be *kamma*, while the circumstances of *kamma* is to be only *kamma-nimitta* defining thus: *kamma-nimitta* is a condition that causes *kamma*.

Some say *kamma-nimitta* is an object of *kamma*. Some sentient beings, like King *Ajātasattu*, received the object of *gati* (destination) seeing in a dream etc., as their object. It is true the King killed his own father in two lives. Since

he has killed, the object of *gati* (destination) reflects on him while sleeping.¹⁸

Herein, *yathāsambhavaṃ* means as fit for the object of such and such *cittas, paṭisandhi*, etc., which received through six-door, etc. And the possible division will come in the chapter of *maranuppatti* later.

Yebhuyyena means "generally". *Bhavantare* means "in the just previous life" exactly "at the time of dying". *Chadvāra gahitaṃ* means "being grasped by the *javana* thought arisen at the time of death through six-door.

Furthermore, herein by the word *yebhuyyena* it makes the qualifier *bhavantare cha-dvāraggahitaṃ* uncertainty. Why? Because it is possible to have the object that is not grasped by a *citta* through six door.

To be explained: For *asañña-satta* beings, when they are about to die, the *kamma, kamma-nimitta* and *gatinimitta* and for *arūpa* beings, when they are about to die, the *gati-nimitta*, become the object of the *cittas paṭisandhi, bavaṅga* and *cuti* in *kāma* plane. These objects are not grasped by any one of *cittas* through doors in the previous life.

To be continued: Herein it should be known: "In Paṭṭhāna¹⁹ the two "purejāta" condition is rejected dealing with "arūpa" plane. In Commentaries²⁰ it is said that the "kāma paṭisandhi" of those, who die as "arūpa" being, have the present "gati-nimitta" as their object. And the "gati-nimitta" is described to only visible object. Therefore, the "kāma paṭisandhi" of those, who die in "arūpa" plane, has an object, *giti-nimitta*, which is not grasped by any *citta* through the door in previous life".

In another way, at the time of death the manifestation of the objects, *kamma* etc., through the power of *kamma* must be generally only for those who die unconsciously; and for the others, the manifestations of the object can be through the power of effort belonging to others; or through the power of recollection of good experiences usually felt by himself; or through the power of deities who come from the world of gods to bring one like the lay devotee, *Dhammika*²¹ by name, and so on.

The wardens of hell, too, come from the hell and take some one. Herein, "the Story of *Revatī's* Abode"²² must be referred. Let me say that the two wardens of hell took *Revatī* first to the "*Tāvatiṃsā*" plane and later they sent her to the hell. They were able to go to the "*Tāvatiṃsā*" plane, because they were a sort of ogres like the retainers of *Vessavaṇṇa*. It is true, the Pāḷi Text²³ says: "*yamassa dūtā dve yakkhā*" Some say: 'the messengers of *Vessavaṇṇa*' are said here as 'the messengers of *Yama*'²⁴

Then, some persons die grasping the objects of *samatha* meditation, *kaṣiṇa*, *asubha*, etc., after having repeatedly meditated upon those and grasping them at the stage of *upacāra jhāna*. Within them, the object of *kāma paṭisandhi* may be an object which is not grasped by any *cittas* in door in previous life. The same way are in the case of those who came from the Brahma world and were reborn in this human life through the power of *upacāra jhāna*.

However, it is said in *Vibhāvanī*: "The object beginning with *kamma-nimitta* of the *paṭisandhi* of those who die in *asññī* life comes into manifestation through the mere power of *kamma* (p.131)".

Herein, by the word *ādi* in *kamma-nimittādikaṃ kamma* must also be included. Because there is not any reason for not taking it in. It should be known that all of those objects come into manifestation at the moment of *paṭisandhi* through only the mere power of *kamma* which produces *paṭisandhi*. But the future object, if manifests, may be only *gatinimitta*. It has no special function to manifests. When the present *gatinimitta* becomes manifested it manifests. So it is said: *paccuppanna matītaṃ, paññatti būtaṃ vā*

However, in *Vibhāvanī* the reason is given thus: "The future is not experienced like the past; it also does not manifest like the present *gatinimitta* (p.132)."

That is not suitable reason. Because it cannot exclude the unnecessary that lies (*pasāṅga*). To be explained: The *gatinimitta*, although it is at present, cannot be the object that is experienced. It comes into manifestation through only the power of *kamma*. If so, the future object, too, may come into being

through the power of *kamma*. So such an unnecessary meaning exists as usual.

Tesu means "among those *cittas* that receives an object as aforesaid". It is how to combine words: *Rūpādīsu pañcasu ekekaṃ ārammaṇaṃ etesanti rūpādī pañā rammaṇaṃ*. It is the definition of the words: *Rūpādīni pañca ārammaṇāni etassanti rūpādipañcārammaṇaṃ*.

Sesāni is the remainings, that is *santīraṇa* and *mahāvīpāka* except from 'five-*viññāṇa*' and the two-fold *sampañcchana*.

Sabbathāpi kāmāvacarālambdaṇā neva: In all their modes arising on the various objects, visible object, etc., with the various functions, *paṭisandhi*, etc. they are have the *kāmas* as their object. To be explained: those *cittas*, even when they arise within the *Buddhas*, due to avoidance of the power of special awareness, are unable to know *paññatti* that is not real, the subtle *mahaggatas* and the deep supra-mundane.

Herein the three-fold *santīraṇa* firstly arises on the five-object, visible object, etc., through the function of investigating. And all the rest of the eleven *vipāka cittas* arise in the six *kāma* objects through the function of *tadārammaṇa*, etc.

However, it is said in *Vibhāvanī*: "The *vipāka cittas* at first arise on the five-object, visible object, etc., through the function of investigating and so on (p.132)."

Herein, the word "through the function of investigating and so on" should not be spoken, but it should be spoken thus: "through the function of investigating".

Herein the classification of the *cittas* arising on their objects, which should be said here, must be taken out from the chapter of *Aṭṭhakathā-kaṇḍa*²⁵.

Then, the supramundane *dharmas*, being much deeper, are the object of only knowledge. Therefore, it is said: *akusala...lokuttara-vajjita-sabbārammaṇāni*.

Herein, it should be noted that those *cittas*, only when they are within those who attain *samāpatti*, are the object of *mahagatta*. And the two

dosamūlas among those are on the object of *mahaggata* in the time when they are aware of the *jhāna* that has lost.

Then, the knowledge, too, is unable to realize the supramundane *dhammas* which are not being attained. Therefore, it is said: *nāṇa-sampayutta ... vajjita sabbā rammaṇāni*.

Herein it should be known that the *kusalas* of *kāmāvacara* associated with knowledge, when they are within *puthujjanas* who do not attained *jhāna*, have the object of *kāma* together with *paññatti*; only those *cittas*, when they arise within *puthujjana* as *gotrabhū* prior to *sotāpatti*, have the object of *Nibbāna*; only those *cittas* and the *kusala* of higher knowledge (*abhiññā*), when they arise within *puthujjana* who attained *jhāna*, have the object of *mahaggata*; only those within those whose position is the lower *Phalas* have the object of *magga*, *phala* and *nibbāna* they attained each.

Then it should be known: the *ariya* persons are able to know only the objects of *magga* and *phala* they attained each. Similarly, those who attained *jhāna* are also able to know only the *jhānas* they attained each.

Here may pose a question: Are those, who wish to have *jhāna* and make an attempt preliminary action of *jhāna*, or who explain "the Suttas on *jhānas*", able to know the object of 'higher *jhānas*' without attainment of them, or not?

They are not able to do so. Because they, hearing 'the *jhānas* are so powerful and have so many advantages, or standing on the conjecture of nature that gotten through the power of learning, aspire to those *jhānas*, do the preliminary work, or explain the Suttas only through inference.

Otherwise, these objects - *magga*, *phala* and *nibbāna* - may be the object of those *puthujjanas*. Because they, too, aspire to the supramundane *dhammas*, do the preliminary work for *magga*, talk on *magga*, *phala* and *Nibbāna* and explain them. Actually, it should be known that those *cittas* of *puthujjanas* experience only the meaning of the terms dealing with *jhānas*, etc. It is true, the term of those excellent *dhammas* is also in the nature of excellence.

Then, it is said in the Commentary on *Navaka-nipāta* of *Aṅguttara*:²⁶ "The deity, *Māra*, who has the supernatural power and can read others' mind, is able to read *rūpa-jhāna* dealing with *vaṭṭa* but not *vivaṭṭa*. And he cannot read the *arūpa-jhāna* dealing with even *vaṭṭa*."

Then, within those who attain the highest *magga* and *phala* "the *kriya javana* of *kāma* with knowledge" and "the *kriya javana* of higher knowledge" have not any *dhammas* in the four-fold plane, together with *paññatti*, according to person, which cannot be the object of those minds. And the same way is for the *manodvārāvajjana* which precedes. In order to explain that meaning it is said: *nāṇa-sampayutta ... sabbathāpi sabbā-rammaṇāni*.

Herein, *sabbathāpi* means "in all modes", that is all *kāma*, all *mahaggatta*, all *lokuttara*, all *paññatti* and all *paccupanna* and so on. And the word *sabbathāpi* is said referring to those *cittas* which arise within the Omniscient *Buddhas*. But the others which arise within *Pacceka-buddhas* have a partial object of all. It is true that their *cittas* are unable to know even a single "earth element" in all its modes.

The second and the fourth *cittas* in *arūpa* plane have the object of *mahaggata*; because their objects are the first and the third *citta* of *arūpa*.

Sesāni means the rest, which are all *mahaggata*, twenty-one in number, except from the second and the fourth *arūpa*, have *Paññathi*, *kasiṇa* etc., as their object.

The word *pañcavīsa* is said referring these - *pañca-dvārā-vajjana*, twenty-three *kāma-vipākas* and the smile-producing *citta*.

Parittamhi means "only on the object of *kāmāvacara*". Then *paritta* is so called because it is, due to possessing little power, reduced all its parts; it is made to be powerless by the opposite *dhammas*. [*ārammaṇa saṅgaho*]

125. *Vatthu saṅgaha* is that through the division of bases of eye, etc. it summarizes *citta* and *cetasika*.

However, it is said in Vibhāvanī: "*Vatthusāṅgaha* is the summarizing through dividing bases and analyzing the *cittas* which depends on the base (p.135)."

That is not correct.

Vatthu is that on which *cittas* and *cetasikas* are seated. It is the connection of words: eye base ... body base and heart base.

Only eye is called *cakkhu-vatthu* (eye-base); in the same way, only ear, etc. are called *sota-vatthu* (ear base) and so on. It is true. This passage is a brief sentence. It is reasonable to say that 'it is the way of omission' or 'the way of describing last one'. However, some assume it to be a "compound word of *dvanda*" According to their idea the word *ca* is not necessary. Some say the word *vatthu* and *ca* which used in the last word should be used in the former words, too. According to their idea the word *hadaya-vatthu* cannot be a compound word. The others say it is the term which is used without ending (*vibatthi*).

Tāni kāmaloke sabbāni pi labbanti : All those six bases can be found only in the *kāma* plane. Because only those who have the bodies produced by *kamma* dominated by the craving for *kāma* can be with complete faculties.

To be explained: The experience of the objects, visible form, etc., is possible only when there exist the bases, eye, etc. So the craving for pleasure that takes delight in the desired things, visible object, etc., always long for the five bases, eye, etc. Just as a minister, who is in charge of all works, always completes all affairs of the king providing the king with all his needs, even so the *kamma* of *kāmāvacara*, too, is always inducing the body with full of faculties providing the craving for pleasure with what it wishes. Therefore, only the sentient beings in *kāma* plane, being born of *kamma* dominated by the craving for pleasure, have full faculties.

Then, just as eye and ear which are the principle of excellent seeing and hearing are for purification of beings through seeing the *Buddha* and hearing *dhamma*, even so the three bases, nose, etc., are not for that. Actually, they

are for mere enjoyment of sense. Therefore, the three-base, nose, etc., is not found in the body of *brahma* beings that are produced by the *kamma* of meditation which removes the desire for sensual pleasure. In order to explain that meaning, it is said: *Rūpaloke pana gānāditayam natthi*. That is, however, said referring to the three-fold sensitive matter. Actually, *brahma* beings have full organs of nose, tongue and body.

Arūpaloke pana sabbānipi na samvijjanti: Because, in that world produced by the *kamma* that removes the desire for matter there does not totally arise matter both inside and outside. It is true that the beings born there, possessing mere thought process, live only in space.

In this summary to classify *cittas* through seven-fold *viññāṇa* element it is said: *pañña viññāṇa dhātuyo... Tattha* means "of those six bases". It is definition: only the five *viññāṇas* are called elements in the sense of non-being and non-soul. The same are the rest, too.

Manodhātu is an element that is merely conscious; because it has no function of special awareness. It is true the mere function of altering and of accepting cannot be the function of special awareness.

Then the five *viññāṇas* have function of special awareness through seeing, etc., themselves. And the rest, *Santīraṇa*, etc., are not a mere *citta* like *Manodhātu*, because they have higher and excellent awareness through the investigation of the nature of objects. Nor are they the mere awareness like the five *viññāṇas*. Actually, they are called *Manoviññāṇa* defining thus: they are either *mana* in the sense of mere knowing or *viññāṇa* in the sense of being aware. It is meant that "the elements that are specially aware". It is true that the connotation is known when synonymous words become a compound word, like the word *padaṭṭhāna*.

However, it is said in Vibhāvanī : *Manoviññāṇa* is only *mana* that is also called *viññāṇa*, or *Manoviññāṇa* is a *viññāṇa* dealing with *mana* .(p.136)

Herein, this definition "only the *mana* that is also called *viññāṇa* " is

first not reasonable. Because such a definition with a word of confinement is neither found anywhere nor is reasonable dealing with a qualifier compound word, like the word *padaṭṭhāna*, that conveys connotation qualifying each other.

Then the definition "*manoviññāṇa* is a *viññāṇa* dealing with *mana*" is also not reasonable. Because *manaso* means "of the mind that is the three-fold *manodhātu*."

Of these (*manodhātus*) both *sampaticchana* is a condition of the *manoviññāṇa* process of which beginning is *santīraṇa*. And the *pañca dvārā vajjana*, when it is in other *dvāra* later, is a result of only the *manoviññāṇa* process. So it is the meaning; a *viññāṇa* that deals with a *mana* being a "condition" in the beginning and a "result" in different *dvāra* in the end.

In other way, all *viññāṇas* except the five-*viññāṇa* are called *mana* due to having the function of awareness. But the five-*viññāṇa* has not the function of awareness owing to mere focusing on an object; they are said only "seeing", etc. Then the *pañca dvārā vajjana*, although it is born of *mana*, is not the condition of *mana*; it is, indeed, the condition of only seeing, etc. And both *sampaticchana*, although they are the conditions of *mana*, are not born of *mana*, but are born of only "seeing", etc.

Then those *cittas*, *santīraṇa*, etc., arise between the two *cittas* each, former and later. So they are *viññāṇa* that concerns the *citta* which is a "condition" and a "conditioned" one. If so, the five-*viññāṇa*, too, may be called *manoviññāṇa* in the sense of being *viññāṇa* that concerns *mana* of "condition" and "conditioned". Because it, too, arises between the two *manodhātus*.

However, in *Ṭṭkās* (p.311) it is said: "A *viññāṇa* that is born of *mana*." That, too, is indeed not reasonable according to the way as discussed before.

It is connection of words: the rest, which are called *manoviññāṇa-dhātu*, numbering thirty - *santīraṇa ... 15 rūpāvacara* - arise depending on only heart base. Herein, the word *ca* clarifies the other 76 dhammas to be *manoviññāṇa*.

However, in *Vibhāvanī* (p.136) the explanation is given assuming

the word *ca* to be in the sense of addition: "It is not only *manodhātu*."

That is not reasonable. If so, the sentence must be thus: *Avasesā ca Manoviññāṇa dhātu sankhātā*.

And the connection of words is mentioned in *Ṭṭkās*: "the rest of the 30 *dhammas* that are called *manoviññāṇadhātu* enumerated as *santīraṇa ... rūpāvacara* (Purāṇa.311;Vibh,136)".

This is also not correct. Because the meaning cannot be clearly known.

Herein, why do they arise only depending on the heart base? Because they do not arise in *Arūpa* planes. And if asks, why do they not arise in *Arūpa* planes?, the answer is given thus: Of these *cittas* *santīraṇa* and *mahāvīpāka* at first do not arise in *Arūpa* plane; because there are not five doors and their own functions there.

The two *paṭigha cittas* do not arise there; because there is not such a hatred which is partly not *nīvaraṇa*. And the real *nīvaraṇas* cannot arise in the plane of *jhāna*.

Herein it should be considered: If there is no such a *paṭigha* which is partly not *nīvaraṇa*, the speech dealing with the complete cessation of *domanassindriya* which is said only in the stage of the Second *Jhāna* in the *Pāḷi*²⁷ Text and the explanation dealing with the appearance of *domanassindriya* in the *upacāra* of the Second *Jhāna* in Commentaries²⁸ may conflict with that aforesaid reason. Therefore, some say "it is also reasonable that both of the *paṭighas* (hatred) do not arise in that *Arūpa* plane, because of that the gross desire for sensual pleasure which is the 'supporting condition' of *paṭigha* (hatred) itself and does not exist in *Jhāna* planes".

However, the compilers of sub-commentaries²⁹ want to accept only the aforesaid reason with this idea: "The statement dealing with arising of hatred in the *upacāra* of the Second *Jhāna* is the mere imaginary".

This is my opinion: If this word may be mere imaginary, the word in the *Pāḷi* Text, too, may be just imaginary. So the only latter reason is probably more reasonable.

Then there does not arise *hasana citta*, too. Because those who are absence of matter have no act of laughing; or 'because of being absence of body' is also proper reason.

Then there does not arise *Sotāpatti magga*. Because *puthujjana* who was born there cannot realize *dhamma* due to lack of hearing true *dhamma* from others. And there do not appear the *Buddha* and *Pacceka Buddha* in those planes. It is true the *puthujjana* who was born there is listed in the eight persons who fail good opportunity.³⁰

Then there do not arise *rūpāvacaras* in these planes. Because those who were born in the *Arūpa* plane overcome the object of *rūpajhāna* through the meditation that makes them free from attachment to it.

It is the connection of words: the rest being *manoviññāṇa dhātu* numbering forty-two as *kusala*, *akusala*, *kriya* and *lokuttara* arise sometimes depending on heart base, sometimes not. It is the meaning: they arise depending on heart base in the plane with five aggregates and not depending on heart base in the plane with four aggregates.

It is how to combine the words: *Kusalāni ca Akusalāni ca Kriyāni ca Anuttarāni cā ti "Kusalā'Kusala Kriyā Nuttarāni "*

Herein *kusalas* are 12 belonging to *lokiya* except the five *kusalas* of *rūpa*. *Akusalas* are 10 except *paṭghas*. *Kriyas* are 13 except *Pañcadvārā-vajjana*, *hasana*, and five *kriyas* of *rūpa*. *Anuttaras* are 7 except the first *mgga*.

It is the connection of words: " The seven elements depending on six bases are known in *kāma* plane; the four elements depending on three bases are known in *rūpa* plane; and the one element depending on none of the bases is known in *arūpa* plane."

The word *tecatālīsa* is said referring to the 30 *dhammas* beginning with *santīraṇa* together with five-*viññāṇa* and three *manodhātus*.

Thus "the exposition of the correct meaning" dealing with "the compendium of *pakiṇṇaka* in the *Paramatthadīpanī*, the fourth commentary on the "Abhidhammattha saṅgahatha", ends.

¹ S.N. Book 2-424.

² S.N. Book 2-429.

³ S.N. Book 2-423.

⁴ S.N. Book 2-417.

⁵ Mūlaṭṭika, Book 3-168.

⁶ Vibhāvani, 125.

⁷ S.N. Book 2-117.

⁸ Visuddhimagga, Book 2-90.

⁹ Aṭṭhasālinī, 307.

¹⁰ Paṭṭhāna, Book 2-110-1.

¹¹ See Paramatthadīpanī, Chapter 1, p.63

¹² See Dhammasaṅgani, 157.

¹³ See M.N. Book 1-158.; Book 3-328; S.N. Book 1-300; Book 2.261.

¹⁴ Sammohavinodani, Commentary on Vibhanga, p.77.

¹⁵ These are the words of Thera Mahādhamma rakkhita. "It was said: Mahādhamma rakkhita talked Abhaya Thera, who specially studied Dhīghakāya, by taking at his hand. See SM.V. 77.

¹⁶ It refers to only the Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha: Ekūnavasati paṭisandhi bhavaṅga cutivasena dvāravimuttāni.(p.19)

¹⁷ Abhidhammattha saṅgaha, p.19.

¹⁸ King Ajātasattu committed patricide in two lives, in the life of Ajātasattu and in the life of Saṅkicca. See the Saṅkicca jātaka story (530 th). Jātaka A. Book 5-278.

¹⁹ The three conditions- Purejāta, Pacchājāta and Vippayutta- are not available in *Arūpa* plane. See the Commentary on Paṭṭhāna. 394.

²⁰ See SM.V. 151; Visuddhi, 2-183.

²¹ See the story of Dhammika in the commentary on Dhammapada, Book 1-83.

²² See the story of Revati in *Vimāna vatthu*, 73. Commentary on *Vimānavatthu*, 204.

²³ *Vimānavatthu*, 74

²⁴ See the commentary on *Vimāna vatthu*, 207.

²⁵ See Dhammasaṅgani, p.271; 272; 273.

²⁶ A.N.A. Book 3-281

²⁷ S.N. Book 3-188; 189.

²⁸ S.N.A. Book 3-274; SM.V. 220.

²⁹ S.N.T. Book 2-498; Visuddhi. T. Book 2.190.

³⁰ See the eight non-opportunities in A.N. Book 3-60. But it is said to be nine in D.N. Book 3-219.

Chapter 4

VITHI SANGAHA

136. Thus having expressed the three summaries namely 'the summary of the division of *citta* ', 'the summary of the division of *cetasika* ' and 'the summary of the division of both ', now *Thera* spoke *cittuppādāna miccevaṃ* in order to present the two *pavatti saṅghas*, namely 'the *pavatti saṅgha* of *vīthi citta* ' and 'the *pavatti saṅgha* of *vīthimutta citta* ', concerning only those (mind and mental property).

Herein *uppāda* is so called because they arise. Where do they arise? "Only in the mind" is understood, because there is not any other word to be heard. Thus *cittuppāda* is *citta* and those which arise in *citta* . It means: *citta* and *cetasika*. In this sentence it is used: *cittuppādānaṃ* (= of *cittas* and *cetasikas*).

Icevaṃ : in this way of classification said from start. The word *saṅgha muttaraṃ* is used in singular form; it is connected with the words in plural: the three good summaries of classification.

Bhūmi puggala bhedena : here the ending *ena* is '*kaṇa* ' in the sense of "with." It means: with the division of planes, *kāmāvacara*, etc., and the division of persons beginning with *duhetuka* .

Pubbāpara niyāmitaṃ : categorized and classified as preceding and following *cittas* , that is *āvajjana* ,etc. and *cakkhuvīññāna* , etc.

Pavatti saṅghaṃ nāma : this word, too, is used in singular form; "the two *pavatti saṅghas* by such a name" is meant.

Paṭisandhi pavattiyaṃ : this word is used in singular form, but the meaning is in plural. It is a word of anomalous number (*vacana vippallāsa*). " At the time of rebirth and at the time of continuity" is the meaning. It

means that I shall tell the two *Pavatti saṅghas* dividing thus: I shall tell a *pavatti saṅgha* at the time of rebirth and a *pavatti saṅgha* at the time of continuity. The meaning will be clearly known at the opening verse of the next summary.

However, some say: the ending *yaṃ* is *bhumma* in the sense of 'from among' or 'out of' (*niddhāraṇa*). If so, the next summary will be called "the summary of *paṭisandhi*", not 'the summary of *pavatti* ' by name. If so, it does not accord with this opening verse "*pavatti saṅgho nāma, sandhiyaṃ dāni vuccati* " which will be stated in the chapter of *vīthimutta saṅgha* later.

However, it is said in *Ṭīkā*: *Uttara* is good because of the classification of 'the summary of feeling', etc.(*Ṭīkā*,p.312; *Vbhāvanī*, p.137; *Saṅkhepa*,p.245).

It should be examined: if so, the 'summary of *pakiṇṇaka*' alone may be indicated here by the word *saṅgha* . Actually this opening verse is placed among the three or the two summaries; so it should be noted that by the word *saṅgha* here the three former summaries are reasonably indicated.

Then, this *pavatti saṅgha* , if said together with '*vatthu* ', '*dvāra* ' and '*ārammaṇa* ', is fully presented. So those three sorts of "six-set" are repeated here.

However, it is said in *Vibhāvanī*: "the summary of base, door and object are repeated here, although they are expressed before, to present the 'pavatti saṅgha' in its entirety (p.137)."

That is not correct. Because the whole summary of base, door and object are not presented here.

Visaya pavatti is that objects appear in doors. Herein the term *pavatti* is used only in the sense of "reflection". It is true the word *ekacittakkaṇā*

tīṭāni vā. will be spoken. Then the *visaya pavatti* is six-fold: the swiftest one, swifter, swift, slow, slower and the slowest.

Visaya pavatti (dealing with the *Vīthimutta* mind) is that the objects, kamma ,etc.,become appeared, manifested, reflected in doors. It will be spoken: *kammṃ vā kammanimittam vā gatinimittam vā kammabalena channaṃ dvārānaṃ aññatarasmiṃ paccupaṭṭhāti.*

However, it is said in Vibhāvanī: " *visaya pavatti* is that mind appears towards object (p.137)."

That is not correct. If so, the object which is too small(*atiparittārammaṇa*) cannot be called *visaya pavatti*.

Tattha : out of those six sets.

Then, in the case of the division of element it is main the differentiation of element; so '*manodhātu* ' is separately counted by distinguishing awareness (*manana*) from thinking (*viññāṇa*). But in the division of *viññāṇa* awareness (*manana*) is included in thinking (*viññāṇa*). For that reason it is said *cakkhu viññāṇam ..cha viññāṇāni.*

Then the word *cha vīthiyo* must be connected with these words, *dvārappavattā cittapavattiyo yojetabbā .*

Cakkhudvāra vīthi is a thought process which arises in eye-door.It is meant that the thought process which arises depending on distinctive eye-door. In this way the rest are known.

Cakkhuvīññāṇa vīthi is a thought process which is marked with the particular eye-consciousness. But the mere process of *mano*-consciousness is *Manoviññāṇa vīthi.*

However, it is said in Vibhāvanī: *Cakkhuvīññāṇa vīthi* is a thought process which concerns eye-consciousness arising together on the same object and in the same door (p.138).

Dvārappavattā : arising in door. It is meant that it appears depending

on such and such a distinctive door. *Cittappavattiyo* : thought processes. In the word *atimahantaṃ* the ending, *aṃ* , is *paccatta* in the sense of possessive case (*sāmī*).

The *visaya pavatti* is known to be sixfold: In *pañca-dvāra* it is four - the appearance of five-object which is very big...the appearance of five-object which is very small and in *manodvāra* it is two - the appearance of six-fold object which is clear and the appearance of six-fold object which is not clear.

In addition, the state of being "very-big-object"(*atimahanta*) here is known through the conditions, light etc., and or through the very big things, etc. Herein, the ground of object, form etc., subtle or distant, if has full condition, light, etc., can be called *atimahanta*.

To be explained: at the time of first aspiration, etc. when the *Buddha* , the Blessed One, creates to display the world, it is true that beings from here can see the forms, subtle or distant, in the Avīci Niraya plane, Akaniṭṭha world and other universes. On that occasion the brilliance, indeed, appeared. Through this the whole universe - the Earth, Mount *Sineru* and the *cakkavāḷa* mountains, etc.- are suffused like genuine crystals. It is said: "the big and wide brilliance appeared excelling the power of gods"¹. Especially, the Earth and mountains, etc., are unable to obstruct the deities and brahmas their eye and visible object, etc., for their great element on which the sensitive material qualities depends has natural brilliance.

Then mountains, etc., being huge even in distance, and moon, sun and stars, etc., being either big or having natural brilliance, can be called *atimahanta* . In conclusion, the state of hugeness, etc., of conditions, light, etc. the things where they depend should be described. through the series of 'weak, weaker and weakest'.

Then, these five objects which come into manifestation just after one

thought moment are called *atimahanta* ; those which come into manifestation after two thought moments are *mahanta*; those which come into manifestation after four or five, six, seven, eight or nine thought moments are *paritta*; and those which come into being after passing over eleven or twelve, thirteen, fourteen or fifteen thought moments are called *atiparitta*. For that reason it will be spoken: *eka cittakkhaṇā tīṇi vā...*

Vibhūta is an object which is obvious; *Avibhūta* is an object which is not obvious.

Thus having expressed the six classes of six kinds, now, willing to explain how to arise thought process by gathering all in one (six classes of six kinds), it is said *uppāda t̥hiti* ... in order to explain first the division of period dealing with matters and minds, after raising the question "how?"

Herein, *kathaṃ* means "in which manner does the thought process arise?"

However, it is said in *Vibhāvanī*: Having asked 'in which way does it classify the object as 'atimahanta', etc.?', it is said *uppāda t̥hiti*... to present that division of objects through thought moment (p.138).

That seems to be not reasonable. Because, if so, there may not be a place for the former five kinds of "six-set". And it is also impossible to know that this phrase, *uppāda t̥hiti... rūpa dhammānamāyu* , is presented only in order to classify objects.

Uppāda is "appearance"; it means having its own nature. *Thiti* is static. It means the 'non-expiry of its own nature which have been obtained. *Bhaṅga* is "falling down". It means the disappearance of its own nature after having declined.

Eka cittakkhaṇaṃ nāma : what a moment of single mind. Ant that moment is computed as one billionth part of the time occupied by the

snapping of one's finger or by a wink of one's eye. Indeed it is said in *Commentary*:² "during the snapping of one's finger many billions of feelings arise".

In addition, according to the opinion of *Ānanda Thera* it must be said here that 'one-thought-moment' consists of the two small moments as arising and falling.³ Let me explain in detail: as lightning in the world disappears just after having arisen; it cannot be learnt that there is a static interval between arising and falling ; or as a stone thrown straight up falls after having arisen; it does not have separately the static moment from the two moments, rising and falling, so the mind does not have. It is true that mind falls into disappearance just after having appeared. There cannot be separately known the static moment between the two moments like that of matters. For this reason in *Yamaka* only the two moments, arising and falling, are mentioned here and there. And especially in *Citta yamaka*⁴, the only falling and arising of mind is spoken by this phrase:

"Is it arising(*uppajjamānaṃ*) what exists (*uppannaṃ*)? At the moment of falling it exists, but is not arising. And at the moment of arising it either exists or is arising..."

In *Kathāvatthu*⁵, too, the only two moments of mind, arising and falling, are said, but not the static moment, by these phrases:

"Does one *citta* exist for a day? Yes. Is the half day the moment of arising and the other half the moment of falling? It should not be said so.

Does one *citta* exist for two days? Yes. Is one day the moment of arising and the other moment of falling? It should not be said so.

Does one *citta* exist for four days? Yes. Are two days the moment of arising and the others the moment of falling?

It should not be said so. ...one month ... two months ... four

months ... one year ... two years ... four years ... one *kappa* (aeon) ... two *kappas* (aeons) ... four *kappas* ... etc."

If the static moment must be separately known, the *Mahāthera* may examine thus: "Does one *citta* exist for one day? Yes. The first part of that day is the moment of arising, the second the static moment, the third the moment of falling". Then three days, three months, three years and three *kappas* are also may not be side aside.

Here may raise a question: If asked " it is said in Suttantas -*Bhikkhus*, dealing with *saṅkhata* there are the three characteristics of conditioned things. What are the three? The arising is known, the falling is known, the state of change from the static moment is known;⁶ then regarding feeling the arising is known, the falling is known, the state of change from the static moment is known; then regarding perception... mental formation... consciousness the arising...known⁷- so can the third moment of *citta* ,the static moment, be known?", the answer is "No".

Because it describes only the continuity (*pabandhaṭṭhiti*) there. If asked "how is it known?", the answer is this: it is known through this: after having said arising and falling first, then this word "the state of change from the static moment" is separately said. Otherwise, it may be said thus: "arising is known; the state of change into decay regarding to the static moment is known; the falling is known.

Is it not possible to comprehend so? - the continuity is a concept. It is a sort of unconditioned thing. These Suttantas are concerning the characteristic of conditioned things. So if say "it is impossible to know that the continuity is presented there", the answer is that: "It is not impossible". Because the explanation, in the Abhidhamma, too, through concept - group (*samūha*), form (*saṅḍāna*) and continuity (*santati*), dealing with conditioned things can be found.

It is true. The conditioned *dhammas* are expressed under the headings of concept thus: "tall(*dīgha*), short (*rassa*), soft (*saṅha*), gross(*thūla*), round (*vaṭṭa*), circle(*parimaṇḍala*), quadrangle(*caturass*), hexagon(*chaḷaṃsa*), octagon (*aṭṭhaṃsa*), 16-sided polygon(*soḷasaṃsaṃ*), delta(*ninna*) and plateau(*thala*)"... etc, in the Explanation of Rūpāyatana⁸,etc. and "hair, body hair, nails, teeth, etc., in Vibhaṅga.⁹ Needless to say in the Suttantas it is explained through concept.

It is true. In such places the "discourse on concept" deals only with the conditioned *dhammas*. Therefore, just as one of the two moments of arising and falling is known regarding *citta*, even so not the static moment . This is the opinion of *Ānanda Thera* . And this opinion is expressed only in the Commentary on Saṃyutta nikāya.¹⁰ That opinion is rejected by the commentator who compiles the commentaries of summary.

It is said there: "The others say: It is impossible to set forth the moment of maturity (*jarā khaṇo*) belonging to mental *dhammas*. The *Buddha*, who says "the arising of feeling is known; the falling is known; the state of change into decay from the static feeling is known, makes three characteristics of mental phenomenon known. And the three characteristics are known depending on the moment of existence. After having said thus they prove their statement through this verse of teachers:

"The state of existence of all *dhammas* is called *ṭhiti* (a static moment); and the ruin of only that state is ever called "death" of all beings."

In other way, some also say: through the continuity the static moment should be understood. However, in this Sutta there cannot be known such a difference. The only *sutta*, therefore, must be obeyed without rejecting it through the verse of teachers".

Herein, the moment of decay(*jarākhāṇa*) is meant to be the static

moment which is the interval of decay between the two moments of arising and falling. The state of change into the other position (*aññāthattham*) is only "decay". The moment of existence (*atthi-kkhaṇam*) is only the other two moments.

This opinion, though it was rejected, totally accords with the *pāḷi* of *Kathāvatthu*.¹¹

In other way, the state of stop dealing with the developing mind is known as if the stop of a stone thrown up. It is true, there cannot exist the falling if arising does not stop. So it can be said that the stopping alone which is the mere ending of arising, is called here the mode of stopping. However, it is not a moment which deserves to be separately noted. For that reason only the other two moments dealing with mind are expounded in *Abhidhamma*.

Actually, even 'mental *dhammas*' have the state of decay with the characteristic of maturity which depends on both sides (of arising and falling) apart from the first part of arising and the last part of falling. Referring to that, it should be noted, *Dhātukathā*¹² says: "Decay is included in two aggregates."

However, it is said in *Vibhāvanī*: "There must be the moment inclining to fall (*bhaṅgā'bhimukhā'vatthā*), which is different from the moment of arising and falling. That is to be called *ṭhiti* (p.139)."

That does not accord with the *Pāḷi* of *Kathāvatthu*. Because, in that *Pāḷi* the third moment which is different from the moments of arising and falling is rejected through examining thus: "Is the half day the moment of arising and the other half the moment of falling?; Is the first day the moment of arising and the second day the moment of falling?"

And by that word, the following statements in *Vibhāvanī* are also rejected:

"However, in the *Pāḷi* that static moment is not expounded as giving a hint not to conflict with the tendency of the beings to be tamed (*veneyya*). It is true. *Abhidhamma* also sometimes follows the tendency of beings to be tamed; for example, the arising of matter is preached dividing into the two, start (*upacaya*) and continuity (*santati*) (p.139)."

Because the classification of *dhamma* which should be classified is reasonably through beings to be tamed or through *dhamma*. But it is not reasonable to say 'not to talk a real *dhamma* in *Abhidhamma* what should be talked is through beings to be tamed'.

And it is also said in *Vibhāvanī*: "Then in order to describe the characteristic of only the conditioned *dhamma*, the three moments, arising, etc., are said in *sutta* thus: '*Bhikkhus*, there are three characteristics of the conditioned *dhammas*. What are the three? Arising is known; falling is known; the state of otherness with regard to 'stop' is known'. So it is impossible to know it: in this *Sutta* the only stop of continuity which is concept and unconditioned thing (p.139)".

That is also unacceptable. Because the explanation of conditioned *dhammas* is found even in *Abhidhamma* under the head of concept as aforesaid.

Then, it is also said in *Vibhāvanī*: "the meaning of the word *paññāyati* is "to be known", because the prefix, *pa*, that is *upasagga*, is only in the sense of the root (p.139)".

That is also not reasonable, because *Sutta* is a teaching which appreciates the tendency of beings¹³. So the only sense -'to be clearly known' -for beings to be tamed must be accepted.

Then mind, due to having the nature of formlessness, changes quickly while matter, due to having the nature of form, changes slowly. For this

reason it is said: *tāni pana...rūpa dhammāna māyu* .

However, Vibhāvanī gives the reason: "the *dhamma* which receives (*gāhaka*) and the *dhamma* which is received (*gāhetabba*) come into existence according to their own moment."

That is not proper reason, because it cannot be said: the seizing mind and the seized matter changes quickly and slowly to succeed in their work respectively.

It is connection of words: those moments which are as long as the moments of seventeen minds or those seventeen mental moments are the duration of matters. It is meant that the moments which have the same measurement of seventeen thought-moments is the lifespan of the material phenomena except these matters, *viññatti* and *lakkhaṇa* .

But as a *small* moment there are fifty-one, says in Commentary,¹⁴ and thirty-two, says in *Mūlaṭīkā*.¹⁵ Therein, according to *Mūlaṭīkā*, of these the first two moments are only one arising moment of matters and the last two moments are only one falling moment; the twenty eight moments between them are only one static moment of them. Even the arising and falling of matters which changed slowly cannot be quick as if that of mind.

Of those matters both *viññatti* has one moment as that of a mind; *upacaya* and *sartati* have only the moment of arising ; *Aniccatā* the moment of falling, and the *Jaratā* have 'the static moment' that pertaining to matter.

Especially, according to the opinion of *Mūlaṭīkā*, it must be here said: the sixteen of thought-moments are the duration of matters. It is true the commentator who compiles the *Ṭīkā*¹⁶ expounds that matters have the duration of sixteen thought-moments by advocating the statement of Mahā *Aṭṭhakathā* presented in the explanation of *Paṭiccasamuppāda* .¹⁷

However, the opinion of Mahā *Aṭṭhakathā* dealing with arising and falling of matters has been rejected by the commentator who compiled the

summary of commentaries in *Khandha-vibhaṅga*¹⁸ by explaining that it contradicts the *Yamaka*. So it is impossible to confirm it. And if it has been rejected these statements dealing with the lifespan of sixteen thought moments or more than that are also rejected.

However, in Vibhāvanī having rejected the words of *Ṭīkā* saying "that is nonsense" to certify the meaning it gives the reason thus: "Because *Aṭṭhakathā* presents the seventeen thought moments through these words: the matter which arises simultaneously with the *paṭisandhi* mind, since then, ceases together with the seventeenth mind. The matter which arises at the static moment of *paṭisandhi* ceases at the arising moment of the eighteenth mind, etc.

That is not correct. Because it is not reasonable to reject the opinion of *Ṭīkā* quoting only the word of commentator on the 'seventeen thought moments' which is criticized by the commentator of that *Ṭīkā*.

Eka cittakkhaṇaṇi is a moment as if the moment of one mind. This word is used as if it is different, although it is indifferent in its sense, considering thus: "this is the moment of mind; this is the moment of matter." Those objects have one thought moment which passed over, so it is termed *eka cittakkhaṇāṭ Itāni* . This word is used for the five objects which are "very big".

However, it is also said in Vibhāvanī: "Or those objects which pass over one thought-moment; so it is called *ekacittakkhaṇāṭ Itāni* (p.141)."

That is not correct. Because it is impossible to say that the word *atīta* , which is used for the *dhamma* ceased, describes the present matters which come up after passing over a few moment.

Bahu cittakkhaṇā Itāni is those which pass over many thought-moments. This term is used for five objects which is big, etc.

Then, matters have a little more strength when they reflect on only matter. Actually only at the static moment they have strength due to getting fully conditions. So it is said: *thitippattā neva* .

By the word *eva* it rejects the opinion of one who compiles *Ṭṭikā*. It is true he opines: the material object impinges on sense organs as soon as it arises.

Pañcā'rammaṇāni pañcadvāre āpātha māgacchanti : herein visible object and sound, without reaching the sense field, and the other objects reaching the sense field, are to be an object. And this differentiation must be known through impingement.

To be explained: the former two objects (sight and sound) impinge only as reflection (*nimitta vasena*), not as substance (*na vatthu vasena*). But the latter three impinge as substance, not as reflection.

Then, the reflection is only for those objects which do not reach (the sense field), not for those which reach it. And the impingement of substance is only for those which reach and not for those which do not reach.

For example: just as the figure of those who walk on the bank of a lake reflects in the water; but the figure of those who go into the water does not reflect in it. Similarly, the objects of sight and sound which reach (the sense field) do not impinge (on sense organs). Why? Because there is no place for reflection due to having no light and space between the object and mind which seizes the object. Only those which do not reach impinge through the manifestation of own reflection. Why? Because they receive the place for reflection. Then the other three impinge as the origin substance. So they impinge on an object, if reach it; they do not impinge on an object, if not reach it.

There are objects which impinged without reaching sense organ. They standing afar reflect. So on one of sense organs they, even big or many - as

the moon, the sun, etc., or as the sound of thunder, the sound of sheep, etc. - can manifest. But the other three objects impinge only by reaching them. So only one of them can manifest on one sense organ each. And it is said as in *pañcadvāra* . In *manodvāra* all objects come to manifest without reaching sense organ.

Especially *pañca dvāre* is said here to show a particular door. Actually those five objects, when they impinge in their own doors, each can manifest in even *manodvāra* . It is, indeed, said in Commentary:¹⁹ each object manifests in two doors each. When someone, therefore, sees the moon or the sun, mountain, tree or something, many objects manifest at the same moment - each one of them in the eye, one in the mind. This way is known in the other objects.

Especially, the manifestation here is compared to the appearance of letters on palm leaf when the metal stamp is placed on and hitted it by a hammer. Because of manifestation, *dvāras* become to be in the state of distinctive condition.

However, it is said in Vibhāvanī: "the objects of many matter group come into manifestation according to intention.(p.141)"

Herein the word "according to intention" must be examined. Because as many as five objects which is standing on the way of the eye, etc., together with light, etc., can manifest in their own doors each without intention for those who are sleeping or who are in the state of unconsciousness, thinking about other things, absorbing at any of *jhāna* or *phala* or a state of cessation of mental phenomena.

They manifest not only in their own doors, but in mind door as well. And they manifest not only in *bhavaṅga* mind door, but in thought-process of four planes beginning with *āvajjana* . It is said in *Dvārakathā*²⁰: it cannot be said that there is a *mana* which is not called *manodvāra*..

This meaning should be explained by this word: "the first *jhāna* has a disturbance which is sound." To be explained: For a person who is absorbing in the first *jhāna* the sound impinges on the ear and manifests in *manodvāra* which is *jhāna citta*. Then the process of *jhāna citta* shakes and ceases. One withdraws from *jhāna*; then *bhavaṅga citta* comes into being. The thought process which is on the sound object comes into existence.

Those who are absorbing in the second *jhāna*, etc. never withdraw from it by a little sound; but they have to withdraw from it by the loud sound. It is true these *jhānas* are not unshakable. Actually only *Arūpajhānas* are unshakable. Therefore, one who absorbs in *Arūpajhāna* never withdraw from it even by the very loud sound.

Thus, it cannot be said that when those five objects come into manifestation as said the *vīthi cittas* certainly arise on the objects. They continuously arise if the *bhavaṅga* process or *javana* process ceases, and they do not do so unless they cease. When they arise, they arise only on one of objects which have special conditions as a strong object, etc. But, it should not be noted that they arise on five objects altogether at one moment .

Especially, according to this rule "as meaning, change ending (*atthavasā vibhatti pariṇāmo*)" it must be connected words: five objects at the static moment, which passed over one thought moment, come into manifestation in five doors at the static moment which passed over one thought moment; five objects at the static moment which passed over many thought moments in five doors which passed over many thought moments.

However, it is said in Vibhāvanī: "Actually those sensitive matters arise together with *bhavaṅga* which is the anterior condition of *bhavaṅga calana* .(p.141)"

If so, it implies that five objects, even passing many thought moments over, come into manifestation in *pañcadvāra* only which passed one thought

moment over. But the impingement of base organ and object which simultaneously coincide is now widely accepted. It is our opinion: They may arise at the same time or separately. The chief reason is only to be powerful. All should be accepted after having examined.

Then it is said in Vibhāvanī: "the other commentators says it arises together with *āvajjana* "(p.141).

That is not reasonable. Because there implies unnecessary meaning: the base where the five objects manifest is one; the base where the five *viññāṇas* depend is another.

Thus, having expressed 'how to begin the appearance of objects in five doors', now it is said *tasmā* in order to present the full classification of objects and 'how to arise thought-process'.

Tato means 'due to manifestation to the eye'.

To explain that as soon as it manifests to the eye, it manifests to the *bhavaṅga* also it is said *dvikkhattuṃ bhavaṅga calite* .

Herein 'wavering (=calanam)' is regarded that *bhavaṅga* process, which seems to attempt at receiving the new object just coming up towards itself after having abandoned the object of *kamma* ,etc. which have been received, comes into being in a state of differentiation .

Especially, here should be noted: the manifestation to the eye is the cause through which only *cakkhuvīññāṇa* arises, not *āvajjana*. And the manifestation to *bhavaṅga* alone is the cause through which *āvajjana*, too, arises .

However, in Vibhāvanī with this idea: the impingement of the object of form, etc., in the door of the eye, etc., is only the proper location, and this alone is the cause through which *bhavaṅga* ceases it is said:

"Let me explain: when the object impinges on the five sensitive qualities where the location is proper, due to the power of

impingement on sensitive organ, when *bhavaṅga* process is about to cease...(p.141)"

That is not noteworthy. Because it is impossible to say that the impact is only on the proper location. It should be noted: by standing on the proper location, through the impingement of object or of base, like a crash of thunder, the hitting, stirring and vibrating on sensitive organ is to be called impingement as well as manifestation. This meaning was said before.

Especially herein the manifestation simultaneously in two doors each which have different location should be accepted with this idea: it is also a sort of "the order of *dhamma*". The question, however, should not be posed: when the object of sight etc., impinges on sensitive organ there may be the shaking of five *viññāṇas* that depend on it; how does the *bhavaṅga* shake which depends on heart base?.

However, in *Vibhāvanī* raising such a question in order to give answer it is said: "because of relation through continual process.(p.141)"

Herein the word "through continual process" should not be spoken. But it should be said "through existence together". So all of them must not be accepted as essence. Why? Such orderly each in turn vibration is firmly rejected in commentary.

It is truly said there: "one of objects come into manifestation in couple doors each. To be explained: The visible object comes into manifestation in *manodvāra* just having impinged on the sensitive eye. It comes to be condition through which *bhavaṅga* becomes shaken is the meaning. The same are in sound, odor, taste and tangible objects. Let's have an illustration: Suppose a bird flies and alights on the top of a tree. As soon as it touches the branch, its shadow appears on the ground. The touching of branch and the appearing of shadow become neither earlier nor later. Similarly the

impingement of the present visible objects, etc. on the sensitive eye, etc. and the manifestation in *manodvāra* which causes *bhavaṅga* shake become neither earlier nor later".²¹

Thus being firmly rejected through these words *taṅkhaṇeyeva* and *apubbaṃ acarimaṃ ekakkhaṇeyeva* together with "the simile of bird" it should be accepted the simultaneous shaking as the order of *dhamma*, without thinking of the 'orderly shaking'.

Bhavaṅga sotaṃ vocchinditvā : having completely cut out the current of *bhavaṅga*.

Āvajjantaṃ : wondering what it is without seeing at all.

Passantaṃ : making it to be one's present.

Sampaticchantaṃ : seized the visible object as seen without losing.

Santīraya mānaṃ : investigating well.

Vavatthapentaṃ : well setting without being let it confuse, meaning "noting".

Laddha paccayaṃ is so called because the condition, thinking in the correct way, etc., is obtained by (the *javana*). This word *laddhapaccayaṃ* is connected with these words *yamṃ kiñci javanaṃ javati*.

By the word *yebhuyyena* it indicates that *javana* comes into being six times or at least five times when the object is weak or at the time of unconsciousness or dying. *Javati* means it arises with full strength as if the crashing of thunder.

Herein it should be noted: the first *javana*, having not received a successive condition, is the weakest of all. The second is stronger than the first; the third stronger than the second; the fourth than the third. And this is the strongest of all and it reaches top. Starting from this, the *javana* gradually declines. When it arises as seventh time its energy becomes ceased.

Javanā nubandhāni : Just as the current of water follows for a while to a boat that goes upstream, even so it followed *javana*. *Dve tadārammaṇa pakāni* : *Vipāka citta*s, which have the function of *tadārammaṇa*, arise twice. *Yathārahaṃ*: as fit for object, *javana*, and sentient being.

Bhavaṅgapāto : In this "very-big-object" the thought-process, which arose since *āvajjana* or the first *bhavaṅga* that shakes, continues to run until the fourth *javana* and then it goes down starting from the fifth *javana*. Although it goes down, due to not completely extinction of the arisen energy, it cannot be said "going down". In fact, only when the second *tadārammaṇa* have arisen, due to completely extinction of the arisen energy, the thought process goes down. Therefore, the meaning should be noted: *Pāto* means "going down"; *bhavaṅga pāto* is going down of thought process as *bhavaṅga* meaning "going down becoming *bhavaṅga*". Or falling to the function of *bhavaṅga*, the position of *bhavaṅga* and the object of *bhavaṅga* is to be called *bhavaṅga pāto*".

In this case, the simile of a door keeper, the simile of a villager and the simile of a mango fruit should be presented. But all of these must be taken out from Commentary.²²

It is connection of words: so far as I have said, the seventeen thought moments are full in number.

In addition, here the explanation through the six classes of six kinds should be given: A visible object impinges on a eye base; seating on the eye base eye-consciousness arises by noticing the visible object which reflected on it. But the other *manoviññāṇas*, *āvajjana*, etc. arise depending on the heart base which arose together with the preceding *citta* by noticing only that object. The eye door and the mind door perform the function of doors for all *vīthi citta*s. This *vīthi* can be called *cakkhudvāra vīthi*, because it arises in eye-door. And it is also called *cakkhuvīññāṇa vīthi* as well,

because it is marked by eye-consciousness. And it is also called *atimahantā rammaṇa vīthi*, because it appears on a strong object which can impinge just after one thought moment.

Especially, it cannot be said: "there are visible objects which arise in eye and in the position of static moment; they do not impinge on any one of the sensitive eyes, the preceding and the following, forty-nine in number, in the position of static moment".

Actually of these forty-nine sensitive eyes, only one which possibly acts as base and as door for this *vīthi* and on which the visible object impinges and this *vīthi* arises, performs the function. It is called *majjhimāyuka*. And the other eye bases are useless and they are called *mandāyuka* and *amandāyuka*.

Furthermore, these sensitive eyes are twofold: the earlier and the later due to being act aforesaid function. Both are forty-eight which exist at the moment of arising of eye-consciousness. The rest, the earlier and the later, although they impinge, are not computed here; because they are not considered that whether they act as base and door.

Here may raise a question: does the person know or not "I am seeing this" while this *vīthi citta* is arising? He does not know. And when does he know? He knows when the noticing thought process (*sallakkaṇavīthi*) arises.

To be explained: The first of all the *cakkhudvāra vīthi* comes into being; then successively the *manodvāra vīthi*; then such a *vīthi* which seizes as a group of the visible object, then which notices colour, then which seizes form, then which notices form, then which seizes name, then which notices name.

Of these, when the *vīthi citta* that notices colour arises, one notices the colour "I see blue", etc.; when the *vīthi citta* that notices substances

arises, one notices form; when the *vīthi citta* that notices name arises, one notices the name. In this way when the *vīthi citta* that notices such and such things arises one notices "I see such and such things".

Herein the third *manodvāra vīthi* which notes the visible objects repeatedly seized by the two earlier *vīthi citta*s , like noting the circle of wood fire, is called the *vīthi citta* that notes as group, because it is impossible to seize colour clearly without noticing the object as a group.

Yāva tadārammaṇuppādā pana appahontā utakaṃ : (an object) which have two or three thought moments passed over due to being not enough for twice appearance of *tadārammaṇa*. It means that one object, which have two or three thought moments passed over, cannot exist until *tadārammaṇa* arises. Thus, it passes over having not enough time.

Āpātamāgataṃ : coming into manifestation in eye door as well as in mind door.

Natthi tadārammaṇuppādo : here it is reasonable that there does not arise *tadārammaṇa* on a big object which appears after three thought moments and of which lifespan is fourteen thought moments become ceased together with the seventh *javana*. It is true. The commentators do not accept that in a thought process with single *āvajjana* the *citta*s have different objects by time, as if they have different objects as *dhamma*.

Then, if asked - on such an object which appears after two thought-moments and of which lifespan is one thought moment after the seventh *javana* must there be *tadārammaṇa* ?, the answer is "No". Because such an object which is close to cessation cannot be the condition of even one *tadārammaṇa*. It is true. In enumerating *citta*s that have arisen in *Vipākuddhāra* of Mahā Aṭṭhakathā only the two turns of *tadārammaṇa* are mentioned: *tadārammaṇāni dve* .²³

However, it is said in Vibhāvanī: "It is true the appearance of

tadārammaṇa is defined to be only twice in Pāḷi.(p.144)"

Herein it must be noted: the word *in Pāḷi* is used referring to the word of commentary. Because there is not such a *pāḷi* where twice appearance of *tadārammaṇa* is decided.

Then those who specially learnt *Majjhimanikāya* (*majjhimbhāṇaka*) accept even single *tadārammaṇa*. That is, however, rejected by the commentator of the summarized commentary. It is, therefore, noted that it is rejected here by *Thera*, too.

If so, why is it said *sakiṃ dve vā tadālambaṃ* in Paramattha vinicchaya ²⁴by *Thera* himself?. It should be noted that it is said according to the opinion of those who learn *Majjhimanikāya* .

But *Ānanda Thera* wants to accept even single *tadārammaṇa* .He says: just as the interrupted *bhavaṅga* arises once, even so it is impossible to say that *tadārammaṇa* never arises once. And in the enumeration of *citta*s it is said: *tadārammaṇāni dve* . It is not impossible to say that the word *tadārammaṇāni dve* is said as maximum.

It is word connection: an object which passes over due to being not enough lifespan to exist until *javana* arises. It is meant: an object, which passes over four or five, six, seven, eight or nine thought moments, has not enough lifespan to exist until *javana* arises. Thus it passes over without lifespan enough.

Javanampi anuppajjivā : due to not appearance of even *javana*. It is true this suffix *tvā* must be noted only in the sense of *bhāva* , not in the sense of *kattu* . Why? Because the word *anuppajjivā* has not the same *kattu* as the main verb *pavattati* has.

However, it is said in Vibhāvanī : This suffix *tvā* is in the sense of 'because of' (p.145).

That is not correct. Because the sense of *hetu* which is the external

sense cannot be the field of *kitaka* suffixes. It should be, therefore, noted that the suffix *tvā* is only in the sense of *bhāva*; then the ending *paccattavacana* is in the sense of *hetu*.

By this expression the statement - the suffixes *māna* and *anta*, are sometimes in the sense of *lakkhaṇa* and *hetu* - which is presented in some *Pāḷi* is rejected. Because the senses of *lakkhaṇa* and *hetu* which are external senses cannot be the field of those suffixes.

Especially the object which have nine thought-moments passed over and eight thought-moments more as its lifespan comes into cessation together with the second *voṭṭhabbana*; so in that object it is reasonable: "due to not appearance of even *javana*" The reason have been given.

Then, if asked: in the object which have four or five ... or eight thought moments passed over, there must be *javana*? the answer is "No". Because the object which have six thought-moments as its lifespan cannot be a condition of *javana*. It is true, whenever *javana* arises, it arises on only such an object which has enough time for seven *javanas*. Because *javana* arises normally for seven times as maximum.

Especially just as at the time of unconsciousness, of fainting or of death *javana* arises for five or six times due to that the base of mind is not clear and the object is not strong, even so at the normal time, if the object is weak, the *javana* arises for five or six times.

Dvattikkhatum: twice or thrice. For that reason it is said in Commentary: one or two *cittas* arise in the position of *voṭṭhabbana*; then having received *āsevana* condition from the preceding *citta*, it arises in the position of *javana* and *bhavaṅga* process comes in again.²⁵

Herein by this "having received *āsevana* condition from the preceding *citta* it arises in the position of *javana*", it is described that the third *voṭṭhabbana* arises. Otherwise, it may say that one or two *cittas* arise; then

bhavaṅga comes in. Or the word *ekaṃ vā* must be known to be an idiomatic word, like *diratta tirattaṃ*.

In other way: *tato* refers the two meaning - after one *citta* or after two *cittas*. Of these, by the first it is said that *voṭṭhabbana* arises twice and by the second *voṭṭhabbana* for three times.

Then the word *having received āsevana condition* should be known to be a metaphorical expression. Because in *Paṭṭhāna* it is not said that *voṭṭhabbana* operates as *āsevana* condition. Master *Ānanda Thera*, however, accepts the term of *parittārammaṇa* marked only by *javanas* arisen for four or five times on an object which have four or five thought moments as its life span after *voṭṭhavana*, not by *voṭṭhabbana* which is the end of thought process..

It is true. *Paṭṭhāna* says only thus: "*bhavaṅga* acts as a condition of *āvajjana* through the *anantara*²⁶ condition". But it does not say thus: "*āvajjana* acts as condition of *bhavaṅga* through the *anantara* condition". Then just as it needs five or six *javana* terms due to weakness of the base at the time of fainting and death, even so it is not impossible to say here that "due to the weakness of object".

Furthermore, it may be proper reason: one *voṭṭhabbana* arises on the object which has one thought-moment as its life span after *santīraṇa*; the two *voṭṭhabbana* arise on the object which has two thought-moments as its life span and if life span more than two, three *voṭṭhabbana* arises. Nowadays, however, it is presented: there are six *vīthis* on the *paritta* object with *voṭṭhabbana* which arises for two times, and five *vīthis* with *voṭṭhabbana* which arises for three times. If so, it may be examined thus: on which *paritta* object there arise *voṭṭhabbanas* for two times, on which *paritta* object *voṭṭhabbanas* for three times.

Then, an object, of which lifespan is not enough until *voṭṭhabbana*

arises for two or three times, cannot be the condition of *āvajjana*. In order to explain it, it is said: *tattha bhavaṅga calana meva hoti, tatthi vīthi cittuppādo*. Herein, *bhavaṅga calana meva* means there is only two wavering *bhavaṅgas*.

Icevaṃ cakkhudvāre : it is interpretation: in this way as said - if the visible object having one thought moment that passed comes into manifestation on the eye - the *visayappavattis* are known to be four through the four terms in eye door. The same are in the ear-door, etc. It is connection of words: *visayappavatti* is known to be four in all its mode.

Then the *atiparitta* object is also the object of *mogha* term through manifestation, not through receiving object. But the other objects are the object of the other terms through both of them. In order to explain that it is said: *catunnaṃ vāraṇaṃ yathakkamaṃ ārammaṇabhūtā* .

However, in *Vibhāvanī* it is said referring to the *atiparitta* object: *ārammaṇabhūtā* means "being the cause". It is true the *atiparitta* object is the cause of *mogha* term to be called it so..

It is interpretation: the *vīthi citta*s in five-door are only seven through function as it is proper, fourteen as arising times of the *citta*s. And it is fifty-four as enumerating of *citta*s in detail. *Ettha* means in this *paritta javana* term.

137. Then objects, which have even a short moment, which are in the past, in the future and are absent of time, come into manifestation in mind door. Therefore, in *manodvāra* there is not such a program: "the objects, which have one thought-moment that passed over or many thought-moments that passed over, come into manifestation when they are at the static moment." In order to explain that it is said: *Manodvāre pana yadi vibhūta mārammaṇaṃ āpatha māgacchati*.

Herein *manodvāre* means in the pure mind-door. And this mind-door, where an object manifests together with the impingement on eye-door, etc., is called "mixture-door (*missaka-dvāra*)". But here needs only pure mind-door.

That mind-door is also twofold: the following five-door (*pañcadvārā nubandhaka*) and the self-existence (*suddha*) .

Of these two the first that follows five-door is this: just as when a bell is rung once by a stick, the unity of matter, which forms the body of the bell, makes, striking each other, the process of repeated sound arise even for a long time; even so striking once in five-door by an object, the five-object in the past makes, even though the *vīthi citta* in five-door have come into cessation, many thousands of thought processes in mind-door arise as it has manifested in the mind-door. Thus the *bhavaṅga* process, which is the door of those *vīthi citta*s in mind-door, is called 'the following'. And those minds are called 'the following *vīthi citta*' .

The other, in which such and such six-object comes into manifestation without following the object which strikes in five-door, is called 'the separate existence'.

How do the objects come into manifestation in that mind-door which separately exists? It should be answered: They come into manifestation through many conditions - through having seen (*diṭṭha*) or relating to having seen (*diṭṭhasanbandha*), having heard (*suta*), relating to having heard (*sutasanbandha*), confidence (*saddhā*), preference (*ruci*), reasoning (*ākāra parivitakka*), satisfaction after having examined by view or knowledge (*diṭṭhi nijjhānakkantiyā*), the power of various *kamma*, the power of various super normal ability, the vibration of elements, the showing by deities, the proper knowledge or the penetrate enlightenment, and so on.

Therein "having seen" means the five-object seized by *citta* in five-

door before. That object, too, comes into manifestation in the pure mind-door in different time when it receives condition.

Then "relating to having seen" is said to be an object similar to what have been seen. To be explained: for one who compares something seen before with another unseen the all object that was unseen or similar to it in the past, present or future, comes into manifestation.

"Having heard" means the six-object seized after hearing. And it has wide field. After hearing a discourse of the omniscient *Buddha* there is not any object that cannot be seized. Then "relating to having heard" means an object similar to what was heard.

"Confidence" means to trust others. "Preference" means one's own idea. "Reasoning" means considering this and that dealing with indefinite meaning, expression and reason. Then "satisfaction after having examined by view and knowledge" means acceptance by deciding 'it must be thus' after repeatedly examining by knowledge or by one's own ideas. The rests can be known easily.

Especially, herein the condition of *anantarūpanissaya* has a great spread on thought process. The object that received even once can be the cause that shakes *bhavaṅga* starting from having ceased after repeated experience until a hundred or a thousand years or next life.

And *citta*, too, has a great spread if it progresses through the aforesaid conditions, "having seen", etc. It arises spreading on the many thousands of objects, having seen, etc., at a moment after receiving some of conditions. The thought process, if being always stimulated by those conditions and if there is not such a condition, physical tiredness, etc., that makes *citta* weak, inclines to be far from *bhavaṅga*.

It is true *citta* does not take delight on unclear object, but on clear object. Therefore, the '*manasikāra*' associated with *bhavaṅga*, causing

bhavaṅga shake again and again, stimulates repeatedly *āvajjana* on objects having got conditions. At that time, those objects come into manifestation to the *bhavaṅga* which associates with *manasikāra* that inclines to the object. It is, indeed, impossible to say that the *citta* which arises seizing an object has not the state of inclination to other objects.

Tadārammaṇa pākāni pavattanti : this word is said referring to the beings in *kāma* plane. Actually, for beings in *rūpa* and *arūpa* planes there is not *tadārammaṇa* even on the clear object. just as there is not, even so there is not *tadārammaṇa* on *atimahanta* objects in five-door belonging to the beings in *rūpa* plane.

Avibhūte panālabane javanāvasāne bhavaṅga pātova hoti : This word is said maximum limitation. In the Commentary on *Nāṇavibhaṅga*²⁷, however, the term of *voṭṭhabbana*, in which *voṭṭhavana* arises for two or three times, is also said dealing with an unclear object.

Furthermore, in *pañcadvāra* a *moghavāra*, the fourth term, which is said through *bhavaṅga* shaken, should be known here, too. It is true even in pure *manodvāra*, when an object manifests, there will be no number of terms where *bhavaṅga* alone shakes for twice without causing the appearance of *vīthi*. It cannot be said: there is one *visayappavatti* when an object comes into manifestation and *bhavaṅga* shakes.

Thus, in this *manodvāra*, too, the *visayappavatti*, the object, should be known to be four orderly: *tadārammaṇa*, *javana*, *voṭṭhabbana* and *mogha*. Here should be joined respectively thus: the object of *tadārammaṇa* is *ativibhūta*; the object of *javana* *vibhūta*; the object of *voṭṭhabbana* *avibhūta*, and the object of *mogha* *ativibhūta*.

To be explained: therein the state of *ativibhūta* is known through either object or mind that has strength much. It is true although mind is weak, the strong object as earth, mountain, etc., is to be *ativibhūta*. And if

mind is so strong *Nibbāna* which is so subtle can be called *ativibhūta*. This way should be known in the rest, too.

Especially, the division of terms (*vārabhedo*) here are twofold: the follower (*anubandhako*) and the self-existence (*visuṃ siddho*). Of these two, the following is five-fold as the following to eye-door, and so on. And each one of the following has four terms: seizing past (*atītaggaḥaṇa*) seizing group (*samudāyagahaṇa*), seizing figure (*vatthugahaṇa*) and seizing name (*nāmagahaṇa*). Then the term of *tadārammaṇa*, etc. should be compared with those four terms as it is proper.

The *self-existence* is six-fold: the term of being seen (*diṭṭha vāra*) the term of relation of being seen (*diṭṭha sambandha vāra*), the term of being heard (*suta vāra*), the term of relation of being heard (*suta sambandha vāra*), the term of being conceived (*viññāta vāra*) and the term of relation of being conceived (*viññāta sambandha vāra*).

Herein it should be noted that the terms dealing with confidence (*saddhā*), satisfaction (*ruci*), reasoning (*ākāra parivitakka*) etc., are mentioned as the term of being conceived and the term of relation of being conceived.

However, it is said in Aṭṭhasālinī:²⁸ the object, which is seized through confidence and satisfaction, etc. is either real or not real as it is seized. So they are not taken in commentary.

It may exist or not, such an object must be reckoned if there arises *vīthi citta*.

Of those six terms, each one has four terms through *tadārammaṇa*, etc. And in those terms, the object should be divided as *kāma*, *mahaggata*, *lokuttara* and *paññatti* and as past, future, present and timelessness.

However, most of the scholars now consider the division of terms as the past *bhavaṅga* and *tadārammaṇa*. Of those two, considering the division

of terms as the past *bhavaṅga* is useless. Because there is no differentiation that objects are strong or weak through moment in *manodvāra* like in *pañcadvāra*. Because in *manodvāra* there come into manifestation the object belonging to the past, future or timelessness although it does not exist in present.

On this point there may raise a question: the commentators want to accept an object which is not different as *dhamma* and time in a thought-process with single *āvajjana*. These sentient beings can read others' minds by noticing such and such behavior. But the deities, who can read others' minds, conceive it without noticing behavior. Herein at the time of reading others' present mind there arises *āvajjana*. Does that *āvajjana*, firstly, turn to others' mind which arises simultaneously with itself or which arises later on together with this and that *javanas*? And regarding *javanas*, too, do they conceive others' mind which arises together with *āvajjana* or which arises together with each of themselves?

There is something more that needs to be said: Firstly, if it (*āvajjana*) turns or they (*javanas*) conceive others' mind arising together with *āvajjana*, there exists the difference as time, not as *dhamma*. Because for *āvajjana* the mind is present, but for *javanas* the mind is past.

Then if *āvajjana* turns and *javanas* conceive separately others' mind arising together with each of themselves, there still exists the difference as *dhamma*, not as time. Then *javana* conceives separately others' mind arising together with each of themselves and on that *āvajjana* turns. Although it is there still exists the difference.

Herein commentary²⁹ firstly having expressed the state of indifference as *dhamma* that *āvajjana* turns and *javanas* conceive only the *citta* which arises together with *āvajjana*, decides thus: that *citta* seized as long term and process, although it have ceased, is to be in present of

javanas.

As the opinion of *Ānanda*:³⁰, the teacher, at the time of knowing what the other wishes to do after having noticed the other's such and such movement, *āvajjana* and *javanas* turn and conceive respectively each of the *cittas* which arises together with itself. There is nothing different as *dhamma* or time. The object of all is only *citta* and at present as well. And there is not a *javana* that is absence of *āvajjana*. Through *āvajjana*, indeed, it turns to *citta* and *javanas* conceives as *citta*.

If *javanas* conceive matter when *āvajjana* turns to *citta* or if *javanas* conceive *citta* when *āvajjana* turns to matter or if *javanas* conceive yellow when *āvajjana* turns to blue, the *javanas* are to be absence of *āvajjana* from the point of *dhamma*. In the same way, if *javanas* conceive present when *āvajjana* turns to the past, *javanas* are to be absence of *āvajjana* from the point of time.

And it is said in *Paṭṭhāna*:³¹ the present *dhamma* is related to the past *dhamma* in the way of contiguity condition. So it is reasonable here to say that the present is to be momental (*khāṇa*), not to be periodical (*addhā*) and continuous (*santati*). Otherwise, the time of object beginning with the past may be said from the point of period (*addhā*) and continuity (*santati*) in all sections of thought-processes.

In the stanza: *Tiṇeva*: only three according to function. *Cittuppādā daseṛitā*: as the moment of *citta* it is said to be ten. *Vitthārena*: as numeration of *cittas*. *Ettha* means in this *manodvāra*. *Ekacattālīsa*: forty-one as the *cittas* in *kāma* plane except from five *viññāṇa* and *manodhātu*. *Ettha*: in this section of *javana* belonging to *kāma*. [*paritta vāro*]

138. *Vibhūtā vibhūtabhedo natthi*: it means *vibhūta* (obvious) object alone must be known. Because on the *avibhūta* (non-obvious) object *Appanā*

cannot arise.

In the same way there is no *Tadārammaṇa*. Because *Tadārammaṇa* never follows the *Appanā javana* which is much calmer.

Herein it is word connection: any of *javana* out of the twenty-six *javanas* belonging to *Mahaggata* and *lokuttara* makes upon the process of *Appanā*.

Javana with two-hetu without wisdom, due to having not the state of stability, cannot be the *Anantarūpanissaya* condition of *Appanā*. In order to explain it *Thera* spoke: *ñāṇa sampayutta kāmāvacara javanāna'maṭṭhannaṃ*

Parikamma'pacārānuloma gotrabhu nāmena: herein *parikamma* is so called because it prepares *appanā* through conditions, the state of equality of faculties, etc.

Upacāra is so called because it exists close to *appanā* meaning "close existence". Herein, the close existence must be known as a state of being immediately able to lead *appanā*. On arising of *upacāra* there appears *appanā* soon.

Anuloma means one which fits for *appanā*; which benefits *appanā*; and which leads to *appanā* by destroying the obstacle conditions of the appearance of *appanā*. On arising of *anuloma* there are no opposites which is the obstacle of *appanā*.

Go is that by means of which the meaning is known. It is a term for word and knowledge. It protects those two, word and knowledge; so it is called *gotta*. It is a term for the lineage, that is lower species. *Gotrabhū* is that in which the lineage of *kāma* ceases.

In addition, four types of *javanas* can be called as *parikamma* or *upacāra* or *anuloma*. But *gotrabhū* is a name only for the last one. Here, indeed, in order to grasp four names together, and because of this reason,

there is no room for such a question - "why is only the first *javana* named *parikamma* ? The others, too, prepare for *appanā*, do they not?..."

Catukkhattum tikkhattumeva vā : only four times or only three times. Of these, by the first *eva* (only) it rejects the appearance of *gotrabhū* as the fifth. It is true at that time *javana* comes to fall down, and it gets vibration and shaking. It cannot be a condition to reach the higher stage, passing over the lineage of *kāma*. By the second *eva* it rejects the appearance of *gotrabhu* as the second. It is true at that time *anuloma* without *āsevana* condition cannot make the next mind to be in a state of *gotrabhū*. By only these two, *eva* , it denotes that *appanā* cannot appear beyond the fifth and earlier than the fourth.

And by the word, *vā* , it denotes that for one who has a little knowledge the *javana* of *kāma* arises only four times, not three times; and for one who has a great knowledge it arises only three times, not four times.

And in *Aṭṭhasālinī*,³² it seems to consent the appearance of *parikamma javana* for five times too, classifying the person into three: one who has a little knowledge, and medium knowledge and a great knowledge. However, that statement must not be accepted because it is rejected in other commentaries³³ having been well examined.

And it is said in *Vibhāvanī* that at the sixth and seventh positions it cannot stand as *appanā* due to being close to *bhavaṅga* as if a man who is near to the edge of a slope cannot stand (p.148).

Herein the meaning of the word, *bhavaṅgassa āsanna bhāvena*, is that due to being near to the state of *bhavaṅga*. It is true, the *javana* process, starting from the fifth *javana*, is gradually in a state of exhaustion. It changes to be *bhavaṅga*. For this reason the simile of a man who is near the edge of a slope is reasonable.

The word, *niruddhā'nantara meva*, must be analyzed *niruddha* +

anantara meva . Which is it next to? It is understood that it is next to the *dhamma* which has been ceased due to being heard of nothing else.

Then, the *appanā*, if it arises, arises since the fourth or the fifth position, not since the sixth or the seventh position. It is true, it, even though it has much experience, never arises at all if it has no chance at the fourth or fifth position. And, if it has a chance, it arises for the whole day without stopping. Therefore, it is regarded that the word, *catuttham vā , pañcamam vā* , is said in order to define only the starting point. It is why the words are spoken thus: *appanā vīthi motarati* and then *tato param appanā vasāne bhavaṅgapāto hoti*.

Then, if *javana* goes down since the fifth position why does the *appanā javana* appears at the time of going down? This must be answered. The time of going down for the stone in hand is when it just escaped from the hand. However, that stone thrown by hand still goes even farther.

Herein, the speed of the stone originates in the motion of the hand; and the speed of the hand originates in the strength of the body.

Thera compares *appanā javana* to the stone; the time after the fourth position to the time of going down of the stone; the motion of *gotrabhū* to the motion of the hand; the power of the earlier *javanas*, *parikamma*, etc., to the strength of the body.

In the case of thought-process in a beginner, the power of *kāma javana* is compared to the strength of a baby who only can sleep on his back. In thought-process belonging to attainment, the power of *kāma javana* is compared to the strength of a man who is full-grown. Just as the stone thrown by a baby falls immediately when it escapes from his hand, so the *appanā javana* comes up once and falls in the thought-process in a beginner. As just as the stone thrown by a man who is full-grown goes far or farther without going down even at the time of falling, so the *appanā javana* in the

thought-process belonging to attainment runs for a long or longer time.

However, in *Mūlaṭṭikā* it is said: "the *appanā javana*, although it appears at the time of falling, does not fall through reaching the other stage or through seizing the other object."³⁴

Herein, a question may be posed: Why is it said that *javana* falls starting from the fifth position? The seventh *javana* volition, due to being so powerful by not falling, results in, in the next life or becomes *ānantariya kamma*. And the five-volition between the first and the last, due to not having power, results in after long in the third life and never becomes the *ānantariya kamma* as well. Is it not true?

That should not be noted as you said. Because, if powerful by taking effect swiftly, then the first *javana* volition may be the most powerful of all. It is true that results are manifested only in this life.

It is a decision at this point: the maturity of the first volition is compared to the maturity of plants which have one-year life span; the maturity of the seventh volition to the maturity of plants which have two-year life span; the maturity of middle volition to the maturity of big trees.

Of these, the plants which have one-year life span have no essence. And due to being without essence they are weak and do not exist for a long time. So they become mature quickly. They, indeed, grow swiftly and reach a state of full development. They bear flowers and fruits and fall down and disappear soon.. They are unable to go beyond a summer season. They never exist beyond a second year. And herein, the time of death is compared to the summer season.

Then, the plants which have two-year life span are with a little essence. Due to this they are a little stronger and last longer. Only due to being with essence do they become mature after a little time. It is true they, in the first year, grow and develop, but they are unable to bear flowers and

fruits. Only in the second year do they bear flowers and fruits and fall into disappearance. And they cannot go beyond the second summer season. They never exist beyond the third year.

Then, the big trees are full of essence and strong and last long. So they become mature slowly. It is true, they are one span or one cubit in height after one or two years. They have not yet obtained full development, and are unable to bear flowers and fruits as yet. But they exist very long and fall down after five or six hundred years.

Similarly, the first *javana* volition, due to not having *Āsevana* condition, has no essence and power. It cannot produce one life and cannot go beyond the time of death. Only in this life it comes to exhaustion after or before maturity.

The seventh *javana* volition, however, is with a little essence because of having *Āsevana* condition. It is able to produce one life. Due to being with essence it comes to maturity slowly. It cannot mature in this life. It becomes mature in the next life. But it cannot go beyond the second time of death because it is the last one among the declined *javanas* and due to that it has no strength. And it comes to cessation after or before maturity.

The state of slow maturity concerning the other five middle *javana* volitions which have *Āsevana* condition in abundance is known by following the way mentioned before.

And this meaning is explained not only through the simile of plants, but it should also be explained through the simile of beings.

Beings who lay in the womb and have a short life-span live in the womb briefly and are born quickly. Their organs also become strong quickly. On the day they are given birth, they rise up and go about (here and there). They take their food and each becomes clever quickly in his own affairs. They quickly age and die. But the beings whose life-span are long all

stages, such as laying in the womb, etc., is long, and only comes into being slowly.

Furthermore, therein *mahaggata kusala javanas* are known to be in the place of the seventh *javana*. It is true the *parimakka javanas* are compared to the well-ripe *sāli* rice due to its long existence. And *mahagatta javanas* to the well-cooked *sāli* rice. So they do not last long and cease in the second life after or before maturity. They do not effectuate completely even in this life if they are blocked by opposite *dhammas*, sensual desire, etc. Therefore, they have no strength in that aspect.

Then, the state of certainty of effectuating of *Ānantariya kammās* does not come into being without a definite time. And the definite time is also exactly only for the seventh *javana* not for the middle *janas*, because there is no exact limitation that they result in only such a life. Therefore, we must come to a conclusion at this point that the seventh *javana* volition is called *Ānantariya kamma* only because of its two-fold certainty, not because of being stronger.

However, in *Mūlaṭṭikā*, raising a question and giving an answer to it: "the seventh *javana* volition, due to being powerful, is in a state of *upapajja vedaniya* and *Ānantariya*, is it not? That seventh *javana* volition becomes *upapajja venndaniya* and *Ānantariya* as well. This is because the last *javana* volition works well as an *Anantara* condition for the *vipāka* process which is the *Anantara* condition of *paṭisandhi*. Not because it is powerful like the *javana* volition which does not fall down."³⁵

That does not seem to be reasonable. Because, if so, must be asked thus: "for which *dhamma* does the first *javana* volition work as *Anantara* condition and so it becomes '*ditthadhamma vedaniya* ?'

And it is said in *Mahāṭṭikā*: "the last *javana* volition, although weak, has a special ability in producing an effect because of being with the special

function of certainty. So it becomes *Upapajja vedaniya* and *Ānantariya* as well."³⁶

Yathāvahaṃ: fit for such and such individual. *Yathābhinihāra vasena* : fit for leading to such and such *parikamma bhāvana* mind to the objects, *kaṣiṇa* form etc., and the characteristic of impermanence etc., *Appanāvīthiṃ*: *Appavā* continuity. And this word is spoken in order to grasp the *Appana javanas* which arise many times. Therefore, *Thera* said: *tato paraṃ appanā vasane bhavaṅga pāto va hoti*.

Herein *tato* means after the of the fifth (*appanā javana*). If it is the meaning it implies that the thought process falls into being *bhavaṅga* definitely at fifth or the sixth moment. So the word, *appanā'vasāne* , is spoken again. It means that there is only falling in the *bhavaṅga*, not *tadārammaṇa*.

However, it is said in *Vibhāvanī*: "By the word, *eva* (*bhavaṅga pāto +eva*), it rejects the statement of other sect who say the appearance of *kāma javana* even after the *Appanā javana* in order to make seven *janas* full in some of the *appanā* section (p.149)"

Tatha: in that *appanā javana* section. And there is no differentiation of feeling dealing with *javana* which consecutively arises. Therefore it is said: *Somanassa javanā' nantaraṃ* , etc.,

However, in *Vibhāvanī* the reason is given thus: "due to being not expressed the *dhammas* which have feelings in different nature to be *Āsevana* condition reciprocally.(p.149)"

That is not correct. Because the state of *Āsevana* condition is not important here. Why? Because it needs that even *phala javanas* which are excluded from *Āsevana* condition have non-different feeling (*abhinna vedanā*) with each other and with the *parikamma javanas* .

Pāṭikākhittabbā: it is exactly needed.

However, in Vibhāvanī it gives the meaning "admired.(p.149)"

That is not correct. Because such an interpretation is not found.

The defining "former and later" is only for the *Appanā javanas* with the *parikamma javanas*, although *Arahattaphala* arises after *Arahattamagga* in the *Magga* process. In order to explain it *kriyajavanā nantaraṃ arahatta phalañca* is spoken.

It is the interpretation: there arise thirty-two *Appanā javanas* after the *kāma javana* of *kriya* with indifferent feeling; eight *Appanā javanas* after the *kāma javana* of *kriya* with indifferent feeling.

Herein *dvattimsa* means thirty-two counted by means of these -- four *Rūpa kusala* except the fifth *jhāna*, sixteen *Magga jhānas* except the fifth twelve lower *phalas* except *Arahatta phala*. *Dvādasa* is twelve through these -- one *Rūpa kusalas*, four *Arūpa kusalas*, four *Maggas* and three lower *phalas* belonging to the fifth *jhāna*. *Aṭṭha* is eight through these -- four *Rūpa kriyas* and four *Arahatta phalas* except the fifth *jhāna*. *Cha* is six through these -- one *Rūpa kriyas*, four *Arūpa kriyas* and one *Arahatta phala* belonging to the fifth *jhāna*.

It is the interpretation: the forty four *Appanās* arise after the *Kāma kusala* with three-*hetu* within *Puthujjanas* and *Sekkhās*. The fourteen *Appanās* arise after the *Kāma kriya javana* within *Arahantas* who are free from attachment.

139. *Sabbatthāpi* : in all divisions, *Atimahanta* ,etc. *Ettha* : in those five-door and mind-door as said before. Or the word must be thus: "*Sabbatthāpi pana aniṭṭhe...*" It is why in *Ṭīkās* the meaning is given: "*Sabbatthāpi* means in five-door and mind-door, too.

It is desired, so it is called *Iṭṭha*. By whom it is desired? It is desired

by common people in the world, and out of them by the people in the middle position excluding the people who are so high and so low. If so, to classify the desired or undesired is easy" it is said in *Commentary*.³⁷

Only that object on which the resultant of *kusala* arises is to be called "desirable" (*iṭṭha*). And only that object on which the resultant of *Akusala* arises is to be called "undesirable" (*aniṭṭha*). It is true, the object, desired or undesired, cannot deceive the *Vipāka* mind.

In other way, the state of "desired" or "undesired" must be known through the door as well. Therefore, with regard to one of the matter groups belonging to animate and inanimate matters, colour, etc., are "desired", some are "undesired". Sometimes, they are "desired" and sometimes "undesired".

Herein "some are desired and some undesired" means that: just as some flowers have desirable colour but the smell is offensive, taste unpalatable, touching undesirable and having a gross feeling, and some flowers have desirable colour as well as smell but taste, etc., are undesirable, equally some of the matter groups within the body of the *Buddha*, too, have desirable colour but undesirable smell.

The bloated carcass of a black dog has a desirable colour but undesirable smell. It is true that if that colour is the colour of a dress worn by someone, it will be very expensive.

"Sometimes desired and sometimes undesired" means that: fire is desirable in winter and it is beneficial. But it is undesirable in summer and it is not beneficial. And cold water is desirable in summer but undesirable in winter. Then, the clothes that are smooth are desirable for the normal body but for the wounded body it is undesirable. Or it is desirable to be touched gently and slowly by the cloth but it is undesirable to be touched roughly.

Aniṭṭha means not desired. That word, *aniṭṭha*, is used in the

sentence *aniṭṭhe*. *Iṭṭhe* means in the object of medium desirability. This word *kusalavipākāni* must be connected with these *pañca viññāṇa sampaticchana santīraṇa tadārammaṇāni*. However, *santīraṇa* and *tadārammaṇa* here must be known with only indifferent feeling. Therefore, *Thera* spoke: *Ati iṭṭhe pana*, etc.

Ati iṭṭhe means six objects which are much desired by many people in the world: they are gold, silver, ruby, etc.; vermilion colour (*haritāla*), etc.; the colour of silk, etc.; the beauty of heavenly goddesses, etc.

Especially, to meet undesired object is the occasion of the effect of only demerit and to meet desired object is the occasion of the effect of only merit. Therefore, by such a definition it is known that there are only the effect of demerit when the undesired object exist; only the effect of merit when the desired object exists.

However, the definition of feeling is known according to only their object. Because *vipāka* minds are effectuated by the power of *kamma* without their own effort like reflected faces on a mirror, do not receive various objects by making an attempt in such and such way.

And not only *vipāka* minds associate with feeling only as their object, but also the *kriya javanas* of *kāma* belonging to *Arahantas* who are free from hallucination associate with feeling only as their object. Pointing out this meaning, *Thera* said: *tathāpi somanassa sahagata kriya javanā vasāne*, etc.

Tatthāpi: out of those *vipākas*.

Somanassa sahagata kriya vasāne: in the end of *kriya javanas* with pleasant feeling on the object much desired, as the form of *Buddha*, etc.

Upekkhā sahagata kriya javanā vasāne: in the end of *kriya javana* with indifferent feeling on the objects undesired and moderately desired. And this defining of *tadārammaṇa* after *kriya javana* is also said in

Commentary. it is truly said there:

The two *kriya javanas* of *kāma* with three-*hetu* that associated with pleasant feeling is to be the *Anantara* condition for five-*vipāka* with pleasant feeling which is under the name of *tadārammaṇa*, etc.³⁸

Furthermore, this is said according to the *kriya javanas* which commonly arise. But the *kriya javanas* which arise through such a created mind (*cittābhi-saṅkhāra*) associate with indifferent feeling, even on a desired object and with pleasant feeling even on an undesired object.

It should be quoted:

"*Ānanda*, how does a noble person have a faculty that has been developed? *Ānanda*, in this teaching the pleasure or the unpleasure or both come into existence within a monk due to seeing visible objects with eye. If he wishes, "I will stay perceiving disgust as not disgust", he stays perceiving it as not disgust. If he wishes, "I will stay perceiving non-disgust as disgust", he stays perceiving it as disgust".³⁹

The whole *Indriyabhāvanā Sutta* of *Majjhimanikāya* must be quoted.

Herein, by these words "the pleasure or the unpleasure or both comes into existence" it expresses: the *kriya javanas* of *kāma* within *Arahantas* normally associate with pleasant feeling on a desired object and with indifferent feeling on an undesired object. But these words, "if he wishes 'I will stay perceiving the disgust as not disgust, he stays perceiving it as not disgust', etc.", say that if *Arahantas* have such a trained mind, their mind can associate with indifferent feeling even on a desired object, and with pleasant feeling even on an undesired object.

Then, the rejection of pleasure in six doors within *Arahantas* is mentioned in *Satatavihāra Sutta*⁴⁰ by these words: "O monks, in this teaching a monk is neither happy nor unhappy seeing a visible object with

eye; he stays with indifferent feeling, mindfulness and contemplation, etc.." It must be also noted: that Sutta is said according to such trained minds within *Arahantas*. Or *Arahantas* are also happy when they see the *Buddha*, etc. or the place fit for meditation. So it is reasonable that this Sutta is mentioned indicating the desired and undesired objects, visible object, etc., which are the conditions of craving, etc.

Then, here should be known such a mental training according to the way presented in Paṭisambhidā magga⁴¹:

"How does one stay perceiving disgust as not disgust? One pervades loving-kindness; or considers as element regarding the undesired object. In this way he stays perceiving disgust as not disgust.

How does one stay perceiving non-disgust as disgust? One pervades his consideration of filthiness or considers as impermanence regarding the desired object. In this way he stays perceiving non-disgust as disgust, etc."

However, other commentators say: "*Arahantas* pervade the contemplation of filthiness or consider as impermanence when much desirable object, the form of heavenly goddesses, etc., comes to appear. Then the mark of filthiness and the mark of impermanence which is undesired become the object of *kriya javanas* with indifferent feeling, not the figure of heavenly goddesses, etc., which is much desired. And they equally pervade loving-kindness or consider as element when very much undesired object, such as the foul body of a leper, comes to appear. Then only the mark of the absence of enemy which is desired becomes the object of *kriya javana* with pleasant feeling, not the foul body of a leper which is much undesired. Therefore, those *javanas* always associate with feeling according to objects like the *vipākas* of *kāma* ".

That is not reasonable. Because those marks cannot be known

separately without the figure of heavenly goddesses, etc., but only together with it. Therefore, here must be noted that the mental training, that is the pervasion of filthiness, etc., is the condition of the *javanas* with indifference on the much desired object and of the *javanas* with pleasant feeling on the much undesired object as says in these references:

"In Commentary⁴² it expresses: to be the pleasant feeling on the much undesired, the bloated corpses, etc., by seeing the benefits or by seeing the distinction between the former and the latter mental culture.

And in Pāḷi text⁴³ it expresses: to be the pleasant feeling on the form of a skeleton ghost, which is an undesired object, for the *Mahā moggalāna Thera* by seeing the *Buddha* as a real *Buddha* or by seeing the self-accomplishment.

And in Commentary⁴⁴ it expresses: to be the pleasant feeling within *Mahākassapa Thera* on the undesired stale barley meal obtained from the hand of a leper through such a mental training."

It is true, the state of being desirable or undesirable of an object must be known through the wish of many people in the world and it is not serious and is a ground of hallucination and mental defilement as well.

It should be quoted:

"Herein, which matter is inferior? A matter which is known as lower and is looked down by such and such beings, etc."⁴⁵

Herein, by these words "by such and such beings" it indicates that the state of being desirable or undesirable of an object comes to be known according to the general consensus of many people in the world.

Therefore, it must be known that both of these, which perceives much desired object, the form of heavenly goddesses, etc., as much desired object and which perceives much desired object, the figure of *Buddha* etc., as undesired object, come to appear through only hallucination of many people

in the world who do not yet expel their hallucination.

Then, both of these, which perceives the form of heavenly goddesses as undesired object and which perceives the figure of the *Buddha* as much desired object, come to appear through only the power of knowledge of those wise disciples of the *Buddha* .

However, it is said in Vibhāvanī : "the *javana of kusala* and *akusala* of those who do not expel their hallucination come to perceive much desired object as moderately desired and undesired object, and much undesired object as desired and moderately desired object.(p.150)"

And it is also said in it: "the *kriya javanas* of *Arahantas* come into being only according to the object. Because *Arahantas* have not mental hallucination.(p.150)"

That must be examined. Because only those, who have no eyes for *dhamma*, have to follow the persuasive mind and object through hallucination; so only the *javana of kusala* and *akusala* come into being according to their object, but not the *kriya javanas*. It is true, *Arahantas* never follow the desired and undesired objects assumed by many people in the world as mind and object persuade .

It should be quoted:

"Wise excite not; Owing to pleasant objects, Form, sound, smell, taste and touch; And owing to the things desired or undesired too."⁴⁶

Therefore, *Tadārammaṇas* which arise after *kriya javanas* with pleasant feeling associate with pleasant and indifferent feeling. Like that the *kriya javanas* with indifferent feeling does so.

However, it is said in Mulaṭṭikā⁴⁷: it is said in Paṭṭhāna⁴⁸: *kusalā'kusale niruddhe vipāko tadārammaṇatā uppajjati*. So *tadārammaṇa* is

expressed only after the *javana* of *kusala* and *akusala*, but not after the *abyākata*. And it is found where *tadārammaṇa* is mentioned after *kriya javanas*. There is also no reason in not saying it, if it is possible. It is reasonable that *bhavaṅga* follows only *javano* which have activity as if the current in a river follows a boat going against the stream, but it does not follow the non-active *kriya javana* in *Arahantas* who have six kinds of equanimity. Therefore, the statement of *tadārammaṇa* after *kriya javana* should be considered."

Let me give examination: In the three *abyākata padā' vasānas* in the division of *Ārammaṇa* condition of *Pañhāvāra* in the *Kusalattika* in Paṭṭhāna⁴⁹ only *tadārammaṇa* is main for *sekkha* and *puthujjana* persons, not the *javana* of *kusala* and *akusala*. Therefore, in those two sections having said thus: *sekkhā vā puthujjanā vā kusalaṃ aniccato vipassanti.kusalaṃ assā denti* it is said again *Kusale niruddhe akusale niruddhe vipāko tadārammaṇatā uppajjati*.

But for *Arahanta* either *javana* or *tadārammaṇa* is main. Therefore it mentions only thus: *Arahā kusalaṃ aniccato dukkhato anattato vipassati*. However, it does not say thus: *Kriyā' byākate niruddhe vipāko tadārammaṇatā uppajjati* .

And if said, it may make *tadārammaṇa* main. Although it is not said in Paṭṭhāna, the *tadārammaṇa* is also included by this word *vipassati* . Therefore, this statement which is expressed - "In Paṭṭhāna it is said: *Kusalā'kusale niruddhe vipāko tadārammaṇatā uppajjati*. So *tadārammaṇa* is said only after *kusala* and *akusala*, not after *Abyākata*. And it is not found where *tadārammaṇa* is mentioned after *kriya javana*. There is also no reason in not saying it, if it is possible". It is not reasonable.

Then, after *kriya javana* it is found *tadārammaṇa* together with *bhavaṅga* under the name of *vuṭṭhāna* in the division of *Arattara* condition

thus:⁵⁰ *kusalaṃ vuṭṭhānassa; Akusalaṃ vuṭṭhānassa; Kriyaṃ vuṭṭhānassa;* and *vipākadhamma dhammā khandhā vuṭṭhānassa; neva vipāka nāvīpākadhamma dhammā khandhā vuṭṭhānassa*. Therefore, this statement - there it is not found that the *tadārammaṇa* is said after *kriya javana* - is also not reasonable.

And the *kriya javana* in a state of calmness in *Arahanta* who has the six kinds of equanimity is not non-activity, because it also produces the gross physical and mental actions like *kusala javana*.

However, it is said in *Vibhāvanī* making comment about the statement of *Mūlaṭṭikā*: "If say *tadārammaṇa* after the *abyākata*, perhaps some may assume that *tadārammaṇa* arises even after *voṭṭhabbana* on the small object; For this reason *tadārammaṇa* is not said after *kriya javana*. (p.151)"

That is not correct. Because, there is not such a place in *Paṭṭhāna* where a *dhamma* is not said with this idea: "if it is said some may assume this". And there is not such a supposition (*paṣaṅga*) of *Parittārammana* section in five-door dealing with this passage which says how to arise the insight knowledge : *arahā kusalaṃ aniccato dukkhato anattato vipassati*.

And in the end of *domanssa javana* both *tadārammaṇa* and *bhavaṅga* must be with indifferent feeling, not with the pleasant feeling. Why? Because, the pleasant and unpleasant feelings are paradoxical in nature. For this reason those feelings are not spoken to be *Anantara* condition for each other in *Paṭṭhāna*.

Herein, by defining *tadārammaṇa* only after *kriya* and *domanassa javana*, *Thera* implicitly expounds that there is not such a definition after *kusala* and some of *akusala javanas*. Therefore, after these eighteen *javanas* by adding eight *Kusala*, eight *Lobhamūla* and two *Mohamūla*, the all *tadārammaṇa* and *bhavaṅgas* arise as fit for objects. Generally speaking,

the *tadārammaṇa* which arise after *Akusala javana* must be only without *hetu*; after *kusala javana* with two *hetus* must be with two *hetus*; after *kusala javana* with three *hetus* must be with three *hetus*. This is the general definition.

Especially, when *akusala javanas* arise sometimes within one who has *kusala javanas* with two or three *hetus* experienced much, then even after *akusala javana* the *tadārammaṇas* with two *hetus* or three *hetus* arise. Then one has *akusala javanas* experienced much. Within him, if arise sometimes *kusala javanas* with two *hetus* or three *hetus*, there arise the *tadārammaṇas* without *hetu* even immediately after *kusalas*.

It is true, it is said in *Paṭṭhāna*:⁵¹ "One contemplates *khandha* without *hetu* as impermanence unpleasant feeling arises. When the *javana* of *Kusala* or *Akusala* have ceased, *Vipaka* with *hetu* arises as *Tadarammana* and *Vipaka* without *hetu* arises as *Tadarammana*."

Actually, what we call *Tadarammanas*, though they are produced by one of *Kamma* effectuated *Paṭisandhi*, vary in different *Vithis*. Needless to say, the *Tadarammanas* produced by various *kammās* effectuated the continuity and are various.

Tasmā : there is no pleasant feeling after unpleasant feeling; because of that...

Somanassa Paṭisandhikassa : for a being who has one *Paṭisandhi* mind among the four *Mahāvīpākas* with pleasant feeling.

Tadārammaṇa sanbhavo : a condition which makes *Tadārammaṇa* appear; or the appearance of *Tadārammaṇa*.

Yam kiñci : one of the objects, form, etc., which is desired or undesired.

Paricītapubbaṃ : experienced through receiving many times just before the present moment only in this life. "Regularly experienced" is the

meaning.

Parittārammaṇaṃ : an object which belongs to *kāma*.

Arabbha : having depended.

Upekkhā sahaḡata santīraṇaṃ : one of the two *santīraṇas* with indifferent feeling - if the object is desired, the *santīraṇa* with indifferent feeling must be the *vipāka* of *kusala* and if undesired, the *vipāka* of *Akusala*.

In addition, there cannot be said the other four *Vipākas* of *kāma* with indifferent feeling do not become the *bhavaṅga* which is to be called a "visitor" (*āgantuka bhavaṅga*) within those who have these *vipākas* usually experienced much.

But, in Commentary⁵² the only two *Santīraṇas* of *Ahetuka* with indifferent feeling are mentioned after *Akusala javana* because of being in the stream "general definition" in the opinion of *Maāadhamma rakkhita Thera*.

It is true, because of that reason it is said in Commentary⁵³, after having explained that *Thera* 's statement "only the *Tadārammaṇa* without *hetu* arises after *Akusala javana* " to be not perfect meaning in the place of examining the *Thera* 's statements, "When *Akusala javana* arises intervening *Kusala javanas*, it is possible for *Tadārammaṇa* to arise in the end of *Akusala javana* as well as usually in the end of *Kusala javana* ". If *Tadārammaṇa* is possible, that *bhavaṅga* also must be possible. Therefore, it must be known that there are six *Vipākas* with indifferent feeling to be the *bhavaṅga* named a "visitor".

Herein, there is no *Tadārammaṇa* when the unpleasant feeling arises on the much desired object, the form of *Buddha*, etc., which is *Atimahanta* and *Ativibhuta* within one whose *Paṭisandhi* is with indifferent feeling: so mind comes to be as *bhavaṅga* after the *javana* with unpleasant feeling.

And there is neither *Tadārammaṇa* nor original *bhavaṅga*, when the

unpleasant feeling arises on all six objects desired and undesired which is *Mahanta* and *Avibhūta* within one whose *Paṭisandhi* is with pleasant feeling. So, one of six *Vipākas* with indifferent feeling, as it fits, arises to be the *bhavaṅga* named a "visitor", after the *javana* with unpleasant feeling.

The same way is known when the unpleasant feeling arises on the six objects much desired, the form of the *Buddha*, which is *Atimahanta* and other objects of *Mahaggata* and *Paññatti* within such a person.

Furthermore, regarding this point it is said in *Dhātuvibhaṅga*⁵⁴ of *Abhidhamma*: "there is the first attention to all *dhammas*."

And in the *Mahā hatthipado'pama Sutta* ⁵⁵, it is said:

"Friends, the eye which is internal is not destroyed; the visible objects which are external come into manifestation; but there is no attention proper for it; the proper consciousness does not yet come into existence.

Friends, the eye which is internal is not destroyed; the visible objects which are external come into manifestation; there is a proper attention to it; at that time the proper consciousness comes into existence.

Friends, the ear ... the nose ... the tongue ... the body ... the mind which is internal is not destroyed; the *dhammas* which are external come into manifestation; there is not a proper attention to it; the proper consciousness does not come into existence.

And friends, the mind which is internal is not destroyed; the *dhammas* which are external come into manifestation; there is a proper attention to it; so the proper consciousness comes into existence."

Therefore, the Active Minds (*vīthi cittas*) never appear

without *Avajjana*. If the *Āvajjana* attends to an object defining something according to *dhamma* and time, only that object is perceived by the Active Minds. And if *Āvajjana* attends to an object without defining, those objects, too, which are attended to are perceived by the Active Minds. Actually, it must be known that in the case of a process with a single *Āvajjana*, the Active Minds do not have different objects and *dharmas* and time from that of *Āvajjana* and of each other.

Herein, a question may be posed. "If that *bhavaṅga* named a "visitor" arises on some of *kāma* object experienced before without perceiving the object attended by *Āvajjana* at the beginning in thought-process, may it be without *Āvajjana* and may it also have different object as *dhamma* and time from that of *Āvajjana*, etc..?"

It is true: Just as the *Gotrabhu* and *Vodāna* in *Magga vīthi*, the Minds of Fruition in the *Phalasangāmi vīthi*, the Mind of Fruition within one who rouses from *Nirodha sangāmi* is without *Āvajjana* and has different objects, so it is also nothing wrong with the *bhavaṅga* named a visitor to be without '*Āvajjana*' and to have different objects.

And the statement which is presented here and there - "in one life *bhavaṅga* must not be different as either *dhamma* or object from that of *Paṭisardhi*" - is said indicating the normal *bhavaṅga*. But this is a *bhavaṅga* named a visitor. So there is nothing wrong with it.

Tamanantaritvā : having made the *Āgantukabhavaṅga* to be its *Anantara* condition.

Vadanti ācariyā : It means that there is no such programme in either Pali text or in the Mahā Aṭṭhakathā.

They need *Tadārammaṇa* only in the end of *javana* of *kāma*, not in the end of *javanas* belonging to *Mahaggata* and *Lokuttara*. If asked 'Why?', it is the answer: because, the only *javanas* of *kāma* have wavering; and the

other *javanas* have not wavering.

However, in *Vibhāvanī* the reason is given thus: "because of being the product of *kamma* originated in the desire for *kāma*. (p.153)."

That is not a proper reason.

In other way, the *javanas* of *Mahaggata* and *Lokuttara* except *Abhiññā* *javana* have not the object of *kāma*. But *Tadārammaṇa* has the object of *kāma*. Therefore, there is no doubt of the appearance of *Tadārammaṇa* in the end of those *javanas*. And although some of *Abhiññā* *javanas* have the object of *kāma*, they are much calmer. So in the end of those also, no *Tadārammaṇa* appears.

By this word, it rejects this statement said in *Vibhāvanī*: "Because, they are not the *kamma* that produces and they are not the *kamma* that is similar to what produces (p.153).

They need *Tadārammaṇa* only within the beings of *kāma*, not within the beings of *Rūpa* and *Arūpa*. Because there is no *Tadārammaṇa* in the end of *kāma javana* within those beings of *Rūpa* and *Arūpa* though they have the object of *kāma*. Because there is no *kāma bhavaṅga* which is an *Upanissaya* condition of *Tadārammaṇa*; and the *bhavaṅga* of *Mahaggata*, due to being quieter, does not perform the function *tadārammaṇa*.

However, eye-consciousness and ear-consciousness arise within the beings of *Rūpa*; because the power of eye and ear faculties appeared in those beings. And *Sampaticchana* and *Santīraṇa* arise because of the order of mind (*citta niyāma*) in the process according to door.

They need *tadārammaṇa* only on the objects belonging to *kāma*, not belonging to *Mahaggata*, *Lokuttara* and concept. Because *tadārammaṇa* has exactly an object of *kāma*. And the reason regarding to that they have only the object of *kāma* is said before.

vekkhaṇa) or *Abhiññā*, .Their *jhānas*,etc. become as *javana* of near death which arise more or less than five times. This meaning will be clear in the chapter of *Maraṇupatti* later.

Bhagvato pana yamaka pāṭihāriya kālāḍṣu : Here it should be noted that such a time of quickening within the others, *Mahāmoggallāna* ,etc., is grasped by the word, *adi..* It is true. It is said in *Visuddhimagga*⁶⁰: "this highest power is known at the time of super normal power,*yamaka pāṭihāriya* ,within the Blessed One, or within the others at such a time."

And by the whole sentence, it expresses: "the contemplating minds arise for six or seven times even within the Blessed One at normal time setting aside the time of quickening like the creation of *yamaka pāṭihāriya* . Needless to say, the minds arise for six or seven times within others."

Cattāri pañca vā paccavekkhaṇa cittāni bhavanti : Herein, such a definition is reasonable that even within the Blessed One the contemplating minds come into being for five times when they are in a quick state, or for four times when they are in a quicker state.

However, in *Vibhāvanī* it is said: "It seems to be reasonable ' for four times within the Blessed One and for five times within the others' (p.155)."

Therein, when the Blessed One creates the super normal power of *yamaka pāṭihāriya* in order to display the couple *pāṭihāriya* , letting fireworks and water fountain simultaneously, he was absorbed firstly in the primary *jhāna* on the object of *tejo kasiṇa* ; then he contemplated the two *jhāna* factors and made a vow "may fire jet out from the upper body!"; after that he attained the stage of *Abhiññā* on the object of that *kasiṇa* ; and through the power of *Abhiññā* fire jets out from the upper body. Then he was absorbed in the primary *jhāna* on the object of *āpo kasiṇa* ; he contemplated the two *jhāna* factors and made a vow "may water stream out

from the lower body!"; then he attained the stage of *Abhiññā* only on the object of that *kasiṇa*; and through the power of *Abhiññā* water streams out from the lower body. Only this way is known regarding the couple of fire and water from other positions.

Especially, in the two turns of the contemplating thought-processes there are only four or five *javanas* ; because it needs quick action. And between the two turns of *javanas* there are only two *bhavaṅgas*. The couple *pāṭihāriyas* seem to be at the same moment to those who see it.

And nowadays some commentators say: on contemplating the *jhāna* of beginners, there arise four or five *javanas*

Ādikammikassa : of one who first makes an attempt to accomplish in meditation.

Pathamakappanā is so-called because it is an *appanā* which arises first. That word is used in the sentence as *pathamakappanāyaṃ* meaning "in the *appanā vīthi* of the beginner." It is true, at that time all of these *Mahaggata javanas* arise only once, because again they are weak lacking the *Āsevana* condition. And the *Abhiññā javanas*, which make an attempt to complete the function of creation of miracle, arise only once in either the beginner or the experienced. Because they have nothing more to do after creation. In order to explain it, *Thera* spoke: *Abhiññā javanāni ta sabbadāpi*

And just as *Abhiññā javanas* arise once, so does *Magga javanas* because they have nothing more to do after having eradicated the mental defilements. In order to explain it *Thera* spoke: *Cattāro pana magguppādā eka cittaḅhaṇikā*. In another way, the volition in *magga* has an immediate effect; after the *magga* has arisen once, the turn of *phala* comes in; so there is no chance for *magga* to arise again. To explain it *Thera* spoke: *cattāro pana magguppādā eka cittaḅhaṇikā*.

Then, the appearance of *javana* is usually for seven times as a

maximum; so after the *magga* which arises at the fifth position, *phala* arises twice within those who are slow-witted and for three times within those who are intelligent. To explain it *Thera* spoke: *Tato paraṃ ... upajjanti.*

Then, at the time of *Nirodha samāpatti* (the attainment of the state of mental cessation) there is no appearance of mind after the Fourth *Arūpa* mind arises twice, because such an attempt has been made only at an early time. To explain it *Thera* said: *Nirodha ... javati.* Herein, the word, *dvikkhattup* (twice)," is said according to the maximum. Actually, it means mind ceases after having arisen once or twice.⁶¹

Catutthā'ruppa javanaṃ : the *javana* of *Nevasaññā nā saññāyatana* which belongs to *kusala* within *Anāgāmī* and to *kriya* within *Arahanta*.

Thera said: *Vuṭṭhāna kāle ca ...* In order to explain it the *javana* arises only once as a mere consequence of *Nirodha* at the time of withdrawal.

Anāgami phale vā Arahatta phale vā : this word is actually used in sentence, *Anāgāmi phalaṃ vā Arahatta phalaṃ vā* . It is true, the ending *aṃ* - is *paccatta vacana* in the sense of *bhāvena bhāvalakkhaṇa* (being marked a verb through the other). So *Thera* said the word, *Niruddhā*.

Sabbatthaāpi samāpatti vīthiyaṃ : in all thought process of *samāpatti* listed as *jhāna samāpatti* and *phala samāpatti* . And these words, *bhavaṅga soto viya vīthi niyamo natthi*, are said referring to the time of mastery (*ciṇṇa vasībhuta kālaṃ*).

Then it should be noted: for those who have experience the *jhāna javanas* gradually increases - two, three, or four - from the starting point in *Jhāna samāpatti* .. But for those great men who have experience they are in full power starting from attainment. And the *Javanas* of *Phala* are in the same way for those who are in the stage of *Phala* .

The word, *pi* , in *bahūnipi* is in the sense of addition (*sampiṇḍanatto*). By the word, *pi* , it adds the other *javanas* that they arise once at the time of the beginning, and so on. [*Javana niyamo*]

141. Thus, after having expounded the mode of arising of *vīthi citta*s as defining 'former and latter', now *Thera* spoke the word, *duhetukāna* , etc., in order to explain the appearance of *vīthi citta*s through the division of persons (*puggala bheda*) and the division of planes (*bhūmi bheda*).

Duhetuka is those who have two *hetus* that arise together with *paṭisandhi* .It is a term for those who have *mahāvīpākas* without knowledge as their *paṭisandhi* .

Then those who have the two *vīpākas* without *hetu* as their *paṭisandhi* are called *Ahetuka* because they have not any *hetu* which associate with *paṭisandhi* . Within these two persons (*dvīhetuka* and *ahetuka*), the *javanas* of *Mahaggata* do not arise. Because they have the obstacle of *vīpāka* (*vīpakā varaṇa*). Needless to say, the *javanas* of *lokuttara* do not arise within them. And the *javanas* of *kriya* are particular for only *Arahantas* . Therefore, *Thera* said: *Kriya javanāni ceva appanā javanāni ca na labbanti.*

Herein, "the obstacle of *vīpāka* (*vīpakavarana*)" is to have the *paṭisandhi* either without *hetu* or with two *hetus*.

Tathā ñāṇa sampayutta vīpākāni ca sugatiyaṃ : in the same way the *Mahā vīpākas* that associate with knowledge cannot arise within those two persons if they were born in *sugati*. In addition, by the word, *sugatiyaṃ* , it rejects the *ahetukka* persons who were born in *duggati*. It is true, they cannot have even the *Mahāvīpākas* that dissociate from knowledge which are allowed for the other persons (*duhetuka*) in this sentence. So it is said: *Duggatiyaṃ pana ...*

In this passage, the complete interpretation should be known thus: "the

ahetuka persons who were born in *duggati* cannot have the *mahāvīpākas* either with knowledge or without knowledge.

In this point, there may arise a question: "Why do you say here thus: "the *ahetuka* persons who were born in *sugati* cannot have the four *mahāvīpākas* with knowledge and who were born in *duggati* cannot have the eight *mahāvīpākas*?" In Paṭṭhāna⁶² is not it said?: "the *bhavaṅga* with *hetu* conditions the *bhavaṅga* without *hetu* through *Anantara* condition,"

Let me explain: for a sentient being during his life sometimes the *bhavaṅga* with *hetu* arises and sometimes the *bhavaṅga* without *hetu* arises; thus, there is no difference in the original *bhavaṅga* (*mūla bhavaṅga*); for this reason it is clearly known that in Paṭṭhāna this word, *sahetukaṃ bhavaṅgaṃ*, alludes to the *āgantuka bhavaṅga* which is called *Tadārammaṇa*. Furthermore, being this word, *sahetukaṃ*, is general (*sāmañña vacana*) it should be known that *tadārammaṇa* must be with either two or three *hetus*. But, in the word, *ahetukassa bhavaṅgassa*, it needs only original *bhavaṅga* which arises just after *tadārammaṇa*. And here, too, the word, *Ahetuka*, is general, so any of the two *bhavaṅgas* without *hetu* can be known. Therefore, these two *Ahetuka* persons may have the eight *tadārammaṇas* with *hetu*. Needless to say, the *Duhetuka* persons have the eight *tadārammaṇas* with *hetu*.

It must be answered. In all Commentaries⁶³, it rejects first *tadārammaṇa* with *hetu* to be within *Ahetuka* persons who were born in *duggati*. So it is reasonable that this word, *ahetukassa bhavaṅgassa*, alludes to the *bhavaṅga* without *hetu* which is to the result of merit. True. It is the way of paṭṭhāna to grasp what is possible." Otherwise, it may contradict all Commentaries.

Then, *kusala* can be obtained through effort; so they associate with knowledge through effort during the life-time as well. *Vipakasa* are not like

that. They cannot be acquired by effort; so they do not associate with knowledge if they have no resource of knowledge that is the knowledge of *bhavaṅga* during one's life-time. Therefore, it is reasonable to grasp only the *tadārammaṇa* with *hetu* which does not associate with knowledge in this word, *sahetukaṃ bhavaṅgaṃ*. It is why *Thera* makes his rejection the *tadārammaṇa* to be associated with knowledge within either *duhetuka* or *ahetuka* persons.

However, *Buddhadatta Thera* said: the two *ahetuka* persons have thirty-seven minds apart from the eight *mahāvīpākas* with this idea - "within the two *Ahetuka* persons there arises *tadārammaṇa* which is either equal *to vipāka* which acts as *paṭisandhi* or lower, but not higher than it." ⁶⁴

That contradicts the word of Paṭṭhāna which was quoted before.

The other Commentators say: just as *tadārammaṇa* with two *hetus* arises within those *Ahetuka* persons who were born in *sugati*, so the *tadārammaṇa* with three *hetus* arises within *duhetuka* persons.

That seems to be reasonable. Because, in Commentary⁶⁵ the eight *mahāvīpākas* are said in some places to be within those two persons without distinction.

Tihetuka is so called because they have three *hetus* which arise together with *paṭisandhi*. And they are divided into three according to their plane, *Kāma*, *Rūpa* and *Arūpa*. Or they are nine-fold according to the list of *Phuthujjana* and eight *Ariya* persons.

Of these persons, *Arahantas* do not have the *javanas* of *Kusala* and *Akusala*. Because all *Kusalas* and *Akusalas* have ceased altogether by completely expelling the later mental defilement (*anusaya*). It is true they come to exist dealing with the later mental defilement.

The word, *tatha*, is in the sense of "next point" (*pakkhantaratto*).

The seven *Ariya* persons who are trainee are called *Sekkha*, because

they still undertake to follow the practice. And here needs the three persons who are at the stage of lower *phalas*. It is true within those persons the five *javanas* which are associated with wrong view and doubt are not found because they have already been eradicated at the beginning by only *sotāpatti magga*. And the *javanas* of *dosamūla* are also not found within *Anāgami* persons. Because they are removed by *anāgāmi magga*.

Then, within each of the four persons who are at the stage of *magga* (*Maggaṭṭha*) only the *javana* of *magga*, that is each one's own, is found because *magga* comes to appear for only one thought-moment. And within each of the four persons who are at the stage of *phala* (*Phalaṭṭha*) only the *javanas* of *phala*, that is each one's own, is found because each of the persons who has lower position cannot possess the higher *phalas*, and the lower *Phalas* cannot arise within those different persons each of whom has higher position. In order to explain it *Thera* said: *Lokuttara' javanāni ... labbaanti*.

Especially it should be known here: when higher *magga* was attained the power of lower *magga* completely ceases. So the persons who have higher position becomes different individual.

Now, *Thera* spoke a verse in order to present *vithi citta* which are found as remaining within such and such persons.

Asekkha is those who have nothing to be practiced because they have completed their *sikkhā* practice. It is a term for those whose *āsavas* have been eradicated (*khīṇāsava*).

It is the interpretation: "Within *arahantas*, the forty-four *vithi citta* are possibly enumerated by adding these types of mind - twenty-three *Vipākas* of *Kāma*, twenty *Kriyas* and one *Arahatta phala*. And within the seven persons of *Sekkha*, the fifty-six *vithi citta* are possibly enumerated by adding these:- seven *Akusalas* except those which are associated with wrong

view and doubt, twenty-one *Kusalas*, twenty-three *Vipākas* of *Kāma*, three lower *Phalas* and two *Āvajjanas*. Within the other four *Phuthujjanas*, fifty-four *vithi citta* are possibly enumerated by adding these:- twenty-three *Vipākas* of *Kāma*, seventeen *Kusalas* of *Lokiya*, twelve *Akusalas* and the two *Āvajjanas*.

Puggala bheda is a division of *vithi citta* through the division of persons.

142. All *vithi citta* are found in *Kāma* plane, because there are all sorts of persons and doors in that plane. *Yathārahaṃ* means as fit for this and that plane and person that are available.

The word, *Paṭigha javana tadārammaṇa Vvajjitāni*, is said because the six types of mind out of the sixteen *vithi citta* which must be excluded in *Rūpa* plane will be said in the later sentence.

It is interpretation: In *Arūpa* plane, the *vithi citta* apart from the first *Magga*, fifteen *Rūpāvacara*, *Hasana*, each of the lower *Arūpas* and apart from the *Paṭigha javanas* and *tadārammaṇa* are found. Here, too, the sixteen types of mind out of thirty-eight *vithi citta* which are to be excluded will be mentioned later.

Sabbatthapi: in the all planes of *Rūpa* and *Arūpa*.

Taṃ taṃ pasādarahitānaṃ taṃ taṃ dvārika vithi cittaṇi nal abbanteva: Firstly, in *Rūpa* plane there does not exist the triple sensitive organs at which beginning is 'nose'. So the six *vithi citta* which arise depending on nose, tongue and body are not found within the *Brahma* of *Rūpa* plane who have not these three sensory matters of nose, tongue and body. Referring to this, I spoke before thus: "because the six minds will be said in a later sentence."

Then, in *Arūpa* plane there do not exist the all types of five sensory

matters. So the sixteen *vīthi citta*s as the ten *Vīññāṇa*s, the three *Manodhātus* and the three *Santīraṇas* which arise in five doors are not found. Referring to it, I spoke: "the sixteen minds will be mentioned later."

But in *Kāma* plane, "the state of being those who are devoid of this and that sensitive material quality" must be explained through the persons who are blind by birth, etc.

It is interpretation: on the plane of *Kāma*, eighty minds are found as they are available. On the plane of *Rūpa*, sixty-four minds are found as they are available. And, on the plane of *Arūpa*, forty-two minds are found as they are available.

Especially, there are not undesired objects in *Brahma* world and in the six *deva* worlds. So to say that the four *Akusala vipākas* are found in *Rūpa* plane must be known according to those, who look from *Brahma* world or who come to this world and see undesired sights and hear sounds which exist here.

However, some say: "the *Brahmas*, who come here, meet the undesired objects; so the four *Akusala vipākas* cannot be found in the *Rupa* plane; and there are only sixty types of mind."

That is not reasonable. Because the mind which arises within those, who come here, must be said to be in *Brahma* world; because it arises within *Brahmā*. And it is impossible to say that they do not receive undesired objects here from that world, because *Brahmās* are able to receive objects even far.

Then, *Vibhāvanī* said in order to reject that statement: "it is impossible to say that the undesired object never come into manifestation within *Brahmās* who look at here from there.(p.160)"

By this statement, it consents: those four types of mind which arise within those (*Brahmās*), who look at here from there, are known there. And

those (minds) which arise within those (*Brahmās*), who come here, are known here. That is not reasonable. Because it is clearly known "what arises within sentient beings who are in this and that plane arises in this and that plane."

The word, *iccevaṃ*, etc. is the big conclusion. *Yathāsambhavaṃ* : fits for those which appear in this and that plane, person, door and object.

Bhavaṅgantariṭā means with *bhavaṅga* interval. *Yāvataṅyukaṃ* : upto such time as long as the lifespan starting from the thought-process of life-attachment (*bhava nikaṇṭi*). It implies that the thought-process continues without cessation if there is not the interruption of "the mental cessation (*nirodha samapatti*)".

So far as I have explained 'the exposition of correct meaning' of *Vithisaṅgaha* in the *Paramatthadīpanī*, the fourth Commentary on *Abhidhammattha saṅgahā* comes to end.

¹ D.N. Book 2-13; M.N. Book 3-165.

² S.N.A. Book 2-295

³ See *Vibhaṅga Mūlaṅka*, 22.

⁴ *Yamaka*, Book 2-306.

⁵ *Kathāvatthu*, 156; 157.

⁶ A.N. Book 1-150

⁷ S.N. Book 2-31

⁸ *Dhammasaṅganī*, 162

⁹ *Vibhaṅga*, 84; 200

¹⁰ S.N.A. Book 2-246

¹¹ See *Kathāvatthu*, 156, 157

¹² See *Dhātukatha*, 13

¹³ The way of teaching is threefold: *Yathā parādha*, *yathānūloma* and *yathādhamma*. Of these *yathāparādha* is a teaching in which the offenders are taught according to their offences; *yathānūloma* is a teaching in which the beings with various tendencies are taught according to their intention; *yathādhamma* is a teaching in which the beings confusing *dhamma* and "I". are taught according to the law. (see D.N.A. Book 1-20)

- 14 See S.M.V. 150; Vibhaṅga Mūlaṅkā, 22.
- 15 Ānanda Thera, who is the compiler of Sub commentaries on the commentaries on Abhidhamma treatises.
- 16 See S.M.V. 150 and Visuddhimagga, Book 2-181
- 17 Vibhaṅga 26
- 18 Aṭṭhasālinī, 144; 319.
- 19 Aṭṭhasālinī, 129
- 20 Aṭṭhasālinī, 114
- 21 See Aṭṭhasālinī, 319; 320.
- 22 Aṭṭhasālinī, 323. It is only a word of Aṭṭhasālinī, so it must be "Aṭṭhakathāyaṃ", not "Mahā aṭṭhakathāyaṃ".
- 23 Paramattha vinicchaya (v.116)
- 24 Aṭṭhasālinī, 310
- 25 Paṭṭhāna, Book 1-411
- 26 It is mentioned in Aṭṭhasālinī,(p.310), not the commentary on fānavibhaṅga.
- 27 Aṭṭhasālinī, 116
- 28 Aṭṭhasālinī, 446
- 29 See Mūlaṅkā, Book 1-195
- 30 Paṭṭhāna, Book 1-413
- 31 In Aṭṭhasālinī it says: But to one of great understanding there are two adaptattions, thirdly, adoption, fourthly, Path-consciousness, [then] three fruitional consciousnesses, after which comes the lapse in the (sub conscious) life continuum. To one of medium understanding there are three adaptations, [then] (4) adoption, (5) Path-consciousness, [then] two fruitional [movement of] consciousness, after which is the lapse into the life-continuum. To one of inferior understanding there are four adaptations, then (5) adoption, then (6) Path-consciousness, then (7) fruitional conscioueness, after which is the lapse into the life-continuum. (Aṭṭhasālinī, 275; The Expositor, 311)
- 32 See S.M.P. Book 2-31. There it says: The Appanā arises as only the fourth or the fifth, not the sixth or the seventh due to being near to bhavaṅga which falls down.
- 33 See Mūlaṅkā, Book 1-117. There it says: Gotrabhu is a new javana that arises on a different object. Magga is the same due to being at the different stage.
- 34 Mūlaṅkā, Book 1-117
- 35 Mahāṅkā, Book 2-377
- 36 See S.M.V. 10; S.N.A. Book 1-138
- 37 Paṭṭhāna, A.441
- 38 M.N. Book 3-351
- 39 See A.N. Book 2-247 But it is by the name of Āhuncyaya sutta : Commentary explains: in this sutta it say how to live Arahants for ever. See A.N.A. Book 3-87.
- 40 Paṭisambhidā magga, 390
- 41 Visuddhimagga, Book 1-188
- 42 See S.N. Book 1-446
- 43 Anudīpanī, Subcommentary on the very text, Paramatthadīpanī, by Ledy Sayadaw himself says that The commentary is the commentary on Dhammapada (p.136). But that story is not found in it. Actually it is in Theragāthā of Mahākassapa. verses-1057, 1058, 1059.
- 44 Vibhaṅga, 2
- 45 See Vinaya, Mahāyagga, 272, but a little different.
- 46 Mūlaṅkā, Book 1-134
- 47 Paṭṭhāna, Book 1-133
- 48 Paṭṭhāna, Book 1-134-5
- 49 Paṭṭhāna, Book 1-138-9
- 50 Paṭṭhāna, Book 3-40
- 51 Aṭṭhasālinī, 317-8
- 52 Aṭṭhasālinī, 326-7
- 53 Vibhaṅga, 91
- 54 M.N. Book 1-248
- 55 See S.M.V. 147
- 56 Aṭṭhasālinī, 310. It is said: " But now, if a vivid object is presented, visual or other cognitions arise when adverting by the five doors agitates the life-continuum, and a unit of the first kind of moral consciousness of sensual realm becomes apperception at the stage of apperception, and coming into play six or seven times, gives the turn to registration. (The Expositor, 358).
- 57 Aṭṭhasālinī, 310
- 58 Mūlaṅkā, Book 1-130
- 59 Visuddhimagga, Book 1-149,150
- 60 Visuddhimagga, Book 2-350
- 61 Paṭṭhāna, Book 3-42
- 62 Aṭṭhasālinī, 316; S.M.V. 157; Abhidhammāvatāva (v.215)

⁶³ Abhidhammāvatāva (v.215)

⁶⁴ Aṭṭhasālinī, 307

⁶⁵ S.M.V. 158. It is said : " The volition of demerit conditions the four resultant viññānas, in Rūpa plane, in life-continuity, but not in rebirth. It is also as seeing or hearing undesired object in kāma plane. Indeed, there is no undesired objects, form, etc. in the Brahma world. The same are in the deity world belonging to kāma. "